The Economic Role of Williamsburg

James H. Soltow

August, 1956

Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Library Research Report Series - 0066
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Library

Williamsburg, Virginia

1990

Notice To Readers

The Economic Role of Williamsburg by James H. Soltow was published in 1965 by Colonial Williamsburg, Incorporated, and distributed by the University Press of Virginia as part of the Williamsburg Research Studies series. The following is the original manuscript from which the published version was produced.

THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF WILLIAMSBURG

James H. Soltow
August, 1956

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACEi
TABLE OF CONTENTSiii
LIST OF TABLESiv
I THE WILLIAMSBURG MEETINGS1
II MARKETING AGRICULTURAL STAPLES FOR EXPORT19
The Tobacco Trade20
Major Markets24
Channels of Trade: The Consignment System27
Channels of Trade: The Direct Purchase of Tobacco33
Market Policies47
The Produce Trade57
Major Markets60
Purchasing of Agricultural Produce68
Summary73
III MONEY, CREDIT, AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE75
The Currency Problem76
Currency in Circulation76
Commodity Money79
Paper Money81
Substitutes for Money87
The Credit System91
The Terms of Credit91
Payments on Debt101
Sterling Exchange109
The Bill of Exchange115
Organization of the Exchange Market115
Summary130
IV WILLIAMSBURG AND NORFOLK IN THE VIRGINIA ECONOMY132
The Growth of Norfolk as a Metropolitan Center141
Conclusion147
BIBLIOGRAPHY149
TABLE I: Exports from the Seven Districts of Virginia, January 5, 1772-January 5, 177319
TABLE II: Estimated Value of the Principal Export Commodities of Virginia and Maryland19
TABLE III: A Recapitulation of the Quantity of Tobacco Exported from Virginia, Specified Years, 1619-175819
TABLE IV: Imports of Tobacco, England and Scotland, 1761-177519
TABLE V: Number of Hogsheads of Tobacco Exported From Virginia, 1745-1756, 1768-1769, 1772-177319
TABLE VI: Tobacco Imports, Scotland, Specified Years, 1708-177125
TABLE VII: Tobacco Exports, Upper District of James River, October 25, 1765-0ctober 25, 176625
TABLE VIII: Tobacco Exports, England 1773 and Scotland, 177326
TABLE IX: Estimate of Number of Hogsheads of Tobacco to be Collected at Virginia Stores of William Cuninghame & Company, October, 1772-October, 177347
Table X: Proposed Plan of Shipping of Tobacco of William Cuninghame & Company, October, 1772-October, 177347
Table XI: List of Glasgow Firms & Importations of Tobacco, 1774 47
Table XII: Official Value of Foreign Coins in Circulation in Virginia in the Eighteenth Century78
Table XIII: Official Values of Currency in the Colonies in the Eighteenth Century79
Table XIV: Virginia Bills of Credit, 1755-177383
Table XV: Amount of Cash on Hand and Accounts Receivable at the End of the Accounting Year, William Prentis & Company, Williamsburg, 1734-177594
TABLE XVI: Average Annual Exchange Rates, Virginia Currency on Sterling, 1740-1775116
TABLE XVII: The Course of Exchange, 1764-1773116
Figure I A Typical Exchange Transaction Between Virginia and Great Britain111

PREFACE

The importance of Public Times in Williamsburg is not unknown to those familiar with the life of this eighteenth-century community. People from all parts of Virginia came to the capital four times each year to transact their business as well as to carry on the machinery of government and to participate in the gala social affairs which took place at these times. The purpose of this report is to describe and analyze the role which Williamsburg, through the periodic Meetings of Merchants, played in the economy of Virginia. In other words, the basic questions are: What did businessmen do when they came to Williamsburg, and what significance did their periodic assembling in the capital have in relation to the economic life of the province?

Any study of the economic history of eighteenth-century Virginia touches inevitably upon the relations between merchant and planter and upon the conflict between the business and agrarian ways of life. If any partiality is shown here towards the business point of view, it results in part from the fact that merchants' records were the major sources for the study. However, the emphasis herein is upon the Williamsburg Meeting of Merchants as an institution which developed to meet the needs of business in a decentralized agricultural economy. As long as Virginians produced goods for exchange (as opposed to production for the exclusive use of the producer), some kind of a system of business was necessary to provide the mechanism for exchange.

A word might be said here about the facilities provided to make this study. The original sources which I used are located in widely-scattered depositories from Edinburgh to San Marino, California. However, all of these manuscripts have been made available in Williamsburg v. as a result of the microfilming program of Colonial Williamsburg's Research Department. Unquestionably, this has resulted in a great gain in efficient use of time as well as in convenience.

Finally, I wish to express my appreciation for the cooperation and encouragement extended by Dr. Edward M. Riley, Director of Research, Dr. Richard P. McCormick, special consultant to Colonial Williamsburg, and my colleagues in the Research Department. Thanks also to those who have made available materials at various stages of my research.

Williamsburg, Virginia
August 24, 1956.

THE WILLIAMSBURG MEETINGS

The political role of Williamsburg has been defined rather clearly. In Williamsburg were the institutions of colonial government — the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor as representative of royal authority in Virginia and the Council and Burgesses as representatives of the colony's property owners, as well as the General Court, the highest unit in the province's judicial system. As Carl Bridenbaugh has suggested, the important political lesson of the Williamsburg experience is the story of how a republican form of self-government was developed by an essentially feudal governing class.1

Less definite is the role which Williamsburg played in the economic life of Virginia. Neither contemporary observers nor writers of this century have been able to reach agreement on the significance of the community to the colony's economy. A French traveller in 1765 implied that the town was second in importance in Virginia trade only to Norfolk,2 while St. George Tucker asserted in 1795 that "there never was mch trade in Williamsburg."3 Lyon G. Tyler wrote in 1907 that "the city was the center of the business interests of the colony."4 but Robert W. Coakley concluded in 1949 that Williamsburg's "importance was political not economic."5

2.

The economic role of Williamsburg was indeed different from that of the larger urban centers, such as Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Charleston. Each of these centers was the nucleus of a metropolitan economy, in which the wants and needs of the population of the area were "supplied by a system of exchange concentrated in a large city" which was "the focus of local trade and the center through which normal economic relations with the outside" were maintained.6 Each of these cities was a port for the ocean-going ships engaged in foreign trade; through each were funneled the imports and exports of a hinterland trading area; in each was a business community which collected commodities for export and distributed imported goods.7

Geography, however, was the principal force hindering the growth of a similar metropolitan center to dominate the economic life of Virginia. The presence of the four great tributaries of the Chesapeake, accessible for long distances to most ocean-going vessels, rendered unnecessary the development of a single entrepot to handle the imports and exports of the colony. The James River was navigable by the largest ships of the eighteenth century for a distance of one hundred miles, the York-Mattaponi-Pamunkey for sixty, the Rappahannock for seventy, and the Potomac for 110. Smaller vessels usually could 3. proceed some miles farther to the falls of each river. In addition, there were numerous tributaries, particularly of the James and Potomac, which provided navigation for local craft.8

Jefferson's assertion in 1782 that Virginia had "no ports but our rivers and creeks"9 was more applicable to the situation fifty to seventy-five years previous than to that of his day. The determined efforts of the Virginia government from an early date to foster urban development were thwarted by the Tidewater planters' practice of shipping tobacco and receiving goods at their own landings, which continued through the seventeenth and into the first quarter of the eighteenth century.10

Two developments in the second quarter of the century, though, stimulated an urban growth in Virginia. One was the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1730, which led to the rise of a numerous group of small river towns. Under the terms of this law, planters were no longer permitted to ship tobacco directly from their own wharves but were required to take their hogsheads to public warehouses for inspection and storage prior to shipment. Around these warehouses in the Tidewater area developed communities such as Cabin Point on the James, Urbanna on the Rappahannock, as Dumfries on the Potomac, as businessmen capitalized on the opportunity of trading with the planters when the latter carried their tobacco to the warehouses. Secondly, population expansion into 4. the Piedmont, above the head of navigation, resulted in the need for trans-shipment of goods and produce at the falls of each of the rivers. Warehouses and stores provided the nuclei for the falls towns, such as Richmond on the James, Petersburg on the Appomattox, Fredericksburg and Falmouth on the Rappahannock, and Alexandria on the Potomac.11

Special circumstances contributed to the growth of Norfolk to the position of Virginia's largest city and leading business center by 1775. The growing West Indian commerce, plus a local trade in tobacco and other agricultural products, lumber, and naval stores, provided the basis for the town's economic rise. By the end of the colonial period, Norfolk, located in a strategic position at the entrance to the Chesapeake, held promise of developing into a metropolitan center for the entire Bay area, Norfolk entrepreneurs conducted trade on a large scale and controlled diverse types of enterprises such as distilling and land speculation.12

Geography thus imposed a pattern of commercial dispersion, with only Norfolk possessing more than local trade interests. Since ocean ships could reach all parts of the colony to the fall line, many small centers performed most of the business of their localities.

Although Virginia's economy was decentralized, with each area of the dominion holding direct lines of communication with Britain, 5. Williamsburg provided a focus for the economic as well as the political life of the colony. Williamsburg did not have port facilities, except those for local craft at College and Capitol Landings,13 and its businessmen were concerned largely in the retail and service trades. However, the larger aspect of Williamsburg's economic life centered on the business carried on during Public Times. Four times each year, businessmen from all parts of the colony met at Williamsburg — at the sessions of the General Court in April and October and of the Oyer and Terminer Courts in June and December. Although there was not even an official meeting place, much of the business of the colony was initiated and settled in Williamsburg. Merchants conducted their affairs in the boarding houses, in the taverns, and on the streets. One traveller reported that in the Raleigh Tavern "more business has been transacted than on the Exchange of London or Amsterdam."14 Back of the Capitol was an extension of the Duke of Gloucester street, known as the "Exchange," where financial transactions were made.15

Williamsburg was truly a bustling metropolis during Public Times, when a normal population of about 1,500 expanded to 5,000 or 6,000 people. Lodgings could be obtained only with difficulty. The tavern next to the Exchange, operated by Mrs. Vobe and later by Christiana Campbell, was a favorite because of its location and its 6. reputation as the place "where all the best people resorted."16 However, there were other lodgings, equally desirable, in the area near the Capitol. Mrs. Mary Davis, for example, leased a large brick house a block west of the Capitol, and advertised "12 or 14 very good lodging rooms with fire places in most of them, which will hold two or three beds in each."17 Factors of one of the largest Scottish tobacco firms engaged lodgings here in 1770 and considered renting behind the tavern as a Public Times.18

Not only merchants but also planters were present in Williamsburg during Public Times. Robert Carter of Nomini Hall, for example, made special reference to the fact that he would be unable to be "at Williamsburg this next meeting of the Merchants and Other Gentlemen there."19 As Governor Fauquier pointed out, "persons engaged in Business of any kind constantly attend" the Meetings.

Thomas Nelson called the Meetings of the Merchants "a very busy time."21 A foreign traveller was amazed by the town during Public Times: 7. "In the Day time people hurying back and forwards from the Capitol to the taverns, and at night, Carousing and Drinking."22 There were many diversions for the merchant or planter who spent much of the rest of the year in a relatively isolated location, as he took advantage of the opportunity to witness horse races, cock fights, and theatre performances.23

People travelled to Williamsburg by water and by land. Those from Norfolk had the choice of two weekly packets to Burwell's Ferry near Williamsburg. One boat left Norfolk on Wednesdays and returned on Saturdays, the other sailed on Thursdays and Sundays. Passage cost five shillings, for which "the best accommodations for passengers" were promised.24 Those from the south side of the James rode to Hog Island, where they could stable their horses, and used the ferry across the river.25

Since no formal commercial institutions developed out of the business activity of Public Times in Williamsburg, there is little existing information to indicate precisely how the Meetings of Merchants functioned. Businessmen evidently accepted the Meetings as part of the routine of trade and thought it unnecessary to explain to correspondents exactly what they did at Williamsburg, other than to refer to a specific transaction or item of business. Only when an unusual occurrence took place at a Meeting did a letter-writer see fit to comment at any length 8. on his activities in Williamsburg.

Indeed, there was no formal organization of the Meetings of Merchants before 1769. The rules drawn up in June of that year, though, likely reflect long-established customs and procedures of business. In the Raleigh Tavern, "a meeting of all persons concerned in the exchange and commerce of this country" agreed "to expedite the mode and shorten the expense of doing business" by adoption of the following set of rules:

First. That the 25th days of October and April, and the 1st days of the Oyer courts, shall be the fixed days of meeting in Williamsburg for all persons concerned in the exchange and commerce of this country.

Second. That the time limited for settling the price and course of exchange, and the payment of all money contracts in the General Courts, shall be three days; to begin from the said 25th days of October and April exclusive of Sundays, and in the Oyer courts from the first days of the said courts to the first Friday in the said courts.

Third. That all persons who shall engage for the payment of money, or other contracts, in Williamsburg, in the General and Oyer courts, shall be deemed violators of their engagements, and declared absentees, if not present on the above first days.26

At the Meeting of June, 1770, a Committee of Trade, with 125 members, was organized under the chairmanship of Andrew Sproule, wealthy Norfolk merchant, "to take under the consideration the general state of the trade in this colony." The message issued by the first session of the committee, "To the Merchants and Traders in Virginia," outlined the over-all purpose of the organization:

It has long been a matter of surprise, and concern, to many hearty friends to the trading interest of this colony, that a body of men, respectable as well from their number as the nature and extent of their connexions, should never yet (in imitation of Great Britain, and other trading countries) have formed themselves into a society, upon regular and liberal principles; 9 by which means they would have had frequent opportunities of establishing a confidence with each other, exceeding to their interest as individuals, and of gaining that dignity in the community to which they are so justly entitled.27
The Committee, organized in part to formulate the merchants' policy in the growing controversy between the American colonies and the British government, was similar to the associations formed at about the same time in the other colonies. New York merchants founded a Chamber of Commerce in 1768, followed by those of Charleston, South Carolina, in 1773.28

In the spring of 1771, 168 "principal Merchants" of Virginia subscribed "to an Agreement to meet punctually, for the future," during the General Court sessions in April and October, "and that they expect all those who have any Business with them will meet regularly on these Days."29

Again, in November, 1772, it was "unanimously agreed" by the merchants, assembled in Williamsburg, "to engage to meet, and give our attendance in this city, either in person or by our representatives, in the 25th days of January, April, July, and October." A committee, composed of "a select Number of" the body of merchants and chairmaned again by Sprowle, received power to discipline traders who did not attend the Meetings regularly. If the committee judged the reasons 10 for non-attendance to be unsatisfactory, it was empowered to levy a fine of £5 "which is to be applied to charitable purposes." Names of those who refused to pay fines were to be published, "as Persons who do not pay a proper Regard to their solemn Promises and Agreements." Merchants from all parts of the colony were represented on the committee of twenty-eight members, any twelve of whom constituted a quorum to take action.30

For reasons which will be considered more fully at a later point, even the system of fines and threat of public notice of violators of the rules failed to bring all members of the Virginia business community to Williamsburg at the appointed time of some of the Meetings during the 1770's. In June, 1774, seventy-two merchants found it necessary to state that they had "resolved and are determined, for the future, to meet" in Williamsburg "every 25th day of October and April; of which we give this publick Notice, that those who have Business to transact with us may know when to attend."31

No specific explanation can be given of the origins of the Meetings of Merchants. However, it seems likely that merchants who had legal business, such as suits for collection of debts, made a regular practice of attending the sessions of the General Court in Williamsburg from an early date. Since merchants and planters from all parts of the colony were in Williamsburg together for court sessions, they could use 11 this opportunity to settle accounts, make payments, and buy and sell bills of exchange on Great Britain.

Philip Lightfoot, a Yorktown merchant, described attending the James City County Court twice in 1735 "to receive a Smal[l] bill" for a sum owed him by a New Kent County planter.32 Francis Jerdone referred in 1741 to the market for bills of exchange at Williamsburg: "Bills at present are So plenty & Cash So Scarce."33 In 1749, Jerdone reported that "the Exchange during the last Generall Court got up to 22 ½ for good bills, as there was a greater plenty of Cash in Williamsburg for that purpose than has been for many years past."34 According to Jerdone's letterbook covering the period from 1756-1763, he travelled to Williamsburg in October, 1756, in April, October, and December, 1757, in April and October, 1758, in April, June, October, and December, 1759, in April and October, 1760, 1761, and 1762.35

Very often, comparison of institutions and practices with those in different places and at different times gives greater perspective and meaning. For example, Professor Baxter, in his detailed study of the business careers of the Hancocks, has noted several striking similarities between the methods used by eighteenth-century Boston merchants and those employed by traders of an earlier period in Europe. Particularly in their use of triangular settlements of balances, the 12 Hancocks followed a practice similar to that of European businessmen in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In both cases, a similar reason, the scarcity of money accounted for the practice which was followed.36

Using this kind of approach to our problem, we can see that the Williamsburg Meetings of Merchants resembled in many ways the great fairs of the Middle Ages. Certainly, the Meeting was like the fair in that it was "a periodic meeting-place for a distant clientele and attendance at it did not depend on the density of the local population."37 Because geography hindered the development of a metropolis to centralize trade in Virginia, it was not unusual that business developed some institution to meet its needs, in the way that the medieval fair grew as a facility for trading before the development of the urban exchange.38

At the Meeting, many types of business could be transacted. Although there appears to have been little display and sale of manufactured goods, a major characteristic of the medieval fair, occasional references appear to indicate that some Virginia merchants placed orders for European goods during the Meetings. For example, a Richmond store wrote to a Glasgow firm in 1757 that "we have Received, all the goods we Bought and ordered at the gen[era]l court."39 In 1773, a Norfolk merchant advertised "a large Parcel of KENDALL COTTONS," which had been 13 consigned to him by the English manufacturer. "Any Person inclinable to purchase," the advertiser continued, "will please to apply to him at the ensuing Meeting in Williamsburg."40 A year earlier, a Cabin Point storekeeper advised that those interested in purchasing "the Remains of a Store" could see the invoice and inventory of goods at the next Meeting.41

Merchants who exported Virginia iron products could rely upon placing orders at Williamsburg. A trader located near Richmond pointed out to a Philadelphia correspondent in 1773 that "the Merch[an]ts. … commonly engage the several quantities [of iron) they may want from the Iron Masters who attend there."42 Evidently auction sales of imported commodities were fairly frequent during Public Times. For example, Charles Steuart in 1759 sent part of a shipment of powdered sugar from New York "to W[illiam]sb[ur]g last court in dec[embe]r. to be sold at public sale."43

Although Williamsburg was not a seaport, shippers usually could secure cargo space to most major European ports during Public Times. Ship owners or captains often attended the Meetings to meet merchants for the "Opportunity to commune on Terms of Freight."44 Those with vessels to let on charter also advertised their presence 14 "during the General Court" in Williamsburg to deal with shippers.45 Most Virginia shippers placed their marine insurance directly with underwriters in Britain or in Philadelphia. In 1771, though, a Norfolk businessman opened an "Ensurance Office" where small shippers could order the required insurance; "those who attend the Courts may pay the Premiums" in Williamsburg.46

In a time of slow and uncertain communication, even within the colony, the Meeting provided an opportunity for merchants from different parts of Virginia to confer regarding prospective joint ventures. Most businessmen recognized the danger of risking a substantial amount of their capital in a highly speculative venture such as the slave trade. In the absence of a formal device to spread risks, such as the corporation, merchants worked out agreements for joint capitalization of single ventures of speculative nature.47 "In Consequence of the Conversation we had with you here," began one contract drawn up by Neil Jamieson and five other merchants in Williamsburg in May, 1770, "we hereby agree with you to be each of us concerned in the purchase of a Cargo of Negros to be made in the 15 made in the West Indies."48

More important and fundamental, though, was the growth of the Meeting as a "money market" for Virginia. In the way that a major function of the medieval fair was the clearing of debts contracted at preceding fairs,49 so the Williamsburg Meeting was the occasion for the settlement of credit terms for a wide variety of transactions ranging from the purchase of export commodities to the transfer of title to real estate. It was easier to make personal transfers of payment than to ship money or other means of settlement from one part of the colony to another. Then, too, the man who made a purchase often had to collect a sum due to him before he could make final payment. Also, government offices were available to record transfers of property where necessary, and the court system was at hand to begin proceedings against recalcitrant debtors.

Thus, most terms of payment provided for settlement during Public Times. For example, Robert Carter advised a Dumfries merchant that "whatever Corn or Wheat you Purchase [in the Potomac area] in 16 Consequence of this Order I will pay for att the Assembling of the Merchants att W[illiam]sburg."50 An advertisement of a cargo of slaves stated that "Merchants Notes, payable at the General Courts in Williamsburg, will be received in Payment."51 "One Half of the Purchase Money" of a tract of land in Hanover County, according to another notice, was "to be paid at the next Meeting of the Merchants."52 Notices appeared regularly in the press urging debtors "to make Payment before or at the Meeting of the Merchants."53 Creditors advised that they would be present at the Meetings with lists of debts due.54

As suggested by the rules developed in 1769, one of the most important tasks of the Meeting was to determine, through bids and offers, the rate of sterling exchange, or the value of local currency in terms of British sterling. The rate varied considerably, affected by many factors such as the price level and the volume of imports and exports. Sterling bills of exchange, derived from sales of agricultural products abroad, represented the bulk of the colony's negotiable wealth and were used to pay for the imports of manufactured goods. The Meetings in Williamsburg apparently provided the only active market in Virginia for sterling exchange. Charles Steuart, for example, pointed out from Portsmouth in 1761 that "we seldom can purchase any [bills of exchange] 17 between ye. co[ur]ts."55

Williamsburg, unlike Philadelphia, Boston, and other metropolitan centers of the eighteenth century, was not an assembly and trans-shipment point for the export commodities of the colony. However, as one writer on the Virginia tobacco trade has pointed out, "the one central market was in Williamsburg during the Meetings of Merchants."56 Although the ultimate market for tobacco and other agricultural commodities lay in Europe, the periodic assembling of most of the merchants of Virginia provided an exchange of information regarding colony-wide crop prospects as well as the latest information about prices in Britain and other markets. Traders were able to secure current price quotations on which to make decisions regarding purchases. The Williamsburg Meeting lacked the formal organization of a modern commodity exchange as well as some of its special functions, such as a futures market, but it did seem to fulfill a major objective of an exchange, "to make buying and selling open and competitive."57

To summarize, we might characterize the Meeting of Merchants as an institution developed to meet the need of business for some kind of central system of exchange in a decentralized economy, It contained some elements of a modern exchange as well as many of the characteristics of an older economic institution, the medieval fair. Outlined in the 18 pages following is a fuller analysis of the role of the Williamsburg Meeting in two of its major functions: as a "commodity market" for agricultural exports, which provided the basis of Virginia's wealth, and as a "money market" to mobilize the colony's financial resources.

19

MARKETING AGRICULTURAL STAPLES FOR EXPORT

The economic life of Virginia, like that of the other English colonies in America in the eighteenth century, was based upon agriculture. The surplus products of the plantations and farms were exported to pay for the needed imports of manufactured goods and commodities not produced in Virginia. Table I shows the quantities of the colony's exports to each of the major market areas for 1772. The purpose of this chapter is to outline briefly the methods by which Virginia's commodities arrived at foreign markets.

THE TOBACCO TRADE

Tobacco was the basis of Virginia's economy through the Colonial Period. Despite the growing importance of other economic activities, the tobacco trade still accounted for over three-fourths of the value of exports of Virginia and Maryland in the early 1770's as indicated in Table II.

Table III shows R. A. Brock's estimates of the quantity of tobacco exported from Virginia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while Table IV sets forth David Macpherson's compilations of British imports of tobacco from all sources, 1761-1775.1 Table V indicates the number of hogsheads exported from each of five customs districts in Virginia, 1745-1756, 1769, and 1773. Most statistical

TABLE I — EXPORTS FROM THE SEVEN DISTRICTS OF VIRGINIA, JANUARY 5, 1772 — JANUARY 5, 1773
ProductGreat BritainIrelandSouthern Europe & Wine Is.AfricaW. IndiesCoastwaysTotal
Ashes— Potcwt.66
Pearltons66
Beer, Cyder, etc.bbls.112233
Brass, oldlbs.350200550
BricksNo.8,700111,500120,200
Candles— Spermacatolbs.175175
Tallowlbs.2004501,3001,950
Chocolatelbs.2005,4065,606
Cocoalbs.2,4002,400
Coffeecwt.1818
Cottonlbs.2,4846,6339,167
Featherslbs.5,1925,192
Flaxlbs.1,7721,772
Flaxseedbush.48642,2972,409
Furs— FoxNo.1,8001,800
MinkNo.2525
OtterNo.100100
Furtick[Fustick?]cwt.559559
Gensinglbs.4,6704,670
Gincases55
Grain— Corn, Ind.bush.72,0714,699304,431180,367561,568
Oatsbush.7,8965,41913,315
Ryebush.3002,0472,347
Wheatbush.243,14694,366100,858198,394
Hempbush.5252
cwt.2323
Hidescwt.571571
Indigolbs.2,4232,423
Iron— BarTons961745158
cwt.2722958
Castcwt.88
lbs.8282
Pigtons1,4991541,518
cwt.4444
Wrought-axes-No.221221
Tons4040
Lardlbs.15,45036,23051,680
Leatherlbs.2515,0005,251
Lemons & orangesNo.4848
Logwoodtons.1616
Lumber— boards & planks
Cedarft.1,1001,100
Oakft.48,96448,964
Pineft.30,3598,4952,027,3687,7902,074,012
HandspikesNo.4,1011,272485,421
HoopsNo.9,388158,790168,178
Lock StocksNo.32,06032,060
Oarsft.21,2652,49623,761
ShinglesNo.75,3808,671,66694,6008,841,646
StavesNo.2,681,22078,00053,2602,630,290100,7705,543,540
Timber
CedarTons.11819
ft.326294
Oaktons.557557
ft.8368151
Pinetons.183183
ft.1212
TrunnellsNo.4,10034,103
Mahoganyft.3,6806424,322
Mealbush.546546
Molassesgals.2,0792,079
Naval StoresPitchbbls.1213451197
Tarbbls.21,13885588822,881
Turpentinebbls.1,4112,8948085,113
MastsNo.4949
Oil, Traingals.9494
Ore, Coppertons.22
cwt.1616
ProvisionsBeef & Porkbbls.5,2891,4816,770
Bread & Flourtons.11,193111,4396413,285
cwt.24478104541202
Butterlbs.9104,20029,51034,620
Cheeselbs.200200
Fish-DriedQls.2020
Pickledbbls.63,1838364,025
Hamsbbls.172172
Peas, etc.bush.1,67914,8494,76421,292
Potatoesbush.1,3271,327
Rum-New Englandgals.3,53015,20118,731
West Indiangals.40,47241,012
Saltbush.13,35013,350
Sassafrascwt.9999
Shoesprs.107107
Skins -Bearno.4747
Beaverlbs.1,8501,850
Deer-Dressedno.1,8421,842
lbs.29,69529,695
Rawno.6,0296,029
lbs.144,657144,657
Racoonno.102102
Snakerootlbs.900900
Soaplbs.2009501,150
Stock,Live-Horsesno.55
Sheepno.2020
Poultrydoz.5757
Sugar -Loaflbs.1,7681,768
Browncwt.6803291,009
Tobaccohhds.79,61479,614
lbs.84,755,274147,03636,65584,938,965
Walnut-Black-Boardsft.9,6503,9391,05014,639
Timbertons.46147
ft.9898
Wax -Beeslbs.13,4002,60011,43027,430
Myrtlelbs.1,6001,600
Whalefinslbs.500500
Winetons.44
gals.464336800
Source: North Manuscripts (Bodleian Library)
TABLE II: ESTIMATED VALUES OF THE PRINCIPAL EXPORT COMMODITIES OF VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND, 1773 OR 1774
Tobacco, 96,000 hogsheads, at 8££ 768,000
Indian corn, beans, pease, &c.30,000
Wheat, 40,000 quarters, at 20 s.40,000
Deer and other skins25,000
Iron in bars and pigs35,000
Sassafras, snake-root, ginseng, &c.7,000
Masts, plank, staves, turpentine, and tar55,000
Flax-seed, 7,000 hogsheads, at 40 s.14,000
Pickled pork, beef, hams, and bacon15,000
Ships built for sale, 30 at 1,000 £30,000
Hemp 1,000 tons at 21 £21,000
TOTAL£1,040,000
Source: Harry J. Carman (ed.), American Husbandry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 183. This anonymous work was originally published in 1775 .
TABLE III: A RECAPITULATION OF THE QUANTITY OF TOBACCO EXPORTED FROM VIRGINIA, SPECIFIED YEARS, 1619-1758
YearCrop (in Pounds)
161920,000
162040,000
162155,000
162260,000
1628500,000
16391,500,000
16401,300,000
16411,300,000
168818,157,000
170418,295,000
174538,232,900
174636,217,800
174737,623,600
174842,104,700
174943,188,300
175043,710,300
175142,032,700
175243,542,000
175353,862,300
175445,722,700
175542,918,300
175625,606,800
1757short crop
175822,050,000
Source: Robert A. Brock, "Succinct Account of Tobacco in Virginia," in J. B. Killebrew (comp.), Report on the Culture and Curing of Tobacco (United States Census, 1880, III, Agriculture), p. 224.
TABLE IV: IMPORTS OF TOBACCO, ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND, 1761-1775.
DateEngland (pounds)Scotland (pounds)Total
176147,065,78724,048,38071,114,167
176244,102,49127,339,43371,441,924
176365,173,75231,613,17096,786,922
176454,433,31826,310,21980,743,537
176548,306,59333,889,565,82,196,158
176643,307,45332,175,22375,482,676
176739,140,63929,385,34368,525,982
176835,545,70833,261,42768,807,135
176933,784,20835,920,68569,704,893
177039,187,03739,226,35478,413,391
177158,079,18349,312,146107,391,329
177251,493,52243,748,41595,241,937
177355,928,95744,485,194100,414,151
177456,048,39340,457,589106,505,982
177555,965,46355,927,542111,893,005
Source: Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860 (2 Vols.; New York: Peter Smith, 1941) I, p214. Data were compiled from customhouse records by David Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries, and Navigation… (4 Vols.; London: 1805) III, p, 583.
TABLE V: NUMBER OF HOGSHEADS OF TOBACCO EXPORTED FROM VIRGINIA 1745-1756, 1768-1769, and 1773.
Upper JamesLower JamesYorkRappahannockSouth PotomacTotal
174510,9911,38111,11812,3326,65942,481
174610,7991,37211,01510,7456,31140,242
17479,3551,71812,89512,1325,70441,804
174812,4893,17011,08913,0526,98346,783
174911,5093,15010,97015,0127,34647,987
175012,9742,21813,80214,3315,24248,567
175110,8582,52512,05413,5537,71346,703
175213,5301,42312,62314,2996,50548,380
175318,8302,11315,12716,8156,95959,847c
175413,9001,18114,87813,5127,33250,803
175513,73991815,34411,9635,72347,687
17567,2621,0966,9188,5314,64528,452
1768a15,8601,5045,6689,1055,51239,623d
1769a17,8251,9938,2259,9209,14350,222e
1772a24,900b----8,63414,54910,71665,208f
1773a27,5924,6748,24813,24410,54169,587g
Source: 1745-1756, Edward D. Neill, The Fairfaxes of England and America in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Albany, N. Y.: Joel Munsell, 1868), p. 225.
1768, Jerman Baker to Thomas Adams, January 8, 1769, Adams Papers (Virginia Historical Society).
1769, Virginia Gazette (Rind), November 2, 1769.
1772, Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), November 19, 1772.
1773, Ibid., November 11, 1773. 20 data of the eighteenth century, though, should be regarded with care. Customs valuations were based usually upon traditional rates or were the result of guesswork. Even figures of quantities are subject to the limitation that they record only the goods and commodities which passed through the Customs. Smuggling varied with the rate of duties, which determined the profitability of the practice and with the degree of law enforcement. The extent of smuggling of heavily taxed tobacco is not known, but there is evidence that it was considerable, However, when the limitations of the statistics on the tobacco trade, as well as those on other types of commerce, are taken into consideration, these data do seem to give rough indications of over-all growth and trends. 2

As for the trends shown by these tables, the tremendous expansion of production from 1704-1753 reflects the settlement of the Piedmont.3 The small exports of 1756-1758 appear to have resulted from war-time dislocations. The sharp increase which the data show in British imports after 1771 is questioned by one authority, who comments that the rise "is so sudden as to suggest either a fault in the statistics or some change in trade methods."4

The two principal varieties of tobacco were sweet-scented and Oronoko. The former, grown principally in the sandy loams of the peninsula between the James and York, was distinguished by its round leaf, fine fibres, and mild flavor. Oronoko was coarser, bulkier, 21 and stronger in flavor, and its production more widely distributed through the tobacco-growing areas of the colony. Sweet-scented, which commanded a premium in English markets during much of the seventeenth century, was gradually displaced during the eighteenth century by better grades of Oronoko. Although several subvarieties of the latter were recognized, almost all tobacco was officially classified simply as Oronoko by the latter part of the eighteenth century.5

The quality and quantity of tobacco produced on any plantation depended upon two factors: the type and condition of the soil and the care with which the planter cultivated and prepared his tobacco for market. According to an eighteenth-century authority,

the lands which are found to answer best, in their natural state in Virginia, are the light red, or chocolate coloured mountain lands; the light black mountain soil in the coves of the mountains, and the richest low grounds. Hence has arisen the general reputation of the Virginia tobaccos, and, chiefly, the local reputations of particular tobaccos brought to market: as, for example, James's River tobacco, Tayloe's Mountain Quarter tobacco, &c. which are preferred.6

Since "a Virginian never thinks of reinstating or manuring his land until he can find no more land," the exhausting nature of tobacco cultivation generally required abandonment in three or four years. Although exhausted land returned to timber regained some of its fertility in twenty years or so, it was less productive than new lands.7 One planter among many who were looking to the mountain area for fresh 22 tobacco land, reported in 1771 that those "who have moved from Gloster to Frederick make near 5 times as much as they did down here."8 Tobacco produced on new land was likely to be of better quality than that from a previously worked tract, which was implied by a planter who insisted to a London merchant that "[this tobacco was] made at my Plantation in Brunswick on fresh Land."9

Equally important in producing tobacco of good quality was the method of cultivation, which consisted of a series of tasks which required painstaking care. Each of the processes — seed-planting, transplanting, topping, suckering, worming, and cutting — had to be undertaken at a proper time of growth under precise weather conditions.10 During preparation for marketing, stripping, stemming, and prizing into hogsheads — only long experience could determine whether the plant was in case for the next operation, that is, "in a condition which will bear handling and stripping, without either being so dry as to break and crumble, or so damp as to endanger a future rotting of the leaf,"11 No profit would be derived by the planter who "should blunder in this one point only, then wanted to complete a marketable staple, and become thus involved in a total loss of his whole crop, and have the expences to pay into the bargain, for bringing an unmerchantable article to market."12

Buyers usually were willing to pay a premium for quantities 23 of tobacco cultivated by men of experience and good reputation who worked good lands. This tobacco was then expected to yield a premium in English markets, as indicated by this complaint of an early eighteenth-century tobacco buyer to his English correspondent:

I must make hold to mention a great Evil that I think to be in ye Tob[acc]o. Trade which is in Selling a several persons Tobo. Together to one Man So y[a]t. if mine is never so good beyond the rest I shall have no more for it, than he that owns ye meanest sort in that parcell Altho my Tobo. deservs a penny p[er] lb. more. Therefore earnestly desires my Tobo. may be sold it by. Self without being lumpt of with others. for I am well Satisfyed (for ye Quantity of it) there is not a better parcill of Tobo. Comes from our parts of ye Country and I believe not nigh so good I can assure you the greatest part of it has cost me above 7 £ sterl[ing] p h[ogs)h[ea]d before goeing on Board of the Ship Therefore hopes it may come to a good Mark[e]t. with You to fetch me so much Money to Enable me to give an Encouraging price to those that will take Care to make such good Tobo.13

In order to improve the quality and thus the reputation and price of Virginia tobacco, the inspection law of 1730 required that all Tobacco destined for export be brought to public warehouses, located at convenient points on the navigable rivers, generally about twelve to fourteen miles apart. If the public inspectors, two in number after 1732, approved the tobacco as "good, sound, well-conditioned, and merchantable, and free from trash, sand, and dirt," they were to place an official stamp upon the hogshead and issue a certificate to the planter. Trash was to be burned. The tobacco note, which was a title to the tobacco and changed hands when the planter sold or exported the hogsheads, was accepted for payment of taxes and possessed limited negotiability. Crop notes listed specific hogsheads by mark and number, while transfer notes, representing tobacco brought in loose bundles, 24 entitled the bearer to the same quantity and type of tobacco.14

In spite of some opposition in the 1730's, inspection proved successful in its goal of removing the poorest grades of tobacco from trade, to the mutual benefit of merchant and planter. Occasionally, inspectors were lax, as was pointed out by one merchant to his back- country storekeeper in 1772:

I wish you would discourage your Customers as much as you can with prudence from carrying their Tobo. to Ozburnes Warehouse [as] that Inspection is under a very bad character at present in England, the planters goes out of their way to it on Acc[oun]t. of its being favourable. 15
But another merchant was more optimistic, stating that the inspectors at Aquia on the Potomac "are great villains, but I hope they will soon be turned out."16

Major Markets. According to British law, tobacco was on the list of enumerated commodities, that is, commodities which could be exported only to England. Furthermore, the Navigation Acts required that tobacco, like all colonial products, could be exported only in ships which were built, owned, and manned by English (including English colonial) subjects.17

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, London had out-distanced all outport competitors to become the major British tobacco market. While Bristol still held an important position as distributor in the domestic market, London in 1720 handled at least two-thirds of the tobacco imported by Great Britain.18

However, from the early part of the century, Glasgow began to challenge London's supremacy. The Act of Union of 1707 removed the legal disabilities of Scottish trade with the colonies by placing Scotland within the closed commercial system of Britain. The rapid rise of Glasgow is illustrated in Table VI, which shows tobacco imports of Scotland at specified years from 1707-1775. Scotland's relative growth was even more striking. As late as 1738, the Scottish ports accounted for only ten per cent of total British imports. This rose to 20 per cent in 1744, 30 per cent in 1758, 40 per cent in 1765, and almost 52 per cent in 1769, and declined slightly to 45 per cent on the eve of the American Revolution.19 Table VII shows the destination of the 1765-1766 crop from the upper James, which exported more tobacco than any other district in Virginia.

London merchants were inclined to view Glasgow's growth as the result of lax enforcement by customs officials in Scotland, but whatever merit might have derived from this charge was removed by the Tobacco Act of 1751, which placed more rigid controls on tobacco importations. The most recent interpretation of Glasgow's growth takes into consideration more fundamental factors. In the first place, the route north of Ireland was the shortest and safest route to Virginia. Liverpool

TABLE VI: TOBACCO IMPORTS, SCOTLAND, SPECIFIED YEARS, 1708-1771.
17081,450,000
17152,500,000
17226,000,000
17418,000,000
174310,000,000
174513,000,000
175221,000,000
175324,000,000
176032,000,000
177147,000,000
Source: Jacob M. Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707-1775," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., XI, (1954), p. 180. Data are from T. 1/139/29, C.O. 390/5/13, T. 1/282/23, T. 36/13, T. 1/329 fol. 125, Customs 14, Public Record Office.
TABLE VII: DESTINATION OF TOBACCO EXPORTS, UPPER DISTRICT OF JAMES RIVER, OCTOBER 25, 1765 — OCTOBER 25, 1766
DestinationHogsheads
London2,470
Bristol1,493
Liverpool1,730
Whitehaven1,877
Hull165
Penryn404
Falmouth95
Scotland11,176
Total19,410
Source: Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), January 22, 1767. 26 and Whitehaven, as well as Glasgow, took advantage of this route to expand their colonial trade. Commercial and financial facilities available at Glasgow provided a second advantage. Scotland's banking facilities specialized in mobilizing the credit necessary for the trade. The third advantage, perhaps the most important, was Scottish business efficiency which brought lower operating costs than those of the Londoners. A major policy of the Scots was to cut shipping costs by reducing turn-around time of ships in Virginia. The store system (see below), by which factors and employees purchased cargoes in advance, was one instrument of the Glasgow merchants to obtain more return from capital investment in ships. Furthermore, Glasgow's continued growth after mid-century can be seen as part of "a tendency towards specialization among the outports: Bristol in the West India trade, Liverpool in the slave trade, Glasgow in the tobacco trade."20

From the mid-seventeenth century, when the demand for tobacco in England began to level off, Continental markets expanded to keep pace with the rising production in English America. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Chesapeake colonies were supplying tobacco to all of Europe. Indeed, about 90 per cent of the total tobacco imports of England and Scotland were reexported in the five years 177G-1774.21

Table VIII shows the leading European customers for British tobacco in 1772. Although Amsterdam was an important processing and distributing center for all the Continent in the seventeenth century, European buyers more generally by-passed the Amsterdam market to purchase

TABLE VIII: TOBACCO EXPORTS, ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND, 1773
England (Pounds)Scotland (Pounds)Total
Africa990,873------990,873
Denmark & Norway2,573,284812,6503,385,934
East Country265,019------265,019
East Indies53,915------53,915
Flanders7,150,737-----7,150,737
France7,343,88324,406,24031,750,123
Germany11,953,5771,982,34713,935,924
Greenland1,521------1,521
Holland14,371,83514,629,05029,000,885
Ireland1,855,9234,333,8506,189,773
Italy1,378,156------1,378,156
Madeira100------100
Russia22,048-----22,048
Spain229,722------229,722
Sweden1,076,078------1,076,078
Venice25,209------25,209
Channel Islands825,111------825,111
North America170,51048,446218,856
West Indies94,47425,355119,829
Total50,386,92546,389,51896,776,443
[50,381,975][46,237,938][96,619,913]
Source: Adam Anderson, Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce, revised by Mr. Coombe (6 Vols.; Dublin: P. Byrne, 1790), VI, p. 599. Totals in source were incorrect. Totals in brackets are corrected figures. 27 their tobacco directly in London or Glasgow in the eighteenth century.22 The French played a most important role in the British tobacco market during the eighteenth century. Because tobacco was a government monopoly in France, the agent of the French Farmers General of the Revenue had considerable bargaining power in dealing with the many English and Scottish merchants. Through the use of shrewd market tactics, such as purchasing "successively, and in small Parcels" and playing London against the outports, the French buyer was able at times to control the price to his advantage. Although attempts were made in the 1720's and again in the 1730's to introduce a scheme of direct purchase of tobacco in the colonies for the French, London merchants successfully defeated the proposal, in spite of the contention by proponents of the plan that economies in marketing would reduce the price to the French and at the same time increase the profits of the colonial producer and the British trader.23

Channels of Trade: The Consignment System. When the merchantable tobacco was ready for shipment, there were two principal methods of marketing: the consignment system and the direct purchase system.

28

Those using the consignment method shipped their tobacco to a British merchant who supervised the unloading, paid the customs duties, carted the tobacco to warehouses, and sold the commodity at the best market price. Title was retained by the American consignor, who bore the risks and expences of transportation and marketing. The British commission merchant, acting as an agent in performing the marketing functions, generally received 2 ½ per cent of the gross sales. In addition to selling tobacco, the British merchant attended to many of the other economic needs of the Virginia planter — providing transportation, securing insurance, and supervising the purchase of goods. Each year the account current was prepared, showing net sales of tobacco, after all expenses were deducted, and the cost of goods ordered by the planter.24

Most of the consignment business was centered in London, although some of the outports, principally Bristol, held a share of this type of trade. To transact the selling of 741 hogsheads of tobacco in 1769 required a capital of £6,000 plus the use of £12,000 of borrowed funds, according to the experience of John Norton & Sons, not the largest London tobacco merchants.25 To some extent, the scale of business of the individual consignment merchant was limited by the amount of personal attention which he had to devote to each customer. William Reynolds told George Norton, son of John Norton, in 1774 that he was "really apprehensive the very large quantity he [i.e., John Norton ] had now shipt him must necessarily prevent his paying that 29 particular attention a Man might do with 5 or 600 h[ogs]h[ead]s.26 In Virginia, many of the large planters, who were the most prevalent consignors, consigned not only tobacco produced on their own plantations but also tobacco purchased from small planters and farmers. There were also merchants like Robert Anderson in the early eighteenth century who purchased tobacco for consignment.27

In most cases, the commission merchant maintained an agent or employee in Virginia to solicit consignments. John Hatley Norton, first acting as agent for his father and then as junior partner, spent many days "riding Journeys in such a hot Country, [which] must be very fatiguing."28 Ship captains, too, travelled around the county courts to contact prospective customers. When the English firm did not have its own full-time agent in the colony, it usually retained the services of a Virginia merchant to supervise its business in the colony, particularly the collection of debts. The normal commission for settling accounts and making remittances appears to have been 5 per cent, but Charles Steuart offered in 1751 to transact business for Bowden & Farquhar of London for 2 ½ per cent.29

The most important benefits derived by the consigning planter were the realization of the full market price for tobacco in England and the credit for necessary imported goods. The system, though, rested on mutual trust: that the merchant sold the consignment of tobacco for the best market price and that the planter shipped tobacco in sufficient 30 quantities to cover the cost of the goods which he ordered from England. Many consignors undoubtedly were well satisfied that their English correspondents exerted every effort on their behalf, as in the case of one Virginian who wrote: "I have lost considerably by my last Consignment of Tob[acc]o, but this I know you could not help."30 Considerable understanding of rapidly fluctuating markets in Britain was necessary for this comment:

You seem to be uneasy that you shall not be able to render as good an Acc[oun]t. of Sales for the Tob[acc]o. of last Year as you did for that of the preceeding; but all reasonable Men will make Allowance for the Difference of Circumstances, and the unreasonable are not to be satisfied with any Thing.31

However, all tobacco growers were not reasonable, and it was inevitable that the great distance between merchant and planter would result in some misunderstanding. Some Virginians complained about lack of care in transacting business, as did Robert Anderson in the early eighteenth century:

I find by your Measures to me that row Concerns is not worth Your minding, for I have not been used to be obliged to go to other Men to Know my Affairs till being Concerned with you and I was in hopes your Principles did not allow makeing such differences in Respect to Persons but since I find it is so I desire you to Settle my Acc[oun]t.32
At times, the ship captain was guilty of an oversight in loading tobacco. The master of one of John Norton's ships was the target of this criticism:
I had advised you in my last that I had shipt you six H[ogs]h[ea]ds of Tobacco, and I had actually delivered orders for them, but I find Robinson was kind 31 enough to leave them out, and he has treated Mrs. Chamberlayne in the same manner. I think it strange that your particular Friends should be thus treated, many others complain and I wish it may not hurt your interest with them.33

Many complaints were directed to what the planter regarded as excessive selling charges. The nominal commission of 2 ½ per cent of gross sales actually amounted to as much as 8-10 per cent of the net proceeds, since the commission was levied against all charges and duties. Fixed charges — freight, insurance, primage, wharfage, porterage, lighterage, storage, and customs duties — generally amounted to 75 to 90 per cent of the price to the consumer but sometimes resulted in a loss to the producer. Because these charges varied little whether tobacco prices were high or low, a small percentage change in consumer prices, when shifted back to the produced, made a comparatively large percentage difference in prices received.34

Endless controversies developed over the prices end quality of goods ordered by the planters. If prices were higher than anticipated, or the condition and quality less than perfect, or the goods ordered not precisely what the planter had in mind (whether or not his specifications 32 had been precise), the commission merchant was blamed.35

On the other side, planters were often guilty of overdrawing on their accounts. Some expected excessive advances as a condition of consignment to a particular merchant, as one Virginian observed in the 1770's:

Some people are so very unreasonable in their Expectations to have Money advanced, that it is extremely difficult to avoid giving them Umbrage. The Misfortune is that, if one Merch[an]t. will not comply with their Desires, they fly to another.36

While many of these charges levied by both sides were true and the causes of the complaints valid, most planters overlooked the basic factors. As one recent writer has pointed out:

Much of the criticism directed at the merchants resulted from wistful refusal or inability to perceive that fundamentally market conditions could not be controlled by either the merchants or the planters. In making whipping boys of unreliable merchants, the planter succeeded in glossing over other important issues. Among them was the evident fact that in Virginia overproduction was chronic. The demand for tobacco could grow only as the taste for tobacco became more widespread, new markets were exploited, and the population of Europe increased. All of these things came during the eighteenth century, but in the meantime Virginians produced for potential, rather than actual markets.37

Although the consignment system was used almost universally in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, by the 1750's it 33 accounted for only about one-quarter of Virginia's tobacco exports.38 James Parker, Norfolk merchant, may have exaggerated in 1770 that "the trade of Consigning Tob[acco] to the London Merch[an]ts seems to be nearly at an end,"39 but it does seem that by the 1770's most of the consignment business was carried on from the older declining Tidewater area of the colony.

Channels of Trade: The Direct Purchase of Tobacco. Under the direct purchase method, in contrast to consignment, title to the tobacco passed from the producer to the agent or employee of a British firm, which assumed the responsibility, risks, and costs of shipping and marketing the produce in Great Britain.

As indicated previously, settlement of the Piedmont resulted in a great expansion of tobacco production and in new marketing problems, since ocean-going ships could not navigate into the region. However, London merchants, who controlled much of the consignment trade of the Tidewater, were reluctant to pursue vigorously the business of this new area. Virginia merchants, as well as those from the English outports, lacked sufficient capital to expand operations. Into this situation stepped the Scottish merchants to take advantage of a potentially lucrative commerce. "They were not accustomed to the specialization in trade that characterized the English mercantile enterprises, so they could adapt themselves to the demands of the Virginia situation 34 more readily than could most English merchants."40

Many of the early Scottish traders were travelling merchants. Indeed, they were often called the "Scots peddlers." Each venture appears to have been financed and organized separately by groups of merchants, who appointed one of their number as supercargo to supervise the sale of goods and the purchase of tobacco.4l

By the 1730's, a more permanent organization was in operation. Stores were located at likely trading locations; here the factors42 the Glasgow firms supervised the purchase of cargoes of tobacco and sold the goods shipped out from Britain. The fall line towns, where trans-shipment of goods to and from the Piedmont took place, became centers of Scottish mercantile activity. Factors operated stores in such places as Alexandria, Richmond, Fredericksburg, Falmouth, and Petersburg. Elsewhere Scots became entrenched in Norfolk and in the Northern Neck.43 Although the Scots were most important in the direct purchase method, some English firms operated in this manner. Roger Atkinson of Petersburg purchased tobacco for the Lydes of London, and Harry Piper of Alexandria for Dixon & Littledale of Whitehaven.44

35

Factors received a commission, usually of five per cent on tobacco purchased and ten per cent on goods sold. Many, like Francis Jerdone in Louisa County, also engaged on their own account in other types of business such as the West India trade and sometimes speculated in consignments of tobacco which they purchased.45

By the 1760's and 1770's, tobacco purchasing became a large-scale business, as several Glasgow firms established extensive chains of stores. The Cuninghame interests, the largest by 1774, operated seven stores in Maryland and fourteen in Virginia, the latter located at Richmond, Amherst, and Rocky Ridge in the upper James valley, at Petersburg, Cabin Point, Mecklinburg Courthouse, Brunswick Courthouse, and Halifax on the south side of the James River, at Dumfries on the Potomac, at Falmouth, Fredericksburg, Fauquier Courthouse, and Culpeper in the upper Rappahannock valley, and at Caroline Courthouse.46 Companies controlled by John Glassford, another of the leading Glasgow "Tobacco Lords," operated stores throughout Maryland and Virginia, including those at Quantico, Dumfries, Fredericksburg, Falmouth, Colchester, Cabin Point, Rocky Ridge, Boyd's Hole, and Alexandria.47

Administration of a chain of stores required more organization than did maintenance of a connection with a single factor or even several 36 factors. In charge of the American operation was a chief factor — sometimes a partner, as was Neil Jamieson, who supervised the Glassford stores in Virginia. Jamieson, in addition to his duties as chief factor, engaged in an extensive trade to the West Indies and southern Europe on his own account.

The chief factor was alert to locate new stores in likely places to attract customers. James Robinson, chief factor in Virginia for William Cuninghame and Company, indicated some of the strategy involved in store location in his instructions to the manager of a newly established store at Culpeper Courthouse:

The more immediate motive for fixing this store was to be a Check on Mr Lawsons transactions at this store in the little fork of Rappahannock & to prevent any Other Company occupying a situation at the Courthouse, which appears to your employers a suitable place for a Settlement being in a Good Tobacco County and in the Center of the County.48
The new storekeeper, though, was cautioned not to deal with people "who are Allready Customers to their [i.e., the Companys] Frederick[sbur]g or Falmouth Stores as they Can gain no additional Int[e]rest or influence by such." He was further instructed to build up his trade "with As little noise and parade as possible for fear of Alarming others, and puting them on the same scheme before the store is well established."49

A similar element of business strategy in store location is shown in this communication from Leedstown factor to a London firm:

There is now a Scotch Store fixed within about 6 Miles of Leeds, the principal director has been pleased to give out that he has done it purely to take away the large Custom [of] your store at Leeds and to try if you have money to Carry on & support the Trade — This I think is a very [b]add declaration — I have it now in my power 37 to fix a store at a good Wareho[use] on Poto[mac] about 6 Miles above this Gentleman, w[hi]ch I am determined to do.50

Each store was in charge of a salaried manager. Probably representative were the arrangements made by James Robinson in hiring storekeepers for the Cuninghame stores. For the management of the Culpeper store Robinson agreed to pay £60 sterling annually for a period of five years.51 At Petersburg, where operations were more extensive, an experienced storekeeper received £80 sterling the first year, £90 the second year, and £100 annually for the remainder of the five year term.52 In addition, the storekeeper was allowed living costs and an expense account. Alexander Blair expected to receive £20 "yearly for Incident Charges" in the operation of the Glassford store at Fredericksburg.53

The storekeeper was expected to devote all of his time and energy to the operation of the store. Contracts usually provided that the storekeeper

be debarrd from all manner of Trade whatever directly or indirectly on his own account or on any other account than his constituents whose business of every kind he is to execute to the utmost of his ability as directed from time to time.54
38 James Robinson, in dismissing the manager of the Cuninghame store at Fauquier after the latter's marriage, maintained that the Company "cannot agree to be served by a married man, if a single one can be got, thinking the former must often be necessary call'd from their Business by his family affairs."55

The storekeeper was advised "Strongly from forming Acquaintance with the Idle and profligate part of your County." If business affairs did not keep the storekeeper busy, "any Intervall may be filled up much to his Improvement, by read[in]g Good Authors who Generally prove the best friends."56 James Robinson promptly dismissed his storekeeper at Dumfries, who "gave a loose to dissipation" by "a purchase … of a Servant Girle which he kept for some time; and gaming to excess."57

In most cases, the post of storekeeper seems to have been filled by a young Scot. David Ross's sentiments probably reflected those of other merchants, who avoided hiring an American:

from the manner of Educating the Youth of this Country, there [sic] untoward disposition & reluctance to confinement & drudgery induces me to intreat you not to Employ any more of them unless it be as a temporary assistant. I see from repeated experience that after a man has been at much pains with them & might reasonably expect he had so moulded their dispositions as to act & think like himself, he is at once disappointed & finds after all he cannot deppend on them as their heads at that time a day are generally bent another way & they have too many passions to sacriffice before they can be serviceable to any man — I speak in general terms — there are exceptions —58
39 Some claimed that the large Scottish firms followed a policy of nepotism, as indicated by this comment on locating a position in Virginia for a young man: "I was in hopes this afternoon to have got him fix1d on York River in a very extensive & broad new Concern, but when the budget was open'd, an advocate appeard for the Supra Cargoes brother, which you may easily believe prevaild."59

Many believed that the road to wealth and success in business began with employment as a storekeeper for a tobacco firm, but James Parker, wealthy Norfolk merchant, disagreed. In discussing a suitable position for a young nephew of a friend in Scotland, Parker pointed out his belief that unless the young man "had a Sufficienty to purchase a small Share of one of those concerns after he had Served 4 or 5 Years in the business the Chance is against him" succeeding. Parker did not have fond memories of his own period of employment in the organization of Alexander Spiers, "the Mercantile God of Glasgow," "I was a factor, & had I been a third or fourth Cuzin to Some of the principalls, I suppose, with a patient, dilligent, Saving & Subservient disposition, I might have jogged on in a State of dependance to this day."60

In addition to the storekeeper, one or more clerks or assistants were employed in the operation of the store. Wages probably varied greatly according to experience. Neil Jamieson engaged a clerk, evidently one with some experience, for his store at Boyd's Hole at an annual salary of £40 sterling.61 A beginning clerk might receive as little as £5 per 40 year, plus room and board, although annual increases were provided in this case to bring the salary to £25 in the final year of a five year contract.62 Since clerks might be eligible for promotion within the organization, managers of the Cuninghame stores were directed annually to "transmitt [to] the Company the Names of the Assistants under your directions; the time they have Served with their Characters & Capacitys in the most Impartial manner."63

Negro slaves were used for work around the store. James Robinson employed fourteen slaves in the operation of the Cuninghame store at Falmouth: five as house servants, one to load and unload ships, one as carpenter, four to man a sloop, and three as crew of a schooner.

Although the early stores were probably strictly utilitarian in architecture and furnishings, many of those of the 1770's were elaborate affairs. The Cuninghame store at Fredericksburg was valued in 1775 at £1,700, not including the goods in stock or slaves.65 Arthur Morson estimated the value of the Falmouth property, consisting of a storehouse and more than one warehouse, which he used to conduct the business of the Glassford firm, at £440.66 In 1774, Neil Jamieson 41 considered leasing, as a site for the Glassford store, property at Cabin Point which included a dwelling, a two story store building and counting house, kitchen, slave quarters, smoke house, stable and carriage house, pasture, and "a Large new Granarie," for an annual rent of £50 local currency.67 When a company undertook trade in a new area, "Houses on Rent will answer better than to build for some time, untill it was known if the Trade turns out well."

Total operating costs of stores varied greatly, of course, but an account of costs of one of Neil Jamieson's stores in Pasquotank County, North Carolina, a produce rather than a tobacco area, does indicate something of the break-down of expenses. Of the total amount of £300 spent for store operation in 1772, the sum of £150 represented the "Board Wages &c" of Matthias Ellegood "to Carry on the Management of a Store at his house," £20 "a Young Mans Board &c," £10 for a Negro, £40 for "Buying and sending 2 horses," £40 for the use of storehouses and carts, and £40 for "Victuales [and] liquors in the House on the ocasion through the year for Customers &c."69

The primary purpose of the store system was of course to purchase tobacco, but it was necessary for the storekeeper to keep on hand an assortment of European goods and West Indian commodities. The greater the assortment of goods, the more likely was the storekeeper to attract customers. One factor, who operated a store at Leedstown, complained 42 to his employer: "I hope you do not intend these goods as a proper supply of Fall Goods for y[ou]r. store, if you do, your Customers must go to some other Merch[an]t."70 A backcountry storekeeper, in Mecklinsburg County, wrote to Neil Jamieson:

The many Stores in the neighbourhood which of consequence causes a rivalship oblidge me to keep a better assortment both of European & W[est] India Goods than what I would else do — Let me beg of you to send the Sugar as expeditiously as in your power & [as] good of its kind which will stop the murmering of the people.71
The storekeeper might have to accept wheat, corn, and other commodities besides tobacco, but these were to be regarded as "but Secondary & Subservient objects to that article."72

The chief factor corresponded regularly with his storekeepers, informing them of tobacco prices in Europe and in other parts of the colony and reminding them to prepare their semi-annual schemes, or orders, of goods in June and December. In addition, he made periodic personal visits to each of the stores and saw many of the storekeepers at the Meetings of Merchants in Williamsburg.

Each storekeeper was expected to keep the chief factor and the principals in Britain regularly informed of local developments. Adam Fleming, who operated the Glassford store at Cabin Point, wrote to Neil Jamieson:

You think I dont writt you So frequently as I Should do, but I ashure you it is not through any neglect for at Present there is nothing to be purchased at all and my 43 whole Study is to get the goods Disposed of to Good People which I Shall Indeavour to do as far as lys in my power.73
Jamieson was probably a particularly demanding taskmaster. Arthur Morson, his storekeeper at Falmouth, commented that "in your next letter you will blame me for neglecting something or other & for the life of me I cannot recollect anything further to add."74

Storekeepers were advised to

be Generous easie affable and free to your Customers pointed and exact in fullfilling your engagements or even your most trivial promises by these methods you will ingage their esteem regard & Confidence and on this plan allone a large and extensive trade can be aquired and Carried on.75
Neil Jamieson gave similar advice to his young nephew, who was loading a ship for Europe:
I hope youl be careful to be as Obliging as in Power, to the Gentlemen in Shipping of the Cargo, dont by any means stand on triffeles to Carrie any dispute, … To be obliging and good Naturd always gains friends & Esteem, but to act a Contra part, w[il]l. be hind[er]ing you[r] Self and us to[o], be not too pr one to Pas[s]ion, weight a mat[t]er the[o]roughly before you venture to dispute, and even if you are right, do not glory too much in having the advantage, Young People are too fond of such things but as you are cautioned, I hope you['l]1 be on your guard, and shun the Rack that many young men has Splitt upon.76
However, if the storekeeper held "too great an Intimacy with any" of the customers, it "may be attended with bad consequences." 44 Visiting at planters t houses, James Robinson felt, gave them "a pretence of takin[g] great libertys at the Store,"77

The individual storekeeper was responsible for carrying out the policies formulated by the company in Britain and by the chief factor in Virginia. Every storekeeper had to act "pointedly to Orders, indeed if we do not there must be an end of all Business, as they [i.e., the Cuninghame firm in Glasgow] cannot be in any Settled State of Business at home or know what to depend on, If we act at Random."78 The chief factor generally instructed the storekeeper in regard to tobacco price limits, which were based in turn upon information sent to him from Britain. However, successful operations depended also upon the proper pricing of imported goods and prompt collection of debts owed to the store. The storekeeper thus had to know the debt- paying habits of each planter in his neighbourhood and to attend regularly the county courts in the area in which he did business. Goods generally were priced in local currency in terms of an advance over sterling cost; that is, goods which cost £100 sterling in Britain would be priced at £175 in Virginia currency if the advance was 75 per cent. This advance covered the difference in value between local currency and sterling, freight, handling charges, and a profit to the merchandizer. The rate of advance usually varied with the rate of sterling exchange in Virginia and with competitive conditions in an area, but the store-keeper had some leeway in the pricing of individual articles, as these instructions to a new manager of a Cuninghame store show: 45

You are pretty well Acquainted with the general advance laid on goods here, In pricing the present ones you must view the prices your Neighbour setts at, and in regulating prices great regard must be had to the quality of the goods, as you Know goods of the same Cost will not Allways bear the same advance, and some species of goods will bear more than others, the cost therefore must not entirely govern you in the price, judge the Quality therewith and from thence construe what they will bring, In your sales bear in mind that every person ought not to have goods on the same terms It would be unjust as well as imprudent that those people who pay reedy money or Tobacco, Or those on whom you Can depend will make regular payments once every year to the Amount of their dealings should pay as much for Goods As some others, for whom you may advance sums of money, or who it may be supposed Cannot make regular payments, But you must take Care that these Differences in ye prices be as little Known as possible.79

The salaried manager as well as the independent storekeeper had many routine tasks to perform. James Robinson directed his storekeepers in this way:

In the first of September Annually you are to take an exact Inventory of all the Goods & Effects under your Management, and to Shut the old & begin a new Sett of Books; transmitting to your Constituents as Early as may be in your power thereafter, and not latter than the first day of Feby following. Copy of said Inventory list of Outstanding debts due to & by the Store, Account Current founded thereon also Copy of your Cash Acctt, proffitt & Loss, or Intrest Acctt, and that of Charges of Merchandize, and any other paper, Book, or Account which may be required80

In preparing their books, storekeepers were guided by the best accounting practices of the eighteenth century. "The saving of time or the reducing of clerical labor seems not to have been greatly considered," comments one authority.81 The waste book recorded daily transactions as they occurred. These entries were then transferred 46 to the journal, where they were expressed in terms of debit and credit, and then to the ledger, Here were collected the several items bearing on each account, placed so that the opposite parts of every account appeared on opposing sides of the folio. Since the principal purpose of the storekeeper in maintaining records was to keep track of debtors, and creditors, the most important and most detailed ledger entries were accounts receivable and accounts payable. Profits and expenses were determined from merchandize and commodity accounts. At the completion of the accounting year, profits and expenses were closed into a profit-and-loss account for determination of a "net profit." It should be noted, though, that merchants, in arriving at this "net profit", did not usually take into consideration overhead items such as depreciation on property. Eighteenth-century business did not make effective use of accounting devices as administrative tools.82

A principal responsibility of the Chief factor was to coordinate the activities of all of the stores. Since a primary consideration of the Scottish system was to have tobacco ready for prompt loading so as to keep turn-around time of the ships at a minimum, Robinson early in the marketing season of 1772-1773 carefully prepared an estimate of the collections at all of the Cuninghame stores in Virginia and then forewarned a proposed plan of shipping to 47 Glasgow.83 The estimate and the plan are shown in Table IX and Table X.

The Scottish store system required, in addition to a complex organization, a considerable investment of capital. Eleven of the Cuninghame stores in Virginia were valued in 1775 at £11,450 sterling, not including goods, slaves, small craft such as flats, sloops, and schooners, and wagons and horses.84 The Cuninghame firm also owned and operated at least six ocean-going ships for the Virginia trade alone, as the proposed plan of shipping shows.

Needless to say, these firms carried on an extensive business, as is indicated in Table XI, which shows the amounts of tobacco imported by each of the forty-six Glasgow firms in 1774. The size of the importations ranged from over 6,000 hogsheads by Alexander Spiers & Company to eight by James Baird, Sr. It should be noted that William Cuninghame & Company and Cunninghame, Findlay & Company had common partners, which made the two firms really one enterprise.85

Market Policies. The structure of the tobacco market was complex. Tobacco prices, like those of other agricultural commodities, fluctuated widely. Ultimately, the price which could be paid in Virginia depended upon the demand in Europe balanced against the world-wide supply. The amount of tobacco produced in Virginia was determined by weather conditions as well as by the decisions of thousands of individual producers as to how much tobacco to plant.

All of the factors affecting supply and demand had to be

TABLE IX: ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF HOGSHEADS OF TOBACCO TO BE COLLECTED AT THE VIRGINIA STORES OF WILLIAM CUNINGHAME & COMPANY, OCTOBER, 1772—OCTOBER, 1773, MADE BY JAMES ROBINSON, CHIEF FACTOR.
Total (Hhds)RappahannockPotomacJames
Falmouth, Fauquier, Culpeper1,420870550
Fredericksburg1,1001,100
Dumfries750750
Cabin Point, Brunswick, Granville550550
Petersburg, Halifax, Mecklinburgh880880
Rocky Ridge900900
Richmond350350
5,2501,9701,3001,980
Source: James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, October 18, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
TABLE X: PROPOSED PLAN OF SHIPPING TOBACCO OF WILLIAM CUNINGHAME & COMPANY, OCTOBER, 1772-0CTOBER, 1773, MADE BY JAMES ROBINSON, CHIEF FACTOR. [HOGSHEADS]
ArriveRappahannockPotomacJames
Cochrane via Havre de GraceDec.460
Janett via FranceDec.390
Cuninghame straight outDec.500
Neptune [with] goodsApril460
Venus [with] goodsApril450
Ocean [with] goods
[from] LondonApril560
CochraneJune460
CuninghameJune500
NeptuneSept.460
VenusSept.450
OceanSept.560
1,9701,3001,980
Source: James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, October 18, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
TABLE XI: LIST OF GLASGOW FIRMS AND IMPORTATIONS OF TOBACCO, 1774.
Name of FirmHogsheads Imported
Alexander Spiers & Co.6,035
John Glassford & Co.4,506
Wm. Cunninghame & Co.3,881
Dinwiddie, Crawford & Co.2,141
John Hamilton & Co.1,967
Oswald, Dennistoun & Co.1,701
Henderson, McCaul & Co.1,587
Colin Dunlop & Son1,455
Cunninghame, Findlay & Co.1,290
Bogle, Somervill & Co.1,270
John Ballentine & Co.1,245
James Donald & Co.1,264
John McCall & Co.1,233
Buchanan, Hastie & Co.1,085
John Alston & Co.1,013
James Ritchie & Co.903
John McDowall & Co.790
Scott, Donald & Co.657
James Brown & Co.638
Dreghorn, Murdoch & Co.502
Jamieson, Johnston & Co.492
Wm. Donald, Junr., & Co.485
Dunlop, Crosse & Co.423
Geo. and Andw. Buchanan & Co.403
McCall, Dennistoun & Co.434
Ramsay, Monteith & Co.392
William Gray & Co.389
James and Robert Buchanan364
Thomson & Snodgrass329
Thomas Dunlop & Co.300
McCall, Smellie & Co.270
Charles Reid190
James Gammell & Co.137
Alexander Donald & Co.109
William Coats100
Andrew Sym & Co.100
Andrew Brown99
Hugh Wylie & Co.79
Cun, McKenzie & Co.67
Baird, Weir & Co.55
Simon Brown48
Baird, Hay & Co.41
John Rowand & Co.39
Hugh Wylie17
Andew Hannah & Co.10
James Baird, Senr.8
Total imported40,543 Hhds.
Source: [James Gourlay], A Glasgow Miscellany: The Tobacco Period in Glasgow, 1707-1775. (n.p., n.d.), p. 26. 48 considered in determining a price which could be paid for each kind of tobacco. Correspondence by letter was the only means by which information could be conveyed. Letters to England contained detailed information of the condition of growing crops and estimates and revisions of estimates of future crops based on changing weather conditions at any particular stage of the crop year, as well as news about the activities of competitors. Letters from England referred to current market conditions and to the prospects for future changes, and particularly to the policy of the French buyers who had considerable leverage in the British tobacco market.

Seemingly it should have been a simple matter for the British merchant to set an upper limit at which his factors could purchase tobacco, count on his factors to exercise shrewdness to obtain tobacco for as much under the limit as possible, dispatch his ships to carry the tobacco to British markets, and then sell his cargoes at a profit. However, there were many problems which intervened to upset his most confident expectations, the most important of which was communication. Because communication was so slow and poorly organized, information regarding market and crop conditions was always outdated and often disregarded or at least discounted.86 Francis Jerdone, discussing the prospective short crop of 1758, told his London correspondents: "I know it is a very common thing with the Merchants at home to pay little regard to the advice sent from this [place] about the Shortness of Crops."87 A decade later, one of the large Scottish firms in London, in reply to information about a short crop in Virginia, 49 pointed out: "The prices here have not yet advanced as the People here have suffered so often by false Reports of a short Crop or rather false Prisages of one that nothing but a real Scarcity will affect this Market."88 It seemed at times that Virginians, too, disregarded market advices from Britain. David Ross maintained in 1772 that tobacco could "be purchas[d] on better terms in England then here."89 A similar sentiment was expressed a few years earlier by another buyer, who felt that "the price of [tobacco] here is so high that I have not any hopes of yr. market being equal to it."90 Francis Jerdone summed up the problem in this way: "The low prices of tobacco with you & the high price here are both discouraging to ship tobacco to your market."91

Actually, the tobacco trade revolved around the Meetings of Merchants in Williamsburg and the meetings of the county courts. At Williamsburg, all of the available information on market conditions could be analyzed. Here, buyers and sellers were able to determine over-all crop prospects and to compare data on conditions at the major markets in Britain, For example, Francis Jerdone, who operated a store in Louisa County, knew well the crop situation in the area drained by the York River and its tributaries, but he could report from Williamsburg that "by all information I can get here, tobacco is as scarce every where as on York River."92 After balancing the probable size and quality 50 of the Virginia crop against the latest advices from Britain, merchants and planters began to buy and sell a little tobacco. When these opening prices were accepted by any considerable number of buyers and sellers, the price was said to be "broke," or to have become the prevailing market price.93 Merchants usually referred to this price established at the Meetings as the "Court price,"94 The importance of the trading at Williamsburg is well illustrated by comments of Virginia merchants. James Robinson pointed out that "there will be no certain price untill we return from the Generall Court,"95 Roger Atkinson informed his English employer: "When I return from ye Octo[ber] Court, I can acq[uain]t you fully of ye Crop."96 Individual deals were then concluded at the county courts and at the stores with reference to the price prevailing at the last Williamsburg Meeting.

There was, of course, no one price for tobacco throughout Virginia, because of the differences in types of tobacco produced. Robinson reported in April, 1773, that the price of tobacco was 14 shillings per hundred pounds on the Rappahannock and Potomac, 16 shillings at Petersburg, and 18 shillings on the upper James.97 Quality varied not only between regions but between individual producers as well, 51 so that recognized makers of a good product received a premium above the market price.98 Prices in a local market varied, too, depending upon the number of ships which arrived in the river.99

There seems to be little substance to the charge of the planters that merchants succeeded very often in buying tobacco "at their [i.e., the merchants'] own price," which they fixed at a "shamefully low" rate.100 At times, merchants did form "gentlemen's agreements" to hold the price line to a definite limit, but the number of competing buyers was sufficiently large that these agreements did not remain in effect long. For example, James Robinson reported in 1772:

When we got home from Williamsburg all the Merchants of the Town [i.e., Falmouth] in Consequence of a previous meeting for that purpose went to Frederick[sbur]g to endeavour to persuade the other purchasers there to abide by the price of 18/ p hundred; … In my Opinion we ought to have Succeeded here, but the Merchants of Frederick[sbur]g thought otherwise.101
Attempts to enforce price limits usually failed because of the refusal of one or two merchants to comply. Robinson wrote from the Meeting of April, 1773, that "by Generall convent we have fallen in the price 52 of Tobacco."102 Harry Piper, though, pointed out a little earlier that "the misfortune of this Trade is, we are too much subjected to the caprice of a few, because there are too many purchasers pushing one another."103

In order to solicit business, newly established merchants often offered a price above the market rate. William Allason followed this practice when he entered business in 1760, although he denounced it when it was used by others in later years.104 Robinson summed up the competitive situation in the Fredericksburg-Falmouth area in 1769 in this way:

I am much afraid the price given for these Collections will be extravigantly high from the new Stores fix'd here and at which last place since you was there Mr. James Robb has opend Store, It is Rumor'd that Mr Briggs Offered 25/ p Cwt to the planter and 6 d p Cwt more than any person here will give, It this is the truth judge what will be our Condition105

Another practice showing the extent of competition was that of granting the "rise of the market." Under this arrangement, the merchant who bought tobacco early in the season agreed to pay the planter the top price paid for his particular type of tobacco in the area at any time during the marketing year. Merchants denounced this custom as excessively speculative, but their attempts to curtail the practice were unsuccessful.106 Francis Jerdone pointed 53 out that "the planters will not sell on any other terms, than an assurance of the highest price that is given during the market: which hard times, necessity, & mean a real Scarcity of the commodity compells me to agree to."107 Harry Piper described in this way the circumstances under which he gave "the rise of the market:" "You see he gave me long Credit, w[hi]ch was an Inducem[en)t, & [I] could never have conceiv'd it would be so high."108

Tobacco buying had many aspects or "angles." The storekeeper might agree to pay in cash, in bills, or in goods, or in some combination of these. Since money was scarce and a profit was made on the sale of goods, the purchaser tried to limit as much as possible his cash outlay for tobacco. Indeed, one Glasgow merchant maintained that the profit on the sale of goods made it worth while to purchase tobacco in Virginia with goods even when the tobacco sold at a nominal loss in Scotland.109 On the other hand, William Johnston claimed that he "Endeav[o]r[ed], to deal as much in ye mon[e]y way as I can tobacco commonly being much cheaper purchased that way."110 Generally a higher price was given when the seller agreed to use the amount to purchase goods or to pay for goods previously bought on credit. Thus one merchant found in 1773 that "at Richmond they give 18/ in discount of the Store debts & 16/ & 16/8 has been given Cash."111 In other words, the planter who 54 sold his tobacco for cash received 16 shillings/8or 16 shillings pence per hundred pounds, while the man who used his tobacco to pay for goods in the store received 18 shillings in merchandise.112

Usually some cash was necessary in order to attract sellers to the store. Therefore, factors and storekeepers were empowered to draw bills of exchange on their employers at the Meetings of Merchants. The proportion of cash varied with the specific position of the planter — those with top quality tobacco could sometimes exact all money — and with the competitive situation in the particular area. During the depression of 1772-1773, William Cuninghame & Company limited sharply the proportion of cash used to purchase tobacco in their stores, to 20-25 per cent of the value of remittances on the Rappahannock and Potomac, to 25-33 per cent at Cabin Point and Petersburg, and to 33-50 per cent to Shockoe and Rocky Ridge.113

Even when cash purchases took place, actual money did not always change hands. Bills of exchange payable at the next Meeting of Merchants were used for all or part of large transactions. Francis Jerdone reported to his employer on his tobacco purchases at the Hanover Court in 1757:

Having some money by me, I paid the planters some a half, some 55 one third & some a quarter part, & have given them notes of hand for the remainder payable at May Court: so that I shall be under a necessity of drawing on you at the April General Court for the whole purchase, or very near it: … 114
At some stores, two sets of prices prevailed for imported goods — one price for those who exchanged tobacco certificates directly for goods, the other for those who paid cash. Thus, the term cash might refer to "cash credit," that is, to credit for goods at the cash rate.115

In the store system, where profitable operations depended on so many elements, no storekeeper could determine the success of his purchasing without reference to the volume and price level of goods sold and to the amount of cash used. James Robinson figured that the Cuninghame store at Rocky Ridge would lose almost £2 per hogshead on 200 hogshead exported in 1771-1772, unless, he told his storekeeper, "you Sell more goods and at a greater advance, or use considerable less Money."116

In regard to pricing policies, it should be noted that every tobacco purchaser faced the necessity of securing a cargo of tobacco for his employer's ship. James Robinson observed in 1770: "It is a doubt whether the Store price can or will be reduced: for Altho' we refuse to take Tobacco at present from the Planters at 25/ yet should our new Stores Continue to give that price, so must we also."117 Harry Piper, who purchased tobacco in the Alexandria area, maintained: "I haver yet started a Market, but I must follow if I purchase, & am sorry to 56 observe that a few wrong headed Men have it in their power to effect the price in the two Rivers."118 It should be remembered too that many planters had the alternative of consigning their tobacco to British merchants if they felt that prices in Virginia were unattractive, as they did in northern Virginia at least in 1773. Piper reported that "many of our Planters are Shipping to London, as they can't think of taking the Price in the Country."119

In brief, the tobacco merchant had not only a short run interest in purchasing as much tobacco at as low a price as possible but also a long run interest in establishing and maintaining a market for his goods and services. Shrewd entrepreneurs, particularly the large Scottish firms, recognized that profits derived from efficient use of the thousands of pounds of capital invested in ships, stores, and goods. This helps to explain the charges made by English buyers that the Scots were "determined to have the whole Trade" by bidding prices up.120

James Robinson, writing to his Fauquier Courthouse storekeeper in 1769, summarized the Cuninghame policy, and what was likely the policy of other tobacco purchasers, in this way:

Frugality or good management is extremely necessary at all 57 times but more so at present when there appears a Certain prospect of a considerable loss being sustained by the years Exportation of Tob[acc]o However that may be Such is the Course of our Trade that we must Endeavour to buy all the Tobacco we Can at the different Stores as what Ever is the marcatt price the Company not being willing to lose any of their Interest in this Branch to any Person what ever, they rather would be for increasing their influence at all their Settlements you will therefore Conduct yourself in that Particular Agreeable to their lines, in which you may depend on being supported—121

The channel of trade provided by the English consignment merchants, as well as the large number of purchasers of tobacco, tended to insure a relatively large degree of competition in the Virginia tobacco market.

THE PRODUCE TRADE

Although tobacco was by far the most important single commodity exported, growing diversification characterized the Virginia economy from the mid-eighteenth century. Worn-out lands useless for tobacco planting and an increased awareness of the disadvantages of a one-crop economy contributed to increased production of grain crops. In addition, grain growing required less of a labor force than tobacco, thus reducing the amount of capital invested in slaves.122 Finally, poor markets for tobacco often provided the immediate impetus for turning to grain production. One merchant observed in 1773 that "the low price for Tob[ac]co will drive the planters to making Wheat, for 58 they cannot live by that Commodity at such prices."123

Production of grain on a scale sufficiently large to develop an export trade was a development which dated from the mid-eighteenth century. As late as 1752, Charles Steuart maintained that much of the wheat exported from Norfolk was brought from Maryland. His correspondence shows several instances of grain carried from the upper Chesapeake to Norfolk by bay craft and of ships destined for Europe directed first to Maryland to load their cargoes.124 By the 1770's the production of Virginia wheat had reached such important proportions that Roger Atkinson could write to an English correspondent interested in American real estate:

it is wth. great pleasure I acq[uain]t you, that We have now got another Staple, of late years as if it were created, viz wheat, wch. will I believe in a little time be equal, if not superior to Tobo — is more certain, & of wch. We shall in a few years make more in Virginia, than all the Province of Pennsylvania put together, altho' it is their Staple Commodity … our poorest lands will produce it in great abundance, & never fails to produce it, altho't it be our poorest Land — but ye richer Lands will still produce it in greater Abundance. I do not believe there is a finer Country under ye Sun, take it altogether, ye rich Land & ye poor, for any grain.125

James Robinson estimated the export from the harvest of 1773 at 300,000 bushels and that "the ensuing one Should the harvest be favourable will be considerably more and in all probability it will increase annually." Despite his specific instructions to storekeepers a few years earlier that the store system existed primarily to purchase tobacco, Robinson by 1774 was urging his employers, the Cuninghame 59 tobacco firm of Glasgow, to undertake wheat purchasing on a sizeable scale. "I agree with you in opinion that the Grain Trade is a precarious one but if you mean to return any here it must be engaged in." He reported that "the People near to Navigation … are all going largely into farming."126 William Aitchison pointed out in 1774 that the loss of a fairly large part of the wheat crop, because of a late frost, "is a very Severe stroke for this Country [and that] the loss of a crop of Tob[acc]o. wou[l]d have been nothing to it."127

In addition to wheat and to the flour and bread manufactured from wheat, Virginia by the 1770's was exporting a large volume of corn and considerable amounts of meat, peas, and beans. Indigo had been reported in the 1750's to be sure of becoming a staple commodity as a result of a bounty placed by the British government, but the Virginia product was unable to compete with that of South Carolina, Georgia, and the West Indies.128 After a British bounty was imposed on hemp in 1764, a Falmouth storekeeper maintained that the "Commodity will in a few years be a staple up way."129 However, hemp growing attained only moderate success compared with wheat. Forest products, such as lumber and naval stores, and iron also figured in Virginia's exports by the eve of the Revolution. Lumber, in the form of staves, shingles, and pine boards and planks, was particularly important. Neil Jamieson 60 noted that "Not one ship ever Loaded in Virginia but had some lumber on board … to dunnage with."130

While the tobacco trade was controlled by British merchants and handled in British ships, the produce trade was carried on largely by Virginia merchants in their own ships. Very often, factors for British tobacco houses purchased and sold other agricultural products on their own accounts as independent merchants.131

Major Markets. Although Great Britain was the destination of all of the tobacco exported, Virginia had to seek other markets for its grain and meat products. Britain from the mid-eighteenth century was growing more dependent upon the outside world for its food supply, but the Corn Laws provided for low duties to permit the importation of American grain only when the price rose above a certain level.132 Thus, Virginia shipped to Great Britain 55,059 bushels of wheat in 1768 and 33,671 in 1771, but the amounts in other years were small.133

The West Indies were of prime importance as a major market. A variety of produce found its way from Virginia to the West Indies, but flour, corn, meat, and lumber products figured more importantly than wheat. The following invoice of a cargo shipped by Neil Jamieson from Norfolk to St. Christopher in 1766 is probably fairly typical of 61

CommodityQuantityValue
Indian Corn1,040 bushels£166. 8.
Pickled Pork50 barells146. 5.
Flour23,936 pounds (100 barrels)179.10.4
Casks for Flour1008. 6.8
Bread13,955 pounds (100 barrels)104.13. 2
Barrels for Bread10010.
Red Oak Hogshead Staves8,400 (shipped as 7,000)19. 5.
Shingles31,50022. -. 1
TOTAL656. 8. 5
Commission at 5%32.16. 5
689. 4.10.
134

In some cases, the voyage was initiated by the Virginia merchant. He ordered a cargo consigned to a West Indian firm, which handled the sales of the commodities for a commission, usually of 5 percent. The ship captain, though, often was given orders to proceed to another island if the market at the first proved unfavorable. Returns might be made in West Indian produce, purchased by the local house, again for a commission, or in bills of exchange on Britain, or in specie, depending upon the particular situation. In some instances, as in that of the cargo described above, the shipment was made on the account of and at the risk of the West Indian firm, which likely has sent West Indian produce to Jamieson to sell on commission. Most of the West Indian trade of Virginia, like that of the other mainland colonies, was carried on by ships which shuttled back and forth between the mainland and the Islands. Some commerce followed according to the popular notion of a triangular trade, involving Africa or Europe, but 62 it appears to have been small in volume compared with the direct trade between the two areas.135 As Charles Steuart pointed out to a West Indian correspondent in 1752, a "Vessell continually imployed in the trade from hence to hour Island with full freights each way, may under good management clear money."136

Southern Europe and the Wine Islands (Madeira and the Canaries) constituted a growing market for Virginia products from the mid-eighteenth century. Charles Steuart in the 1750's sent cargoes to Madeira, Lisbon, and Teneriffe. Neil Jamieson in the 1760's and '70's had a more extensive trade with Madeira, Lisbon, Cadiz, Barcelona, and Leghorn.

Southern Europe, like the West Indies, was the market for a wide variety of Virginia farm products. Wheat, though, was more important in this trade than in the West Indian commerce. The recommendation of a proper assortment of cargo, made by a Madeira firm to Neil Jamieson in 1764, probably represents the type of shipments made to the Mediterranean area:

Assortment for a Cargo
CommodityQuantity
Wheat1,000 bushels
Indian Corn1,000 bushels
Flour100 barrels
Bees Wax6-8 barrels
Pork40-50 barrels
Rice39-59 hogsheads
63
White Oak Pipe Staves3--4,000
Hogshead and Barrel Stabes3--4,000
Pine boards, 1 ¼-1 ½ inch thick2,000 feet
137

The writer pointed out that "Our limited market permits not of our trusting to any one Commodity, tho sometimes it might hit … but it is a chance if we are not gluted as soon as it begins to come in." Even in the larger Lisbon market, caution was demanded when a particular commodity was in great demand, as was flour in the summer of 1769:

A Glut of that Commodity will follow of course in that case [of speculation because of the shortage], wherefore we would have you be cautious of sending us whole Cargos of Flour notwithstanding the encouragement we gave you lately to do so, but content yourselves with putting a few hundred Bar[rel]ls of it between decks of such Ships as you may send us with Wheat in proportion to the size of the Vessels.138
Because of slow communication, one of the recurring problems for an eighteenth-century merchant was to get his cargo to a good market before it became glutted. A London merchant described to Jamieson in 1764 what happened time after time in foreign trade:
Last year there was a good Opport[uni]ty of carrying on that Business [of shipping foodstuffs] up the Straits as there was a Famine in many Parts of Italy, but it was overdone towards the End of the Year. 139

As in the West Indian trade, the cargo was consigned to the European firm, which sold the commodities on commission. Sometimes, though, the foreign houses requested a one-quarter to one-half concern in specific cargoes shipped by the American firm, provided the commodities 64 could be purchased within certain price limits. For example, Mayne & Company of Lisbon directed Jamieson in 1769:

You apprehend rightly that when any of your Neighbours are loading Wheat or Flour for this Market, we would have you Interest us as farr as One fourth or One Third wherein, tho you should have no Share yourself, provided the Commodities be of a good quality, & come within our limits; that the Vessell is sufficient & the whole Cargo be addressed to us.140

Returns were made in southern European products, particularly and salt, in bills of exchange, in cash, or in a combination of these.

Existing correspondence indicates that Norfolk merchants, like those of other American ports, dealt exclusively with British firms or branches of British houses located in southern Europe. Jamieson consigned cargoes to Mayne & Company of Lisbon, March & Tilebein in Barcelona, Tesson Welsh in Cadiz, Fergusson, Murdock & Company in Madeira, and Otto Franck & Company in Leghorn. The Mayne firm was directed by Edward Mayne of London and the Franck house by John Henry Noble, also of London.141 Because of the distance involved, much trust had to be placed in the foreign firm's integrity and business ability. Thus personal contact and recommendation were important. When Jamieson first became interested in the trade to southern Europe, he made inquiry of his regular London correspondent as to reliable houses.142 Before he started to trade to Italy, Jamieson called 65 personally upon Noble during a visit to Britain in 1772. Nobel also referred Jamieson to John & Francis Baring & Company, his bankers, for recommendations as to the firm's financial condition and ability to make prompt remittances.143

Although the southern European market was evidently highly profitable at times, it was also marked by considerable fluctuations, depending upon the size of local crops and the amount of imports from normal suppliers in northern Europe, Italy, Turkey, and northern Africa. For example, Charles Steuart wrote in 1752 that the "Demand for Grain in Madeira and Europe has diverted the Trade a good deal from the west India Islands this winter." Eight years later, he reported that "indiff[eren]t prospects for our product in Mad[eir]a has lessened and allmost entirely broke off our trade thither."144

Available statistics show well the wide variation in volume of trade: wheat shipments from Virginia to southern Europe totalled 65,763 bushels in 1768, 335,945 in 1769, 174,045 in 1770, 133,743 in 1771, and 87,364 in 1772.145 Correspondents discussed at great length and in considerable detail the European conditions which determined prospects for profitable exportations of American foodstuffs to southern Europe, Mayne & Company wrote from Lisbon in the summer of 1769: "Daily advices from the Country confirm the shortness of our Crops so that there must be a demand for foreign grain."146 As a Cadiz firm pointed out 66 in 1770, the harvest "of the Crops in Italy Sicily & the West of France & England may have some Influence upon the Span: & Portugal marketts."147 In the summer of 1769, the demand for American grain was expected to increase at Barcelona, since "no supplys can be expected from the Levant on account of the Turks being in warr with the Russians."148 On the other hand, it was reported from Lisbon in 1772 that "our imports of wheat from your side have been very inconsiderable by being pretty well supplied with Sicily, Northern & some Country Wheat of the late crop."149

Increasingly large amounts of wheat were shipped to Philadelphia, the major grain and flour market in North America. For example, Robert Pleasants of Curles attributed the brisk demand for Virginia wheat in 1773 "chiefly to fulfill Orders from Phila[delphia]."150 James Robinson reported that one Philadelphia firm purchased 100,000 bushels of wheat and another 30,000 during the fall and winter of 1773-1774.151 So important was the trade with Philadelphia that the Virginia merchants ordered their resolution of November, 1772, prescribing the days of the Meetings at Williamsburg, to be published in the Pennsylvania Gazette.152

Probably much of the grain shipped to Philadelphia represented 67 orders placed by firms in that city. In 1763, Stewart Duncan & Company of Philadelphia inquired of Neil Jamieson the price of Virginia wheat. "Sh[oul]d Your Terms Suit us we may probably Contract wh You for a Considerable Quantity to be delivered at Sundry Times."153 A decade later, James Robinson reported that Inglis & Long of Norfolk were purchasing large quantities of wheat for Willing & Morris of Philadelphia.154 Robert Pleasants solicited orders from Philadelphia merchants, but he also shipped wheat on his account with "a view of Employing our new Vessel, and in hope of geting the prices lately going for wheat in Phila[delphia]."155

A smaller volume of grain and flour apparently flowed to Boston and New York. In the 1760's and '70's, Benjamin Harrison of Charles City County and William Holt of James City County made shipments of wheat, corn, and flour to William Palfrey of Boston. Holt, who operated a flour mill near Williamsburg, proposed in 1765 to keep a "Vessel constantly Running backward, & forward" between his mill and Boston.156 There appear to have been regular but relatively small shipments of wheat to New York.157

68

Purchasing of Agricultural Produce. By the l760's, a well-organized system for the collection of wheat, flour, corn, meat, and other agricultural commodities was in operation. Although a number of Virginia ports participated in the trade with the West Indies and southern Europe, Norfolk was predominant.

The correspondence of Neil Jamieson, Norfolk merchant, illustrates well the methods of collecting country produce. Jamieson used the Glassford stores, which he supervised for the Scottish tobacco firm, to organize and conduct an extensive business in wheat, flour, corn, and other produce. Adam Fleming at Cabin Point, Arthur Morson at Falmouth, and Alexander Cuninghame at Fredericksburg made regular shipments of these commodities to Norfolk. Much of the produce represented payment for goods which the storekeeper sold to planters and farmers in the neighbourhood . The following communication is representative of the periodic report s made by Fleming

It is Realy impossible for me to Say what Quantity of Corn Pease &c I may Receive this Winter as the Most of these Comoditys that I Collect is purchased intirly with West India Commoditys & Salt (particularly Brown Sugar & Molasses)158
From time to time, Fleming was ordered to make specific purchases from producers or neighbouring storekeepers, as in this case:
I Observe you will want 6000 Bushels Indian Corn nixt Month, I Coud have purchased a great deal of Corn before this time, but they have got a Notion that Corn will bring more then 10/ p Barrel in a Short time therefore the most of them will not Sell there Corn at present under 12/6159

Jamieson also dealt extensively with independent storekeepers throughout Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina. He received frequent 69 letters offering commodities for sale, as in the following inquiry from a Fredericksburg merchant:

I have got 200 Barrels Indian Corn for Sale … if you are in want you may have it … let me know the very utmost you'1l give as we are at a distance and cannot chassen much About.
160 In one case, Jamieson was offered all or a considerable part of the annual output of a merchant flour mill, located near :Petersburg , which milled 10,000 bushels of wheat per year.161 More often, Jamieson sent orders to correspondents when he was in need of a specific amount of produce. A Petersburg storekeeper wrote to him in 1765: "Your last came too late to make a purchase of Flour on your terms. … Theres no possibility of making a Purchase of the Q[uantit]y of Pork you mention."162

Jamieson evidently used the produce derived from the regular trade at the Glassford stores as a nucleus of his stock of export commodities and purchased from other suppliers when a particular commodity was needed. This policy is well illustrated by the following letter from an Alexandria merchant:

I only Recd, yours of the 26th. Novr. yisterday and had [smudged] ten days ago I could have Sent you near two hund. barrels of verie Good flower which I sold here at 13/10 pr. Cwt. when I was at your place I had no incuragement to depend on any market with you but had you desired me to have purchased flower on your accot. I could have had by this time about 200 Ct or perhaps mere at the Reate of 12/6 for Ready Money which is the lowest price here… if in case you will want any flower in the spring and that your price will be agreable or worth while I can perhaps purchase some by that time but to purchase at an uncertainty 70 I will not do but will be glade if you would as soon as posible advise me of the price of that article with you at all times.163

Exporting farm produce presented problems not encountered in the tobacco trade. One of the most important involved storage, since there were no public warehouses like those for tobacco. This was recognized early in the history of the trade as a limiting factor. Francis Jerdone pointed out in 1739 that a purchase of 2,000 bushels of wheat was "as much as I have Convenient house Room for."164 It was necessary for large dealers like Jamieson to have a fleet of river craft to transport the produce to their warehouses in Norfolk. Adam Fleming told Jamieson in 1770 that two sellers of wheat in the Cabin Point area "Grumbels a good deale and Says they wont Kepe it much Longer."165 In another year, he reported: "There is aboute 1000 Bushels Corn that Lyes upon the River at different places that I must take away before this Month is out Therefore youll please send up a Vessel for it."166 In the winter of 1773, Fleming explained that 1,200 bushels of the wheat which he had purchased "must be taken away as Soon as possibel as it lys in the peopels way."167

Maintenance of a standard of quality was a difficult problem. Legislation in the 1740's and '50's provided for the inspection of flour, meat, pitch and tar, and lumber, but the methods of enforcement were 71 inadequate. In 1772, though, an act was passed providing for more effective regulation of the flour trade. The law required flour to be graded and sold in casks of a specified size, marked with the maker's name and the weight of the flour.168 Buyers usually were able to judge the quality of a shipment by examining a sample. In purchasing flour, Arthur Morson of Falmouth told Jamieson that he never examined "above two Barrells of a waggon Load when they are all one mans make & manufactored at the same Mill." If the merchant's inspection did not detect bad produce, as happened in this case, "whatever loss has happend must be sustaind by the Store here."169

Methods of purchasing produce from the growers were similar to those in the tobacco. In the earlier years of the eighteenth century, barter seems to have been fairly extensive. Francis Jerdone spoke in 1739 of allowing "a Bus[hel of] salt for one of wheat" in making a purchase of 1,000 bushels.170 However, by 1771, as Robert Pleasants pointed out, wheat on the James River was "almost a ready money article."171 Arthur Morson reported from Falmouth in 1773:

I have hardly received a hundred Bushells of wheat yet but I expect 4 or 500 Bushells, the price now given is 4/6 half goods half Cash. … Most of our Corn Sellers want money for their Corn however I expect to pick up a little for Goods and debts say One hundred Barrells between this & March.172

72

The price making process in wheat, flour, corn, and other produce was as complex as it was in tobacco. For wheat, there are enough references in business correspondence to suggest that the Williamsburg Meetings performed much the same function for the wheat market that they did for tobacco. James Robinson pointed out in 1774 that the agents of Philadelphia merchants were "doing a Great deal of business at our Generall Courts."173 James Glassford, Jamieson's partner in Norfolk, mentioned on at least one occasion price quotations on wheat at Williamsburg.174

Prices of corn and other commodities seem to have been governed by the Norfolk market, since these products were exported in volume only from that port. However, Robert Pleasants wrote in 1772 that "there is yet no price fix'd or any agreem[en]t about it [corn], but I suppose that will be done at the present meeting in Wmsburg."175 More often, though, as the correspondence to Neil Jamieson shows, the major interest of country dealers lay in the going price of commodities at Norfolk. These communications from Matthias Ellegood of Pasquotank County are representative of inquiries from Virginia as well as North Carolina storekeepers: "I do Entend in to See & Talk with you Concerning the Prices of Produce in this Country and see what Prices you think would or may Suit to give for Each Kind" and "Inform me by him [the bearer of 73 this note] wheather you think Pork and Corn will have a high Price this year with you or not."176

It is evident that Williamsburg during the Meetings of Merchants provided a central market for tobacco and, to a lesser extent, other export commodities, if one views the market as "a more or less organized group of individuals whose bids and offers disclose the supply and demand situation and thereby establish the price."177 While much of the actual purchasing of tobacco and other commodities was done at the country stores and even more at the county court houses, the Williamsburg Meetings provided a focal point for pricing decisions. It would be too much to claim for the Williamsburg Meetings of Merchants the status of a modern commodity exchange. Yet the essential function of a commodity exchange was performed: the sale of commodities by description and the use of receipts without displaying or transferring the commodities themselves.178 This was particularly clear in the case of tobacco, where tobacco notes represented title to the commodity.

The Williamsburg Meetings of Merchants, though, did not satisfy all of the requirements for a completely efficient market, defined by one authority as "standardization of qualities, localization of transactions, and full knowledge."179

74

The inspection system provided only a minimum quality requirement for tobacco and was still in the experimental stage for other commodities. Probably, more actual transactions were made outside of Williamsburg, although the quotations of Williamsburg prices seem to have governed prices elsewhere. Full knowledge was of course impossible in an era of slow and unreliable communication. However, it was in the communication of available information that the Williamsburg Meeting made its greatest contribution to providing a market for economically decentralized Virginia.

75

MONEY, CREDIT, AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

An exchange economy, in which specialization of economic units and of regions prevails, is necessarily a money economy. There would be little reason for a person to grow tobacco or wheat, for example, beyond his immediate needs if there were no means by which he could trade his surplus production for needed articles produced by others. In an exchange economy, money performs two primary functions: it serves as "a unit of account or common measure of value" and as a medium of exchange. It also performs two subsidiary functions of serving as a standard of deferred payments, when obligations to make future payments are stated in terms of money, and as a store of value, if the receiver of money holds it for any length of time. Monetary problems are usually a major concern of a society, since changes in the supply of money and variations in its value can influence the functioning of the economy in many different ways. If money is to provide a medium of exchange, there must be an amount of it in circulation adequate to the business needs of the community. If it is to serve satisfactorily in its other functions, as a measure of value, a standard of deferred payments, and a store of value, the value of money itself must not fluctuate too greatly without altering the pattern of the distribution of wealth and income.1

Although the large plantation of eighteenth-century Virginia resembled superficially the "natural economy" of self-sufficient economic units, the life of the colony operated firmly within the orbit of a money economy.

76

THE CURRENCY PROBLEM

A persisting problem of eighteenth-century business was an inadequate supply of currency as a medium of exchange. Virginia, like the other colonies, used the English monetary system of pounds, shillings, and pence as a measure of value, but the British government never provided for a currency for the colonies. England was faced with the necessity of providing a money supply for its own business needs. Furthermore, little consideration was given to the development of centralized administrative machinery to deal with Empire-wide monetary policy.2 It is true that English policy seemed to reflect mercantilistic thinking: that the colonies should provide England with specie and that the lack of money would hinder the ability of American business to compete with British merchants and manufacturers.3 However, even politically independent states have experienced difficulties providing for a currency adequate for the needs of business in a rapidly expanding economy like that of eighteenth-century America.

Currency in Circulation. Because Great Britain prohibited the exhoration of English currency and refused to permit the establishment of mints in the colonies, Spanish and Portuguese coins became the basis of the circulating coinage in America. These gold and silver coins, secured directly or indirectly through trade with the West Indies and southern Europe, were valued in terms of the English monetary system. When, in the seventeenth century, this currency was rated according to its bullion content, it tended to be withdrawn from the colonies to be used to pay foreign debts. Like any new country undergoing swift economic 77 development, America imported more than she exported and thus experienced an adverse balance of trade.4

To counteract this drain of their supply of precious metals, all of the colonies in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries enacted laws to raise the legal tender value of foreign coins. The major objective was to attract hard money from areas where lower rates prevailed. The theory was that if a coin was worth more in America than in England, it would remain in the colonies to be used as a medium of exchange. Also, debtors desired to use this inflationary device as a means to reduce their real debt load.5 Each colony set its own value on the Spanish silver "piece of eight," or milled dollar, according to its own trading needs for specie.6 The British government, through royal proclamation in 1704 and act of Parliament in 1708, attempted to introduce a uniformity of coin values throughout America, but many of the colonies were able to evade these measures through continuing to revalue the bullion content of the coins.7

Not only was there lack cf uniformity in the value attached to foreign currency in circulation in the colonies, but the coins themselves varied in their weight and fineness. Original errors committed at the mint were compounded by the eighteenth-century practices of 78 clipping and sweating, or removing part of the bullion content to be melted down.8 The author of a treatise on the currencies cf the colonies advised American merchants to follow the European "Practice of the old Traders and established Houses to be continually weighing most of the Money that passes into their Hands."9 Robert Carter Nicholas, Treasurer of the provincial government, wrote to John Norton in 1769, to order a set of "Money Scale …, one of the best Sort of Hyrdostatick Balances, for determining the fineness of Gold & Silver with the most approved Treatise upon the Subject;" he explained that "there is a good deal of base coin circulating amongst us & I must be a little upon my Guard."10 A few years later, Nicholas pointed out that "our Gold & Silver is not free from Counterfeits, I have too much Reason to fear there is a good deal of each in the Circle."11

Table XII shows the foreign coins in circulation in eighteenth-century Virginia, with the official shilling value in Virginia currency after 1727. In that year, the price of silver was fixed in Virginia at 6 shillings 8 pence per ounce, as compared with the English value of 5 shillings 2 pence. The specific value of each coin had to be determined by examination because of the lack of uniformity in bullion content, but the table indicates the official rating of coins based upon a Spanish

Table XII: Official Value of Foreign Coins in Circulation in Virginia in the Eighteenth Century.
Spanish CoinsRating in Virginia Currency
*Milled dollar (Piece of Eight)
(8 reals)6 shillings
Half dollar (4 reals)3 shillings
Quarter dollar (2 reals)
(Pistareen)1 shilling 6 pence
Eighth dollar (1 real)9 pence
Portuguese Coins
Johannes ("Joe") (16 Spanish dollars)96 shillings
Half-Joe48 shillings
Quarter-Joe24 shillings
Moidore36 shillings
French
Pistol (4 Spanish dollars)23-24 shillings
Source; Edward Channing, A History of the United States (6 vols.; New York: Macmillan Company, 1930-1938), II, pp. 498-499. 79 dollar containing 386.8 grains of pure silver.12 Table XIII indicates the value of the Spanish milled dollar in each of the thirteen colonies and the ratio of the pound in local currency to the pound sterling.

Although there were small coins in the Spanish system, the lowest denomination in general circulation in the colonies was the one real piece, equivalent to nine pence in Virginia currency.13 The colony as early as 1642 attempted to mint copper coins to meet the need for a subsidiary coinage, but the plan failed, as did later ones in 1726, 1769, and 1772.14 Robert Carter Nicholas described "the inconveniences Many Parts of this Country labour under for want of a small Species of Coin in the ordinary Course of Business."15

Commodity Money.From an early date, most colonies used certain commodities as money to overcome the shortage of coin. Commodity money differed from simple barter when the colonial legislature decreed that a certain product should be received in payment of taxes and other public debts. Those who accepted a quantity of a commodity as money did so in the expectation that they could use it to purchase some other article.16

In Virginia, tobacco was accepted in payment of taxes and used to pay salaries of government officials and Anglican clergymen. However,

Table XIII: Official Values of Currency in the Colonies in the Eighteenth Century
ColonyValue of Spanish milled dollar in local currencyRatio of £ Local currency to Sterling £ (£ sterling = 100)
Virginia6 shillings75
North Carolina8 shillings56 ¼
South Carolina4 shillings 8 pence90
Georgia4 shillings 8 pence90
Maryland7 shillings 6 pence60
Delaware7 shillings 6 pence60
Pennsylvania7 shillings 6 pence60
New Jersey7 shillings 6 pence60
New York8 shillings56 ¼
Connecticut6 shillings75
Rhode Island6 shillings75
Massachusetts6 shillings75
New Hampshire6 shillings75
Source: Edward Channing, A History of the United States (6 vols.; New York: Macmillan Company, 1930-1938), II, p. 499n. 80 tobacco, like other commodities in use as money in other colonies, possessed basic defects both as a medium of exchange and as a standard of value. The problems of transporting and storing commodities which are bulky and heavy in relation to their value are obvious. As one writer has pointed out, it is difficult to conceive of " 'gallant young Virginians hastening to the water-side, each carrying a bundle of the best tobacco under his arm' in order to purchase a wife," when "the burden of these ardent lovers would have amounted to above two tons."17 Equally serious in its effect on the use of tobacco as money was the fluctuation in its price, as annual variations might occur due to weather conditions. Also, wide differences in quality made difficult the use of commodities as a common measure of value, since the person tendering a commodity as money was tempted to deliver his most inferior product.18

Some of these difficulties in the use of tobacco as money were removed by the inspection system. As indicated in a previous chapter, the act of 1730 established a minimum standard of quality. The public warehouses made storage more convenient. More significantly, the notes issued for merchantable tobacco passed in local exchange and for payment of taxes. Tobacco notes were declared "to be current & paiable in all tobacco paiments … within the county" where the commodity was inspected and stored, "or in any other county adjacent thereto, and not separated by any of the great rivers or bay."19 Initially, only transfer notes, representing bulk deposits of tobacco, were accepted as legal tender. However, after 1748, crop notes, 81 issued against specified hogsheads of tobacco, also could be used to make payments of legal obligations on the same terms.20

On the whole, the system of tobacco notes, which represented the highest development of commodity money in the colonies, worked well enough to retard the introduction of a genuine paper currency in Virginia. Long-term changes in the value of tobacco notes, based upon tobacco prices, were more moderate than the fluctuations in the currencies of colonies which had issued large volumes of paper money during the first half of the eighteenth century. However, short-term fluctuations resulted during years of poor crops.21 This was the case in 1758, when drought brought a sharp increase of tobacco prices. This led to the Two Penny Acts, which commuted tobacco payments to cash at a rate of 16 shillings 8 pence per hundred pounds, When the market price stood at 27 shillings. The basic problem derived from the dual nature of tobacco as a staple and as money. As one writer has noted, "an appreciating currency works hardships on debtors no less than a depreciating currency does on creditors."22

Paper Money. All of the thirteen colonies issued paper money during the eighteenth century, with varying degrees of success. Massachusetts was the first to experiment in supplementing the hard money available, with its initial issue of 1691, and Virginia was one of the last in 1755.23

Although administrative and legal details varied in many ways among paper money issues, there were basically two methods followed by 82 the different colonies in their emissions. One was the land-bank system, in which the provincial government lent paper money to its citizens on the security of their land or other real estate. This method was particularly successful in the middle colonies, where the volume of paper issued was moderate and the security was profitable agricultural land. Inflation resulted in other colonies from excessive amounts issued.24

Virginia utilized the alternative system of issuing bills of credit, or treasury notes, based on future tax receipts. The occasion in Virginia, as in the initial issues of bills of credit in most other colonies, resulted from war-time financial need.25 As was the case in Massachusetts in the 1690's, the problem was more a shortage of cash in the provincial treasury than a general shortage of money in the colony.26 The legislature, faced in 1755 with the necessity of raising money for the war with France, levied £ 20,000 in extra taxes. Rather than follow the usual procedure of making levies in tobacco and converting the money through sales of the commodity, the Assembly decided to meet the immediate crisis by authorizing the issue of £20,000 in treasury notes to be redeemed the following year with the proceeds of the tax levy. The bills, declared to be legal tender for all debts except the quit rents, bore interest at 5 per cent.27 Essentially, the bills were promissory notes issued by the government, used to pay suppliers of provisions and others to whom the government owed money. It was expected then that the bills 83 would be withdrawn from circulation as citizens presented them to the Treasury in payment of taxes and other obligations due to the government. The basic security was the fund assigned to redeem the money. The notes would depreciate, or lose value, unless holders held faith that future governments would have the ability and the will to collect taxes of an amount equal to withdraw the money from circulation. If the quantity of money outstanding exceeded the requirements of trade at existing price levels, depreciation would take place regardless of guarantees.28

It quickly became apparent that further financing was needed for the war effort, as a special session of the Assembly in the summer of 1755 authorized another issue of £ 40,000 to run for four years and to be covered by special taxes. Indeed, so successful were these first two flotations that there was considerable backing for an act to issue £ 200,000 in paper money on the security of real estate.29 Merchant Charles Steuart believed that this issue of paper money would "enable people to pay their debts, & put an end to [protested ?] bills."30

No land-bank scheme ever succeeded in Virginia, but before the war officially ended in 1763, the provincial government had made fourteen emissions of bills of credit, totalling almost £540,000. As shown in Table XIV, the largest single issue was that of April, 1757, for almost £100,00. Following the practice of other colonies, Virginia paid no interest except on the notes of the first four issues.31 Three further emissions, amounting to almost £77,000, were made in the post-war period,

Table XIV: Virginia Bills of Credit, 1755-1773
YearAmount IssuedDate Redeemable
1755£20,0001June 30, 1756
175540,0001June 30, 1760
175625,0001June 30, 1760
175630,000June 30, 1760
175610,000December 15, 1757
175780,000March 1, 1765
175799,962March 1, 1765
175832,000March 1, 1765
175857,000September 14, 1766
175957,000April 20, 1768
175910,000October 20, 1769
176020,000October 10, 1768
176032,000October 20, 1769
176230,000October 20, 1769
176910,0002November 20, 1771
177130,0002December 10, 1775
177336,8343June 1, 1774
Total of all issues: £614,796.
Source: "Paper Money in Virginia," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XX (1912), pp. 261-262. [Corrected total £619,796. The total in printed record appears to be £5,000 short.] 84 principally to cover losses of tobacco in the public warehouses.32 These later issues were payable for public debts but were not a legal tender, since Parliament in 1764 prohibited the colonies to issue paper money as legal tender.33

The treasury notes were gradually withdrawn from circulation in the 1760's as they were tendered in tax payments. Of the £539,962 authorized during the war, only £206,757 was in circulation in 1767. Notes totalling £103,000 were still unredeemed in 1771, two years after the date for final retirement of the last war issue.34

Although Virginia escaped the worst effects of inflation which resulted in other colonies from excessive volume of paper money, the colony experienced some of the problems of dealing with a currency created by political acts. Space does not permit here an elaboration of the arguments advanced by protagonists in the controversy over the propriety of bills of credit. However, once paper money was in circulation as part of the colony's money supply, confidence in the public officials responsible for its administration was essential to the maintenance of its value. Not only was there the temptation of personal gain for public officials in charge of paper money, 35 but 85 there was also possibility of manipulation of currency for political advantage. The "Robinson affair" in the mid-1760's underscored the problem of the public official in a position where he could alter the economic fortunes of many in the colony.36

John Robinson, prominent member of the Virginia gentry, had "wielded more power than any other man in the Colony" for a quarter of a century as Speaker of the House of Burgesses and Treasurer of the province. Upon Robinson's death in 1766, it was discovered that he had made private emissions to hard-pressed planters of more than £100,000 of treasury bills which were presented for redemption. Robinson had seen the deflationary effects of the withdrawal from circulation of the war-time paper money; thus, he sought to ease the shock by unofficially re-issuing the treasury bills which had been slated by law for retirement. "He could burn the paper money and bankrupt his friends, or ignore the law and make the paper available to those in desperate need."37 The largest single beneficiary of Robinson's largesse was William Byrd III, who owed £14,921. Members of the Council had borrowed collectively nearly £15,600, those of the House more than £37,000. Robinson's political friends generally were favored, although opponents would have received loans "had they asked for it, of course, not solely because that would have been good politics from Robinson's standpoint, but because of his genuine goodness of heart."38

Another major problem was that of counterfeiting, particularly of the issues of 1769 and 1771. So serious was the dislocation of the 86 currency system that the Governor called a special session of the Assembly in 1773 to authorize a loan of over £36,000 for the rapid retirement of the old notes.39 One merchant referred to the "Stagnation of Business occasioned by the great quantities of very ingenious forgeries of our paper Cur[ren]cy. lately discover'd to be in Circulation."40 Many businessmen lost heavily by the counterfeit bills. As a Richmond storekeeper put it, "the trading part of this Country have suffered much lately by some very ingenious counterfeits of the paper money at present in circulation. I loose about forty pounds by it, and am most thankfull that I have escaped so well."41 So clever was the printing of the bogus bills, according to one observer, that "the distance of the White lines in the paper is the Only way they can be discovered."42 Significantly, some merchants suspected a repetition of something like the "Robinson affair." "I'm of opinion if ever there is a discovery," maintained James Parker, wealthy Norfolk merchant, "that some of the Great needy Ones have got hold of the Old Types."43

In spite of these problems, the paper money experiment was on the whole successful in Virginia. Robert Carter Nicholas, who succeeded Robinson as Treasurer of the colony, maintained in 1773 that "for many Years … the Paper Money was generally preferred to 87 Gold or Silver, … and this, even under the supposed Disadvantage of its not being a legal Tender, which surely must be considered by every impartial Person as a proof of its Goodness."44 Nicholas probably reflected the attitude of many Virginians when he stated: "I am sure a moderate quantity of it [i.e., paper money] would be extremely useful in transacting the Business of this Country, … [but] I can say with great Truth that I should never desire to see any Paper Money if we could possibly do without it."45 William Allason of Falmouth wrote, when money was scarce in 1767, that "we shall in some time be as fond of having our Assembly authorized by Parliament, to Emitt more paper Currency, as we was some time ago of preventing it."46 Although much of the historical writing has emphasized the use of paper money as a device by which colonial debtors could reduce their real debt load, the most thorough study of colonial currency points out that "bills of credit were much more than instruments 'for cheating creditors.' Rather, they provided variously: the colonies' 'only expedient in an emergency;' a circulating medium in lieu of, or in supplement to, specie."47

Substitutes for Money. Because of the lack of an adequate supply of money, businessmen turned to a number of devices to make 88 transactions without using currency.48

Probably, simple barter was used in many dealings. For example, William Holt reported in 1768 that "the most that I have done is in the Barter way. Rum at 2/6 for Corn at 10/."49 Essentially the trade of the tobacco-purchasing stores was based on barter, as planters exchanged their tobacco for merchandise. However, this was more than simple barter, since the planter usually did not bring a quantity of tobacco to the store each time he wished to acquire an item of merchandise. The hogshead was too large a unit for this purpose. Furthermore, the planter often needed imported goods at a time when tobacco was not available. Thus, there developed a system of "book-keeping barter" or a "two-way flow of goods and services." The planter withdrew merchandise from the store as needed and settled his "running charge account" annually by presenting the storekeeper with tobacco notes. Although no actual cash might change hands, both sides of the transaction were rated in money values.50

Francis Jerdone used this system of bookkeeping barter to pay his shirt maker. According to a ledger entry of April, 1751, Jerdone owed £6.10.6 to Miss Jean Ansell of Yorktown for "making & 89 mending my shirts to the last of this month," As payment for these services, he made the following entries in Miss Ansell's account:

1751
April 4To: 1 lb Bohea tea 7/ 1 ¼ yd fine muzlin @ 8/ 10/£-:17:-
May 1To: 11 ½ yds Bed type at 2/4. 26/10: 1 pr kid Gloves 3/41:10 :2
June 10To: 1 lb Bohea Tea 7/ 1 lb Coffee 2/ 2 Bed Cords 3/ -:12:-
August 12To: 8 lb Cheese @ 7 ½ 5/ ½ lb Bohea Tea 3/9-: 8:9
Sept 3To: 1 pr womens worsted hose 4/6. 2 3/8 yds. fine check @ 2/6 6/-:10:6
51

To avoid the use of currency, merchants made contracts for the exchange of commodities. For example, Neil Jamieson was a party to this agreement of 1766:

I agree & Oblige my Self to Deliver to Neil Jamieson & Co. on or before the 1st, of Aug[us]t…a quantity of London Marcell pipe h[ogs]h[ea]d & Barrell white Oak Staves, to be delivered at Norfolk in the time, for which which I am to have Nine pounds p[er] Thousand for Pipe [staves] Six pounds Ten Shillings per [thousand for] h[ogs]h[ea]ds. & Three Pounds Ten shillings p M for Barrells, the whole payable in dry-goods out of the said Jamieson & Co. store at an Advance of One hundred p[er] C[en]t.52
Note again that each side of the transaction was rated in money, although no cash was involved.

Frequently, third parties were involved in exchanges which were made without money. In some of these instances of triangular transfers of goods, the merchant was presented, in payment of a debt, with articles for which he had no immediate need. However, the particular commodity might be wanted by a third party, who could in turn tender payment in a more usable form to the original payee.53 90 other types of transactions were like the one in which a storekeeper asked Jamieson "to spare me two Barrells of Pork [as] I am owing a little Cash and the person will take Pork."54

To summarize briefly here, the inadequate supply of currency resulted in the use of many different mediums of exchange to serve one measure of value. Although prices were stated in terms of pounds, shillings, and pence, payments might be made in foreign coins, in tobacco notes, in paper bills, or in one of several methods devised to avoid the use of money altogether.

THE CREDIT SYSTEM

Credit, which makes possible current transactions based on future payments, is as vitally important as money to the functioning of an exchange economy. In the complete absence of a credit system, money would have to be provided for all dealing. Thus, the individual trader would have to limit his trade so "that the maximum need of working capital will not exhaust his resources." Without access to credit, the businessman, for much of the time, might hold either idle capital assets, such as ships and storehouses, if he tied up too much of his capital in permanent investment, or an idle cash balance if he chose instead to retain a large amount of his resources in liquid capital.55

Likewise, economic development of an area would proceed slowly without the use of credit. Any new country, like Virginia in 91 the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, suffers a chronic shortage of capital, or goods used in producing other goods, since so much effort has to be turned to meeting current needs. The necessary capital, in the form of equipment and goods for immediate use, came from England on credit.56 As one writer has put it, credit, "this currency minted of faith," made its greatest contribution in America "to the dynamic conquest of a new land, to the unprecedented rapid development of its resources,"57 Foreign capital, introduced through a credit system, generally is recognized to play a major role in the economic growth of an underdeveloped area.

There were few specialized financial institutions in the eighteenth century for creation of credit and mobilization of capital resources. The merchant performed the functions of present-day commercial banks, investment banks, and consumer finance companies in the organization of the credit system.58

The Terms of Credit. Much has been written about the oppressive effects of British credit policies upon the Virginia planter. Jefferson maintained that "the planters were a specie of property annexed to certain mercantile houses in London."59 Although this account of hereditary debts passed "from father to son for many generations" has become a popular one, there actually seems to be 92 some doubt concerning its validity. In the first place, the debts of the large planters, of whom Jefferson was speaking, did not reach chronically serious proportions until the 1760's and '70's. There were major crises in previous years of the eighteenth century, but planters usually had managed to pull out from under their debts.60 At least, Jerman Baker wrote from Williamsburg in the midst of depression in 1764 that "Virginia may again see the Halycon days she knew 20 Years ago, when they lived in peace & plenty, & feared a Debt in England as the worst of calamitys."61 Also, the problem of increasing debt loads undoubtedly was connected with the declining productivity of tobacco lands in the Tidewater, where many of the large planters were located. Although smaller yields and lower quality of tobacco reduced the planter's income, he often failed to cut down on his expenditures. Finally, the Jeffersonian version of debt difficulties overlooks the statistically small role of the large planter in the total volume of Virginia commerce. It can be maintained safely that by the mid-eighteenth century "Virginia's agriculture was sustained by the middle class planters."62

In actuality, the credit system worked for Virginians in much the same way that it did for other Americans in the eighteenth century. Great Britain was the ultimate source of a long chain of credit extending to the frontier farmer. The British exporter purchased his goods on credit from suppliers, either manufacturers or other merchants. He in turn granted credit to the American importer, who sold on credit to the 93 retailer, who gave credit terms to the consumer.

The British importer usually gave terms of nine or twelve months' credit, with the latter term more common in the shipment of dry goods to Virginia. Slow communication and transportation necessitated what would be considered today a long period for normal commercial credit. Since the term began from the date of the invoice, when the goods were shipped from London or some other port, and expired when payment was received in Britain, the actual time of use of the credit in America was considerably less than the twelve month period.63

The American importer, too, offered liberal credit terms to his customers. William Reynolds described "the nature of our Trade here" in Virginia as one in which "we are obliged to give extensive credit and a great deal of indulgence especially at first setting out to establish a set of Customers."64 The customary credit in the wholesale trade of West Indian and Southern European commodities was six to twelve months.65 Probably, the term of payment was shorter in the case of small sales. A Yorktown storekeeper, who ordered one hogshead of rum from Neil Jamieson in 1774, spoke of six months as "the usual time of payment."66 When William Russell, a Williamsburg retailer, ordered three hogsheads of rum from Jamieson in January, 1770, he promised that "the Cash in April is Certain perhaps sooner as suits 94 me."67 This would involve a credit of four months or less.

At the retail level, almost all sales appear to have been made on credit. As was noted previously, few transactions were made in the country stores for cash or ready tobacco. Even in urban areas, credit was granted extensively, despite advertisements in newspapers offering goods for "ready money only."68 The only detailed study of consumer credit in an urban area in the eighteenth century shows that a Philadelphia cabinetmaker made as much as 94 and 99.8 per cent of his total sales on a credit basis in 1774-1775.69 Catherine Rathell maintained in 1772 that she sold "for Nothing but redy Cash" in her millinery store in Williamsburg, but she had been in Virginia for less than one year when she made this statement.70 The data in Table XV must be indicative of the extensive use of credit in a Williamsburg store in the eighteenth century. The figures on the main items of current assets of the company, operated by three generations of the Prentis family, were compiled from annual balance sheets available for certain years from 1734-1775.71 In 1737, when debts owed to the store amounted to over £2,600, cash on hand was only £10. Similarly, in 1767, accounts receivable stood at over £12,000, but only £70 in

Table XV: Amount of Cash on Hand and Accounts Receivable at End of Accounting Year, William Prentis & Company, 1734-1775.
YearCash on Hand £ Virginia CurrencyAccounts Receivable £ Virginia Currency
17346313,184
17351,1462,539
17363452,622
1737102,658
1738852,717
17393032,159
17403302,499
17412922,184
17423462,205
17434852,086
17458552,944
17461,0153,614
17482044,253
17497494,179
17505154,558
17515616,027
17534698,303
17551,6148,44[-]
17571,0348,575
17591,0088,171
17611,3068,728
17651,20311,241
17677012,238
17691,42610,462
17711,25810,638
17731,09511,598
17741,04411,926
177598012,127
Source: Prentis Papers (University of Virginia). 95 cash on hand.

Debts owed to British creditors carried no interest if paid within the time limit originally set, but they incurred a charge of 5 per cent on the amount unpaid after the expiration of the term of credit.72 William Reynolds of Yorktown, for example, requested long term credit from a wholesale grocer in London in this way:

I am in want of a few Articles in your way which [I] have Noted at foot … I make no doubt I shall be able to re-mitt you for them within the limited Credit of 12 Mo[nths]. but if I shou'd not [I] am willing to pay you Interest after 12 Months from the Shipping which I dont doubt you will think sufficient as it is a better Interest than you can make by your Money in the Stocks [i.e., British government bonds] & the loan of a few hundred pounds for two or three years wou'd be obliging me.73

However, it is obvious that "selling on credit involves costs which in the long run are borne by the ultimate consumer."74 Thus, an interest charge for the "free" use of credit usually was contained in the price. Robert Morris pointed out in 1786 that interest for the first year's credit in trade before the Revolution was "amply compensated by the advances put on the real cost of the goods."75 The British exporter, since he received a discount for prompt payment to his suppliers,76 usually offered the colonial merchant a discount of 5 per cent on whatever portion of the debt was paid before expiration of the term. However, it is not likely that American importers took extensive 96 advantage of this opportunity to reduce costs.77

American importers, too, charged their customers a price which included the cost of credit, as this letter from a storekeeper on the James River to Neil Jamieson indicates:

As our Concern is a new one and we cannot expect to be very flush of Money I shou'd hope that a payment in 12 Months might suit you for the first parcel of Goods, and I am afraid to promise a quicker. [payment] — Indeed I wou'd rather allow some difference in the price than be obliged to pay sooner, tho' I am hopeful you will be as moderate in this respect as you can.78

The method of calculating interest charges is shown also in this contract made in October, 1765, by Jamieson and an iron producer:

I acknowledge to have agreed with James Campbell for a Parcell of Pigg Iron at or about Thirty Tun's less or more, at the Price, and on the following Conditions viz. the whole vallue to be paid in Country Produce at the Curr[en]t. Price, and if Paid on or before the April Court, to Allow him at the Rate of five Pounds — fifteen shillings Virginia Curr[enc]y p[er] Tun Cont[a]ining Twenty two hundred & forty N[e]t. Pounds for each Tun, or if not Paid till after the April Court, in that Case to pay the vallue in Produce as above mentioned, at the Rate of Six Pounds Cur[renc]y p[er] Tun, …79
In other words, Jamieson received a discount of about 4 per cent if he paid for the iron within six months.

There is some evidence to indicate the extent to which retailers gave different prices to cash and credit customers. Apparently, the custom in Philadelphia was to charge the same price, so that cash customers helped to pay for the credit used by charge customers, as 97 in modern department stores.80 However, as was noted in the discussion of tobacco pricing, some Virginia stores sold merchandise at a goods price and at a cash price. The former, which was higher, seems to have been charged in cases where goods were purchased on credit. The lower cash price for merchandise was extended to planters not in debt to the store.81 The policy in the Cuninghame stores in Virginia was generally to quote lower prices to the few who did pay cash for their goods, as well as to those who paid their accounts promptly. James Robinson, who supervised this chain of stores, felt that "it would be unjust as well as imprudent" to charge the same price to all, regardless of method of payment.82

Although credit operations were necessary to business, there was no credit-rating service like Dun & Bradstreet to supply financial data on prospective customers. The problems of an English firm securing reliable data on the credit standing of firms 3,000 miles away is obvious. Reputations of the larger British houses were often better known to colonial merchants than those of the smaller American firms to the English.83

American merchants, of course, could determine more readily the financial stranding of enterprises in their own cities.84 However, 98 in rapidly growing communities like Norfolk, merchants often had difficulty checking the background of the many newcomers. This letter from a North Carolina storekeeper warns of the too-ready acceptance of a supposed fellow-countryman by the Scottish business community in Norfolk:

Let me offer you a piece of Salutary advice: do not place so much Confidence in Strangers especially Carolina men; though other Countrys are not without their Imposters, for I hear a Dutchman named Kennedy now at Norfolk has found out the weak side of the People of that place, and passes against you for a Gent from Scotland, beware of him as he was formerly employed as Cashier to Some [Eng]lish Comp[an]y in the Austrian Netherlands & Elop[ed w]ith the Company's Cash.85

In the absence of facilities for gathering concrete financial data, great importance was attached to reports of a merchant's character and integrity. Reputation was a zealously guarded business asset. When a West Indian correspondent accused Charles Steuart of not making a remittance as promised, the latter replied:

I scarce know any thing by which a Man in Trade would more Justly forfeit, not only his Credit as a Merchant, but, all right and tittle to the Character of an honest Man, than what you are pleas[ed] to accuse me of.86

A Virginian seeking a new connection in England often secured a reference from a fellow-businessman in the colony. For example, William Reynolds of Yorktown wrote to a London merchant with whom he did regular business:

Mr David Jameson of this Town desired me to write you to send him by first opportunity 5 C[w]t best single [refined] Sugar, he is a Man of fortune and one whom you may depend on he imports pretty largely and has told me he will write for all his Grocery from you & remitt you a bill for the 99 Amount annually.87
The American importer seeking goods on credit might also refer the exporter to other British businessmen for information, as did Mary Rathell when she opened her millinery store in Williamsburg in 1772:
perhaps Sir you May Scruple Sending so Much Goods to a person Who you know so little off, but you may depend on My being very Exact in My payments, and for a further Satisfaction to your self, I refer you for Particulars to your friend Coll. Geo. Mercer in Hollis Street, who is Not unacquainted with My Method of Dailing,…88

Similarly, backcountry retailers desiring credit from American importers offered references. A Leeds storekeeper wrote to Neil Jamieson of Norfolk: "As I am a stranger to you I referr yo[u]. to any of ye. tradeing Gent[lemen]. up Rappa[hannock]. River."89

When a firm was approached for credit by someone unknown or unrecommended, it usually made inquiries regarding the prospective customer's local standing and reputation. The investigation has to be made quietly, so that suspicion might not be aroused. William Holt, who operated a flour mill near Williamsburg, asked a Boston merchant to secure information about a man to whom he had sold some flour:

Pray make y[ou]r. inquiry w[i]th. such Causion as may not effect his Credit, as I hope his intentions are hones, & it may be of Consequence to him to appear in a Creditable light at a place where I believe he is gone to settle a Correspondence. 90

Since the credit investigation might take several months, 100 the British merchant was often tempted to make the shipment immediately, before replies were received, so as not to lose a sale.91 Sometimes, security was required before the goods were delivered to a customer who was not known to the shipper, although the colonial merchant might resent this practice as much as the delay of a shipment to await information on his credit standing. When a Bristol firm directed its captain not to deliver an order of goods to William Reynolds without security, the latter was quite indignant. Reynolds immediately wrote that he "did not expect…to have had them [i. e., the goods] shipt under that disagreeable restriction," which he said was "a thing quite new to me," and that he was "sorry that a Correspondence has commenced which must so shortly end."92

Since unsecured book credit was the usual form in use, a demand for security of any kind for normal business debt was regarded as a reflection upon one's credit standing. Thus, Harry Piper of Alexandria was understandably surprised by a British exporter's proposal for landed security for goods sold on credit to a store-keeper, as he reported most of the information usually desired by the English merchant:

I observe what you say with regard to J M, I before mentioned that it is very disagreeable to propose taking Mortgages from a Man in Trade, these things must be made publick — his Credit has never yet been called in question, & it might hurt him much — I suppose if he was to Die, you might lay out of your Money for some time, & that might be the case with the best Man in the Country — His Brother is in the Store, who is a very discreet Lad, & imagine will have the management in case of any Accident. I can't find that he owes many debts, & he has pretty considerable property in Town, he has lately 101 made a purchase of Sebastians Houses & lots, which is a very convenient place for a Store — I am certain such a proposal would shock him, & am yet to believe which he would not agree to, as I dare say never such a one was even made to him —
93

There is some evidence, though, that British exporters at times did not check carefully the credit standing of Virginia merchants. However, it is unlikely that "the prevailing Mode of Trade" was based on giving "extensive Credit" to many people of little or no standing "who call themselves Merch[an]ts," as a planter charged in 1773.94

In the country stores, the manager was charged with the responsibility of knowing the debt-paying habits and extent of property ownership of each of his customers. Storekeepers were instructed on credit policy in this way: "No man unless he has a Clear and Visible Estate must be Credited with more than the Value of their Annuall Crops; Observe to give no Creditt to Tradesmen or Overseers Unless their Employers become Security for what they deal —."95

Payments on Debts. Slow payment was the rule in clearing debts in the eighteenth century. Uncertain lines of communication and lack of a sufficient supply of money in the colony help to explain some of the problem of slow remittances. A store in Kemp, which had secured credit from a London firm on the recommendation of Neil Jamieson, maintained in 1766: "We are most sensible that we are blameable [in not paying the debts promptly] but there is no Money."96

102

A major problem was to maintain payments along the long chain of credit from British exporter to American wholesaler to retailer to consumer. Thus, the most frequent complaint expressed by those who owed British creditors was the difficulty which they encountered in collecting debts from storekeepers or individual customers. For example, Beverley Dickson, Williamsburg storekeeper, wrote to John Norton, from whom he purchased the bulk of his merchandise: "My Collections have been very bad this Court which is the Reason of my Remitting you so small a sum But Sir you may rest assur'd that I shall endeavour to make you punctual remittances."97

Debtors generally paid in whole or in part at such times as they were able,98 as did Dickson in his transactions with Norton. The same practice was followed by those indebted to American importers, like a storekeeper in Yorktown who dealt with Neil Jamieson:

In Williamsburg, I paid your Mr. Glasford 120 £ in part of my Acc[oun]t. with you, & must crave your indulgence (tho' I have before repeatedly had it) for the Bala[n]ce. till Octo[be]r … I hope to make my future dealings with you more acceptable…99

When the colonial debtor could not pay, the British merchant was faced with the alternatives of likely loss of much of the debt and of the customer's future patronage as well, or continuing to give credit to help him to recover. In many cases, the creditor decided that the latter policy was wiser in the long run.100 The debt, though, usually 103 was refunded by execution of a bond secured by collateral such as real estate and by signatures of responsible guarantors. In this case, the debt bore interest from the date of refunding. Bonding was preferable to instituting a suit in court, although legal action still had to be taken if the debtor defaulted on the bond.101

The procedure of bonding the debt of this James River storekeeper who owed money to a Boston merchant was typical:

I have rec'[eive]d a power of Attorny from Mr. Coffin [the Boston creditor] with positive orders to get your Bond w[i ]th good Security for whatever I think may be due to him after the Sale of the Corn you are to Ship him,… I give you this timely Notice, that you may come to Williamsb[ur]g properly prepar[e]d for that purpose … you may depend upon it [that] no one shall know anything of the Matter from me, as soon as the Vessell gets to James Town I shall go to W[illia]msb[ur]g. and there wait your coming … I hope for your own Credit Sake you will make no delay, that I may not be put to the very disagreeable Necessity of Employing an Attorney in the Affair, …
102

In the store trade, planters accounts were settled once a year. James Robinson advised the Cuninghame storekeepers that:

It often happens when a planter is largely in debt at settlement or when any Considerable sum of money is advanced them they will Offer a security on their Estate which should at all times be accepted even from those in the best Creditt.103

The bond was negotiable and could be discounted with merchants or others who had money to lend. Thus, Carter Braxton hoped in 1765 to use a bonded debt as capital to finance a business deal:

I want to raise a Sum of Money to compleat some Purchases I have lately made & I believe it is in your Power to assist me in doing it, my Scheme is this, I have a Bond of Mr Browns 104 payable in Dec[embe]r 1766 for one thousand Pounds St[e]r[lin]g with good Security, the Money to be paid in good Bills of Exchange or gold & silver. If I could dispose of this at a tolerable rate I could then do what I wanted. I presume there are Men in your Town who would lay out Money in this Way if they could expect to make any thing, I suppose if I sell it must be to a disadvantage and I would submit to a small one rather than not have the Money in Octo[be]r or Dec[embe]r Court. I shall esteem it a Fav[o]r if you will consult such People on this Matter as you may suppose would lay out Money in that way & acquaint me of their offers.104

Some British firms employed professional debt collectors, particularly in the 1760's and '70's. Under this procedure, all of the debts due to a firm or store were sold at a substantial discount to a collector, who received title to all of the claims.105

As a last resort, creditors turned to court action to collect debts. For example, Charles Steuart reported to William Bowden, London merchant, in 1755 that "I intend up to Williamsburg, and believe the maney delays & trifling excuses I meet with will oblige me to order some suits for you which shall advise you of in time."106

After 1736 most debtors' suits were filed in the Hustings Court in Williamsburg, since a law of that year permitted this court an optional jurisdiction in all debt cases "whereof any county court within this colony, by law, have, or can take cognisance."107 The hustings court was under the influence of mercantile-minded townsmen who were generally friendly to creditors, in contrast to the situation in most county courts, which were dominated by agrarian debtors. Merchants found county courts very dilatory in processing suits, particularly in times of depression. In some cases, 105 justices of the peace delayed proceedings by not attending the court sessions.108 A Richmond merchant reported in 1773 that "the Patriotic Magestrates in Amherst County, have resolved not to sit to do business but twice in the year, untill the Inhabitants are clear of debt."109 "Suits have seldom remained undetermined longer than 3 or 4 Months" in the Williamsburg Husting Court, a businessman observed in 1770, "when they have remained undetermined almost as many Years in most of the other Courts."110

However, the legislature proposed in 1770 to limit the hustings court's jurisdiction to cases of debt actually arising within the city, in spite of the opposition of the mercantile community to any change in the court system. As one merchant commented, "Debtors too often appear ready to take every Step in their Power to delay the Payment of just Debts."111

When judgment was obtained in a debt case, the creditor could prosecute writs of fieri facias (to take the debtor's personal property), elegit (to take personal and real property), or capias ad satisfaciendum (to take the body of the debtor).112 If the creditor chose to seek restitution from the debtor's property, the court directed the sheriff to hold a public sale. One merchant reported this situation in 1766: 106

when Judgments are obtained, there is such a Scarcity of Cash that if the peoples goods were not sold on Credit they would not get half the value of them and in such cases the Law gives the Sherif liberty to sell on Credit, …
113

Imprisonment of a debtor was costly to the creditor, as Harry Piper of Alexandria told his Whitehaven principals in 1767:

I have ordered Suit ag[ains]t. McIntosh & he is taken, but is quite Insolvent, as soon as Judg[e]m[en]t. he will lay in Jail his 20 days, & therefore have ord[ere]d. if that should be the case, to have him turn[e]d. out, as I can't think of maintaining him there to throw more Money away.114
Probably, creditors ordered imprisonment of debtors only when the latter attempted to flee, as in this case reported by a Falmouth storekeeper in 1773:
Inclosed you have an Executive against the Body of Rancis Martin for £ 11..19..2 ½. & Costs of an Attachement Viz 15 Shill[ing]s & 173 lb Tobacco at 1 ½ d per pound for a Debt due to Falmouth Store — the said Francis Martine made a moonlight flitting or in other words he Run away & I am certainly informed is now in a Small Vesal trading up & down James River. he is a Well looking, very lusty, Likely Man, about Twenty Six years of Age & I am informed he is Owner of the Vesal he sails in; he carryd away a Negro felow of his Own & Sold him some where on James River which enabled him to purchase his Vesal — you will no doubt make all the enquiry you can [page torn] him so as to recover the debt if practicable youll See a Blank in the Exec[utio]n. left for the name of the County where he may be apprehended…115

Despite the problems raised by creditor-debtor relations, all parties concerned in the use of credit received benefits.116 Merchants and storekeepers, in Britain and in Virginia, realized that the only way to build a volume business was through extensive grants of credit. William Johnston described in 1739 the importance of 107 credit in the operation of his store in Hanover County: "so soon as they pay off their old acco[un]t they emedeatly are in want to run in again and such we look on as good pay its true its a great advance of mony but theirs no carrying business Such as Yours otherways."117 Credit for consumer goods at the store enabled the planter "to divert to long-range projects cash and labor which otherwise would have had to be allocated to the needs of the hour: thus, he could speculate in land, buy slaves, clear land for cultivation, etc."118

Attempts to tighten up credit terms were difficult to enforce. In early 1773, the London consignment merchants resolved "not to pay any bills nor ship any Cargoes without Cash in hand." However, William Reynolds of Yorktown observed that:

it is impossible that you shou'd be able to adhere to that Resolve, for their is a Gentleman now soliciting strongly for Consignments to a new house & at same time offering to advance £ 5 Sterling a h[ogs]h[ea]d on the shipping which you well know will prove a very tempting bait to the Needfull.119

Except in a period of severe depression, such as that of 1772-1773, most debts were small and were limited to the ability of the debtors to pay within the crop year. One writer who has surveyed scores of account books of Virginia merchants has found that the "average debt was probably under £ 50 and was settled at the end of the year."120

108

The fact that debtors with few fixed assets could move readily to escape payment probably had some effect upon the rate of bad debt losses. However, storekeepers like those in the Cuninghame stores took care not to extend credit to those not likely to pay, as indicated previously. But merchants often had difficulty locating debtors who moved to North Carolina, where the courts were even more hostile to creditors than were the rural county courts of Virginia.121 Precise data on over-all bad debt losses in Virginia are not available. However, one factor described prospects of non-payment of store debts in this way: "I am generally acquainted with people and their circumstances [which] makes the Risque of Debts but small; [so] that we have Sildom any bad debts."122 Experience would vary from time to time according to general economic conditions, since a sharp decline in the price level would create difficulty for debtors to make payments on debts contracted at a higher price level. Also, some merchants and storekeepers were better able than others to size up good credit risks and to determine the proper time to expand and contract the volume of credit outstanding. For example, data available on late eighteenth century Philadelphia show that one enterprise suffered in bad debt losses only 1.4 per cent of total credit sales, while another had a record of 38 per cent lest in unrecoverable debts.123

109

Finally, it should be emphasized again that credit was not obtained without cost to the community. Robert Morris estimated in 1786 that foreign credit in the pre-Revolutionary period really bore "a rate of interest equal to 15, 20, or perhaps 30 per cent."124 However, this can be regarded as a part of the social cost of the rapid economic development of a new country, where the cost of credit is usually high.

STERLING EXCHANGE

The Williamsburg Meeting of Merchants was an informal clearing house for a large part of the business of Virginia. Many contracts for purchases of tobacco and other commodities stipulated that final settlement be made during the next Meeting. As one tobacco buyer pointed cut, "the Merchants are generally engaged to make their Payments at the General Court."125 Likewise, importers of foreign goods sought to make collections of debts due from storekeepers and individual consumers. As was noted previously, Beverley Dickson, Williamsburg storekeeper, maintained that his remittances to his London creditor were slow because his "Collections have been very bad Court."126

Since most of these settlements involved foreign trade in one way or another, the clearing of intra-Virginia credits was directly connected with the market for foreign exchange. It was necessary for tobacco buyers, for example, to make transfers of funds from their 110 principals in Great Britain to pay for their purchases. Likewise, Virginia importers of British goods had to transfer funds from the colony to make final payment in Britain. This over-simplified example will help to show the close connection between the settlement of foreign and domestic debts: A, the factor of a British firm, must make payment to B, a planter, for a purchase of tobacco. B owes C, an importer of English goods. C, in turn, must remit payments to British exporters. Therefore, A, the tobacco buyer, sells a claim on funds in Britain to C, the merchandise importer, in exchange for local currency; A then pays B for his tobacco, and B pays C for the merchandise.

The principal way of transferring funds between Britain and Virginia. Has the bill of exchange. Although it is true that there Has relatively greater reliance upon the alternative methods of making foreign remittances, by shipments of specie or of produce, than would be the case in present-day international trade, transactions in sterling exchange provided the most important means of settling foreign debts.127

The Bill of Exchange. The bill of exchange, as used in foreign trade, can be defined as a commercial instrument "by which payments between any two points or areas operating under different currency systems are effected without the passing of actual money 111 or of articles having an intrinsic value."128

In physical appearance, the eighteenth-century bill of exchange was "written in a fair Hand, and on a long Piece of Paper, about three Inches broad."129 Ordinarily, there were four persons involved in any exchange transaction — two at the place where the bill was drawn and two at the place of payment. In Virginia, a tobacco factor, for example, as the drawer, sold sterling credits to an importer of British goods for a sum in Virginia currency. The importer, the remitter, sent the bill to his correspondent, who became the possessor, who in turn presented it to the drawee, on whom the bill was drawn, for payment, which was made in sterling.130 Figure I diagrams such a transaction. Sometimes, two of the four parties were merged in the same individual. The drawer might remit his own bill of exchange to settle a balance in England. Or the possessor, to whom the bill was sent in settlement of a debt, might happen to be the drawee.

Bills could be drawn payable at sight — that is, payable on the date on which they were presented to the drawee for acceptance — or for a term of days or months after sight. Acceptance, denoted by the drawee's signature on the bill, indicated that he would pay the specified sum at the specified time. Usance, a term sometimes used on the bill, meant the customary length of time a bill had to run after acceptance before payment was due. Usance varied between different points, and it was generally fixed at sixty days after RR006601Figure I: A Typical Exchange Transaction Between Virginia and Great Britain
Solid line — direction of movement of bill of exchange
Broken line — direction of movement of currency 112 acceptance in the trade between Britain and Virginia.131

To insure against delay by loss in transit, four copies of a bill were made by the drawer; the first copy to be presented for payment cancelled the remaining three copies. The drawer was required also to inform the drawee by letter of the sum drawn, time of payment, and other circumstances of the bill, "to prevent forgeries and that he who is drawn upon may not be surprised with the Draught."132

The bill of exchange was negotiable when it was endorsed by the person to whose order it was originally drawn. Bills could be endorsed as many times as desired, but each endorser might be required to make good the amount of the bill in case of non-payment.133

Protesting meant refusal to make payment on the bill. A bill was protested usually for one of two reasons: non-acceptance, the refusal of the drawee to accept the bill for later payment due to absence of funds in the drawer's account, or non-payment, the inability of the drawee to make payment at the specified time because of his own lack of funds.134 Damages on protested bills, levied against the drawer, usually amounted to 10-20 per cent of the face value of the bill, plus 113 interest charges from the date of protest.135

Since protested bills often resulted in business losses greater than the amount of damages and interest, special attention was paid to the standing of the drawer and endorser. Although Virginia law required "the drawers & indorsers of protested bills to repay the like sum of Current money that was paid for the bills," a rise in exchange rates might "sweep away the whole damage of bills."138 Bills drawn or endorsed by men of good reputation often commanded a premium; those drawn by men with a previous record of protested bills were accepted with hesitancy. Sometimes, endorsing of a bill was required in the case of a drawer not well known, for which service a fee of 2 ½ per cent was levied.137 Many planters who consigned their tobacco to London drew upon their correspondents before accounts of the net proceeds had been received, in some cases for sums substantially larger than their balances. If the planter's credit was good, the London merchant accepted the overdraft; in other cases, he refused to accept the bill, which was then returned protested to Virginia. John Norton, for example, complained that some Virginia correspondents rated their tobacco shipments at double value in drawing bills.138 At times the volume of protested bills was considerable in Virginia. Charles Steuart remarked in 1754 that "a very little acquaintance with this Country would remove your Surprize that Gentlemen draw without Effects 114 which is too frequent[ly] practiced here."139 However, he could advise correspondents that he would "be particularly carefull to purchase good Bills which a general Acquaintance in the Country gives us an opportunity of knowing."140

Since London was the center through which financial transactions were cleared for the whole British Empire, bills payable in that city were most in demand. Bills drawn on correspondents in other cities in Britain usually sold at a lower rate.141 However, Charles Steuart pointed out in 1757 that "bills on Bristol… allways pass here equaly with those on London," and that they were "negotiable in London without any discount or loss in exchange."142 At times, though, it was difficult to negotiate a bill payable in an outport. Harry Piper of Alexandria, who purchased tobacco for a Whitehaven firm, commented in November, 1768, that "only Bills Paya[ble]. in London would be taken, which will be rather hard on the Out Ports."143 This situation recurred in May, 1770, as "none but Londo[n]. Bills would do at the Gen[era]l. Court,"144 and again in August, 1771, when "it is now difficult passing Bills except they are Payable in London."145 115 However, Piper reported to his principals in June, 1772, that he was "obliged for your particular care of my Bills, they are in good Credit here, or else I should be oftener Obliged to draw Pay[abl]e. in Londo[n]."146 In October, 1773, he noted that his bills on Whitehaven were "in as good Credit as any out port Bills, but London ones are still preferred."147

Organization of the Exchange market. In economically decentralized Virginia, the Williamsburg Meeting of Merchants provided the market for sterling exchange. There was apparently no other place in the colony where bills could be negotiated readily. As Charles Steuart of Portsmouth pointed out in 1760, there were "seldom opp[or]t[unitie]s. of purchass[ing] bills here between the courts."148 Even in cases of buying or selling bills elsewhere in the colony, the price of sterling at Williamsburg governed the transaction. When Steuart supplied cash to the captain of a ship which arrived at Portsmouth, he was careful to point out that he took the captain's bill on the British shipowner at the rate determined at the last previous Meeting.149

Unlike the highly organized exchange markets of the present day, there were no specialized dealers or bankers in foreign exchange. Rather, those with credits in Great Britain drew bills of exchange against these balances and sold their bills directly to others seeking to make remittances abroad.150 In Williamsburg, the buyers and sellers 116 of sterling bills assembled at "the Exchange, tho' an open Street, where all money business is transacted."151 As indicated previously, this was located back of the Capitol, next to Mrs. Campbell's Coffee House.

The amount of Virginia currency necessary to purchase sterling depended fundamentally upon the rating given to specie in Virginia. After 1728, the Spanish milled dollar, which was valued at 4 shillings 6 pence in England, was rated at 6 shillings in Virginia. The ratio between these valuations, 125, was the par of exchange; that is, £125 in Virginia currency was equivalent to £100 in British sterling, since each commanded an equal amount of silver. The percentage difference between the two currencies was the rate of exchange. Thus, 25 was the rate of exchange when it stood at par.152 Merchants, in their references to exchange, quoted either the rate, say 25, or the number of Virginia pounds necessary to purchase £100 sterling, 125 in this case.

The actual rate of exchange, though, fluctuated considerably, as indicated in Tables XVI and XVII. As an eighteenth-century writer pointed out, "the Exchange betwixt one Country and another does not run always at Par, but rises above it, or falls below it, according to the Plenty or Scarcity of Money and Bills."153

The exchange rate quoted at Williamsburg was generally for the "best Londo[n]. Bills,"154 payable sixty days after sight. As

TABLE XVI: AVERAGE ANNUAL EXCHANGE RATES, VIRGINIA CURRENCY 0F STERLING, 1740-1775
YearPrice of Sterling in Virginia Currency
174022 ½
174120
174220
174320
174420
174530
174633 ½
174740
174833 ½
174922 ½
175027 ½
175130
175230
175330
175427 ½
175530
175635
175740
175837 ½
175940
176040
176145
176260
176362 ½
176460
176560
176625
176725
176825
176920
177019 ½
177120
177225
177330
177430
177525
Source: Chart showing exchange rates averaged annually, prepared by John M. Hemphill, from notations of exchange rates on protested bills, account books, letters, etc.
TABLE XVII: THE COURSE OF EXCHANGE, 1764-1773
1764May60
November60
1765May65
November55
December40
1766March22 ½-25
June25
November25
December27 ½
1767April27 ½
June25
November25
December27 ½
1767April27 ½
June30
November25
December25
1768May25
June27 ½
November25
1769May22 ½
June22 ½
October20
December15
1770May15
July17 ½
November20
December17 ½
1771May20
November20
July20
December20
1772May20
August25
October25
December25
1773May30
Source: Memorandum compiled by Neil Jamieson, Papers of Neil Jamieson, [May, 1773] XVII, p. 4011. 117 indicated previously, bills drawn by men of unusually good standing often sold for more than the established rate. For example, one merchant pointed out to his principal in England that "I have got you the highest Exchange w[hi]ch I shall always do as those that want Bills are always fond of mine."155 Bills drawn for a period longer than usance were subject to a interest charge in the form of a lower price. The rate of discount for a twelve month bill, for example, was 30 per cent.156

Bills were usually drawn "at the instant the money is paid." However, money could be secured at a General Court in April or October for a bill to be drawn at the following Court of Oyer and Terminer in June or December. For this accommodation of two months, the drawer received 2 ½ per cent less than the current exchange.157

Cash tobacco buyers constituted the most important group of sellers of bills at the Meetings. Since they drew on their principals in Britain to secure currency to make payments to planters, they generally desired a high exchange rate.158 A decline in the exchange rate resulted in an increase in the sterling cost of tobacco, since a larger amount in sterling bills would have to be drawn to cover the currency cost of tobacco purchased. As one tobacco buyer pointed out, when exchange reached a low level in 1770, "if this does not effect [sic] the price of Tob[acc)o. the St[erlin]g price must be very high."159

118

The grain trade had become so important by 1774 that one observer regarded wheat purchasers as the most important drawers of bills. The "rate of exchange … will be regulated by the wheat purchasers. If they have procured Specie to answer their demands … it [i.e., the exchange rate] will rise — on the contrary, should they trust to passing Bills at the meeting it will be reduced."160 Because their sterling balances were in England, they too sought a high rate of exchange.

Those who purchased bills, commonly termed the "moneyed men," were in large measure importers of British manufactured goods. Although there were importers in all of the towns of Virginia, the most important single group consisted of the "Norfolk men." They generally worked for a low exchange rate, since they could pay their sterling debts with a smaller amount of Virginia currency. For example, Francis Jerdone, tobacco buyer, related how "the Norfolk men have combined together to effect" a "fall [in] the Exchange" in 1759.161

Government officials also entered the exchange market, since they regularly remitted funds to England. Richard Corbin, responsible for collecting the quit-rents for the royal government, maintained his account as Receiver-General with Capel & Osgood Hanbury, leading London tobacco merchants, to whom he sent between £4,725 and £8,368 annually 119 in the years from 1762-1766.162

Like other purchasers of bills, the Receiver-General desired a low rate of exchange, as he complained in early 1766 of "the great loss Occasioned by the high Exchange to his Majestys Revenue."163

Robert Carter Nicholas, treasurer of the provincial government, had occasion to make regular remittances of funds to England. In 1769, he opened a "distinct account … as Treasurer" with John Norton & Son of London for this purpose.164 Nicholas remitted sums as large as £1,365 in January, 1769;165 £2,439 in November, 1769;166 and £2,443 in May, 1771.167 He then drew bills upon Norton to discharge obligations of the Virginia government in Britain, such as the salary of the colony's agent in London.168 Occasionally the Treasurer overdrew the account, which resulted in the provincial government's indebtedness to Norton, as in 1773: "I find the Treasury will fall in Arrear, but you may depend upon being reimbursed, as soon as I can possibly procure such Bills 120 as I like.169 When Nicholas was authorized by the Assembly in 1773 to borrow specie to redeem the issues of paper currency which has been subjected to extensive counterfeiting, he inquired of Norton whether the money might be secured at 5 per cent interest in England. If so, the sum could be deposited to the Treasurer's account in London. Nicholas then planned to redeem the treasury notes with bills of exchange drawn on Norton.170 In this situation, of course, the Treasurer would have become a seller rather than a purchaser of bills of exchange.

According to the rules adopted in 1769, the rate of exchange was to be determined during the first three days of the Meeting.171 Often, though, a longer period was needed to settle the struggle between drawers and purchasers of bills. Roger Atkinson of Petersburg reported in May, 1772, that he had been at Williamsburg "near a fortnight, & ye Excha[nge] not yet settled."172 James Robinson, chief factor for the Cuninghame tobacco firm, described the Meeting of June, 1770, in this way:

The last Oyer Court may be Calld a Remarkable one … from the time we pass'd before the Business of Exchange was settled We were no less than fourteen days during the last eight days there was a hard Struggle to fix the Rate of Exchange, the principall drawers stood Out for 20 p[er] c[en]t and the moneyd men Offerd only 15 of which they were the more tenacious As some business had been done by transient drawers through the first week on these terms however on Saturday the last of June we brought it to a Comprimise and Received 17 ½ p[er] Cent Chiefly on London.
173

121

As a means of advancing the price of sterling, Robinson proposed to his employers in 1772 that the "large Companys in Glasgow should have only one or two factors there, who should leave the disposall of the whole Bills pressd on them." In this way, "the holder of a Bill like the holder of any other article for Sale may be able to command his own price." However, drawers in immediate need of cash delivered their bills "at the Current Exchange," which was regarded as "allmost as risque as purchasing Tobacco from the Planter at an unknown markett price or at a nominall one with the rise."174

On at least one occasion, outright manipulation of the exchange market was proposed. William Allason reported in 1766 that a Scottish merchant, financed by a Glasgow bank to the extent of £150,000-200,000, had devised a plan to purchase all of the currency in Virginia with bills at a high exchange; he planned then to bring the exchange down by withdrawing the money from circulation and to sell the currency at a lowered exchange to make a profit of £20,000. However the exchange fell before the scheme could be undertaken. Furthermore, funds were lacking in Glasgow to back the undertaking.175

One way for tobacco buyers to avoid the disturbing effect of fluctuating exchange rates was to agree with tobacco sellers at a sterling price, Roger Atkinson of Petersburg described this method to his principals in 1770:

Now, — with regard to ye Excha[nge] — I set off tomorrow Morning for W[illia]msburg — It is generally expected to be very low this Court and for that reason I have endeavoured 122 to guard against it all in my Power by agreeing in ye Sterling way. 176
Harry Piper of Alexandria pointed out in 1773 that all of his "Tob[acc]o. contracts were in Sterling, so that they were not affected by the Exchange, … it makes no odd when I owe a Sterl[in]g debt whether I fix the Excha[nge] at 20 or 25 p[er] C[en]t. or any other Exchange."177

A remitter could dodge high exchange rates by postponing the purchase of bills, if his credit standing in Britain was sufficiently good. For example, William Reynolds of Yorktown explained to John Norton in the summer of 1772 that he had intended "remitting some Bills from this last meeting but our Exchange being rais[e]d 5 p[er] C[en]t [I] shall defer it till October …at which time it is generally thought they will again be 20 p[er] C[en]t."178 In some cases, remitters preferred making short-term loans of funds in Virginia to purchasing bills of exchange at a high price. Jerdone wrote to a British exporter in 1762: "None of your money is yet come into my hands: whatever I get Mr Holt is willing to take on interest as you rather choose to have it in his hands, than remitted at the present high exchange, which I really think will not lower much before a peace."179

Likewise, a tobacco buyer could postpone, at least temporarily, drawing if he felt that exchange rates would rise, Francis Jerdone wrote to his principals in April, 1759: 123

My drafts on you would have been for a much larger sum at this time, if I could have got 35 per Cent for all I stand in immediate need of, but I am determin'd to suffer many inconveniences rather than fall the Exchange to 32 ½ p[er] Cent. … In June next let the Exch[an]ge be high or low, I must then compleat my payments to the Planters.180
However, when it was necessary to secure money for purchases, many tobacco buyers could not postpone drawing. As Jerdone noted at this time, "the monied men are well acquainted that the Tobacco purchasers are greatly indebted to the Planters, & on that acco[un]t cannot go without it: … there is no doing anything without ready money."181

Some stabilization of the price of sterling was achieved through inter-colonial exchange transactions. When Virginians had a surplus of sterling credits secured through an excess of exports over imports, they sold bills of exchange on London in the Philadelphia market and imported the specie.182 A Norfolk merchant reported in 1770 that some drawers of bills proposed "going even as far as Boston in quest of Cash."183

Because of the large amounts involved in their drawings, the factors for the Scottish stores particularly found it profitable, when exchange rates were low, to send their bills to Philadelphia, where they sold for specie. When James Robinson expected the exchange rate to be below par at the Meeting of October, 1771, he shipped bills, drawn on the Cuninghame firm of Glasgow, to the amount of £4,000 124 sterling to Willing & Morris of Philadelphia with orders to negotiate if exchange there stood at par or above.184 Robinson then advised his storekeeper at Cabin Point of the possible transaction:

In the event of their procuring this limit [i.e., selling bills at par or above], I directed 1 M [i. e., 1,000] £ St[erlin]g might be vested in hard Dollars and shipped for you to the Care of Messrs Neil Jamieson & Co[mpan]y Merch[an]ts [in] Norfolk which you advert to and advise Mr James Glassford of that [firm so that] they may be taken proper care Off.185

However, there were times when specie could not be secured from other colonies to halt the drop in exchange rates at Williamsburg. Harry Piper related in early 1769 that "Cash is become extremely scarce here, so that Excha[nge]. must fall, & the recourse we used to have to the Northward is also stopped, for Gold & Silv[e]r. is not to be got there."186 William Allason reported a few months later that "Sundry of the Factors for the great Companies have been at Philadelphia & New York after Specie & returned with but a part of the Sum they intended to procure."187 In this kind of situation, when exchange rates were under par in most of the colonies, it was necessary to import specie from Great Britain. As William Aitchison of Norfolk indicated in 1770, "unless the Merch[an]ts. at Home supply their factors w[i]t[h]. Specie it [i. e., the exchange rate] will fall lower."188 Later in the same year, John Snelson wrote to his English correspondent about the probable future trend of exchange; "if you think proper send some Portugal money a 36/ piece will go here for about 46/ so that you 125 may know whither you can with Insurance and Interest for lying out of your Money make it answer."189

When the price of sterling rose well above par in Virginia, specie was sent to Philadelphia to buy bills of exchange.190 James Robinson described an effort on the part of Virginia remitters to reduce the rate in Williamsburg by shipping specie to Philadelphia in the summer of 1772:

during the course of the altercation [at the Meeting] severall of the moneyed men entered into an agreement not to exceed 20 p[er] Cent and if Bills could not be procured on these terms to convert their paper currency into Specie and send it to the Northward. In Consequence thereof Joshua Storrs and John Leitch departed from the others sett off on monday evening for York where they professed to embark in a boat for Baltimore with a considerable Sum said to be from 8 a 10 M £ [i.e., £8,000-10,000]. This had no other effect on the drawers than to cause Express being run to Philadelphia by the way of Port Tobacco and Baltimore advising our friends to avail themselves of the Same should they be applyed to for Bills. 191
The strategy of the "moneyed men" was unsuccessful, and Robinson as a seller of exchange proclaimed that "the purchasers of Bills were obliged to come to our terms."192

There was the possibility of shipping specie to Britain when exchange rates rose to a high level. Harry Piper pointed out in 1773 that "at the Ap[ri]l Court. There wer[e], many that rather than give 30 p[er] C[en]t. remitted home, their specie."193 But on many occasions specie 126 was scarce, as Charles Steuart reported on an occasion two decades earlier: "We shall remit the money in the best Manner we can, … but imagin it cannot be done in any Specie that can now be got, under 30 P[er] C[en]t. for Dollars & Portugal Gold are almost all Ship'd and but few Pistoles passing."194

When the exchange on London was more favorable in Virginia than in other colonies, bills flowed to the Williamsburg market. One observer noted in November, 1769, that "as our Excha[nge]. now at 20 is the highest on the continent what Money we have will go immediately to the Nor[th]ward it was Gentlemen from thence appearing at Court that occasiond Excha[nge]. to drop they have carryed with them much Gold & Silver."195 James Robinson reported two years later, that "Bills are more in number than I imagin'd; Occasion'd by … the lowness of the exchange to the Northward; from which Quarter many [bills] have pour'd in upon us."196

As contemporaries pointed out, the rate of exchange in Virginia was "regulated chiefly by the Quantity of Money and the Number of Bills brought to Market."197 James Robinson explained to his Glasgow principals that the price which his bills of exchange brought in Virginia "is generally assertained from the demand and the Quantity of money at markett."198 At times when the supply of cash was "so scarce, that there 127 was not sufficient at the General Court to satisfie the demand of the Drawers,"199 the exchange rate declined. If "there was more money than Bills,"200 the price of sterling rose.

There was considerable controversy over the effects of paper money, issued during the French and Indian War, in creating price inflation by an increase in the quantity of currency in circulation. There was indeed a sharp rise in the rate of exchange in the late 1750's and first half of the '60's. Fluctuations in exchange rates alarmed British creditors, because of an act of the Virginia legislature of 1749, which provided that judgments for sterling debts were to be levied at the par rate of £125 Virginia currency for £100 sterling. As a result, the offending act was amended in 1755 to provide that sterling debts were to "be discharged in current money at such differences of exchange as the courts should think just."201

Actually, the specific effect of paper money upon the course of exchange is difficult to assess, because there were so many factors involved. Charles Steuart, for example, maintained that the high exchange rate in 1762 was "owing to the frequent large emissions of paper money, and if they go on as they have done of late years, we do not know where it will stop."202 However, there is no way to measure the total amount of money in circulation after the emission of paper money. The apparent decrease in the amount of specie in 128 circulation, which took place during the war, reduced by an undeterminable figure the net effect of the issue of bills of credit upon the total volume of money in circulation. More important as factors in raising the price level and the exchange rate were the short crops of the late 1750's, war-time dislocations of trade, post-war readjustments.203

There was general agreement that the small post-war emissions of paper money had little effect upon exchange rates. Robert Carter Nicholas pointed out that the effort of the drawers to raise the exchange rate in October, 1771, following the emission of £30,000 to pay for tobacco lost in a flood, was unsuccessful. "A great deal of this Money," he related, fell "into the Hands of the Scotch factors [so that] they had the less Occasion to draw."204 James Parker, though, noted that much of the money was paid back into the treasury for payments due the government, so "that the Balla[nce] remaining [in circulation] was not felt, & the exch[ange] instead of raising fell."205

Ultimately, the rate of exchange varied with the balance of payments. The supply of bills of exchange on London depended upon the quantity of tobacco and other commodities exported to Britain and their prices there. In addition, Virginia had an indirect source of supply of sterling credits secured through trade with the West Indies and southern Europe, since merchants usually transmitted to London at least a part of the proceeds of sales in those areas. The supply of bills 129 was affected also by the degree of optimism held by British merchants, as this conditioned their decisions as to the amount of bills which they would permit their factors in Virginia to draw to pay for tobacco. The demand for bills depended upon the quantity and prices of goods imported from Great Britain. Another demand for sterling was represented by importations of slaves from Africa, which usually commanded specie or bills of exchange.

However, there were other factors as well, which operated to cause sharp fluctuations in the rate of exchange. One was the high cost of shipping bullion during war-time, so that exchange rates might rise to fairly high levels before remitters found it profitable to ship specie rather than to purchase bills of exchange. Another factor was the shortage of currency in Britain itself and the profitable alternative uses for bullion, such as trade with India and the Far East,207 which probably helped to discourage shipments of specie to America.

Buyers and sellers of bills had to assess many different factors affecting the demand for the supply of bills of exchange before determining the true price of sterling. It was often difficult to reach a decision within the three days set by the rules adopted in 1769. As James Robinson said in 1774, "a precise number of days cannot be assertained. As it will Sometimes require more sometimes less." to settle the rate of exchange.208

130

SUMMARY

Although the Williamsburg Meeting of Merchants lacked the formal organization and specialized facilities of a modern money market, or even those of London in the eighteenth century, it performed the essential functions necessary to the financing of the business of the colony. Since the financial functions of the Meeting developed in response to the particular needs of the decentralized economy of eighteenth-century Virginia, its method of operation and its structure could be expected to differ from money markets of other places and other times.

Even though the Williamsburg Meeting provided facilities for the settlement of debts contracted in all parts of the colony, it was still necessary for merchants to travel to county courts to make collections and payments.209 For example, Francis Jerdone sold bills of exchange at the Meeting of Merchants in Williamsburg in April, 1757, and used the proceeds to redeem "notes of hand … payable at the May Court" of Hanover County.210 Adam Fleming reported in April, 1773, that he had "just Returned from Sussex Court", where he had gone to make collections from debtors.211

Businessmen very likely were inconvenienced by the difficulty of securing bills of exchange at times other than the Meetings. Charles Steuart reported to a correspondent in 1760 that it would be possible "to get one [i. e., a bill of exchange] from Phila[delphia]. sooner 131 than I can depend on send[in]g it to you from hence."212 The periodic Meeting, though, provided the only opportunity for businessmen in widely scattered localities in Virginia to assess the many factors bearing on the price of sterling exchange.

132

WILLIAMSBURG AND NORFOLK IN THE VIRGINIA ECONOMY

Despite the lack of formal organization before 1769, merchants travelled regularly to Williamsburg or appointed a fellow trader to transact their business at the Meetings.1

Although the merchants had adopted definite rules, Meetings after 1769 were frequently late in starting or were so sparsely attended that merchants found it difficult to transact their affairs in Williamsburg. From the Meeting scheduled for October 25, 1770, one merchant wrote on November 5 that "No Business is yet done here."2 In the following spring, Keil Jamieson stated that "the people up the County will not be in here before the 3d. or 4th." of May for the April 25 session,3 but Atkinson complained that little business was being transacted on May 6.4

A similar situation prevailed in the following year. James Robinson reported on May 7, almost two weeks after the scheduled start of the April Meeting: "The Merchants from different parts of the Colony are not all come to Town and altho it is so late there is no business done."5 This Meeting so late in finishing its tasks that merchants was agreed to postpone until July 20 the session regularly scheduled for 133 June.6 However, Atkinson wrote from Williamsburg on July 21: "The Merch[an]ts, altho' it is a Month later than common, are not yet met at this place."7 Robinson reported that the exchange rate was not settled at this Meeting until August 4.8

Since the April and October Meetings, coinciding with the General Court sessions, often terminated their business so late, it was formally agreed in November, 1772, to assemble in January and July rather than during the Oyer Court in December and June.9 In spite of the threat of fines to be levied on those who failed to arrive at Williamsburg, the Meeting of 1773, was late in starting. Neil Jamieson wrote on February 1 that "as yet no business is done, nor do I know what will be done, nor when I shall get home."10

So few came to Williamsburg for the Meeting of July, 1773, that apparently no business was transacted. James Glassford of Norfolk reported on August 3 that:

Of All the Courts or meetings you was ever at in this place I am persuaded you never was at such a one as this I do not find that the least sort of business of any kind has yet been done The Gent[leme]n from Peter[s]b[ur]g and some from James River are not yet come to Town when they will come is uncertain and when the business will be begun to afterward is more so.11
134 Four days later, Thomas Nelson, Jr., wrote that the "Merchants of this Country are not yet collected together to transact business."12 After two weeks, the few who came to Williamsburg returned home without determining the exchange rate.13

Neil Jamieson went to Williamsburg for the October Meeting, heard that "the James River Gent[lemen]. will not be down till the 8th." of November, and decided to go to Richmond to attend to business there.14 A month later, Jamieson wrote from Williamsburg that "its yet Uncertain what time I shall be ready to leave this place, there is not yet any appearances of business."15

James Robinson summarized well the problem created by the lack of prompt attendance to transact business. As he was about to depart from Falmouth at the end of May in 1774 to attend the April Meeting, Robinson explained to his employers:

This meeting has been long postponed, indeed we have been for years past detained so long in Town before the whole company were assembled that every person is in doubt when to go: As he is loth to be there before the bulk to lose so much time -Attempts have been made and resolutions signd by numbers of the Trade to meet at a certain day during the sitting of the Generall Court, but they have here very small effect, soon become obsolett and greatly discourages any further tryal1.16
"The time appointed for the Meeting of the Merch[an]ts in Williamsburg 135 have been so badly observed of late," wrote Robert Pleasants, "that I apprehend they must fall on some other method in future by which to regulate the fulfilling [of] their contracts."17

In part, the difficulties in enforcing attendance at the Meetings resulted from the large increase in the debt load of Virginians in the l760's. In order to finance the tremendous economic expansion of the colony after the close of the French and Indian War, planters and farmers had borrowed heavily. For example, the Colchester store of John Glassford & Company carried on its books debts of only £975 Virginia currency in 1760. This sum increased to £3,500 in 1763, to £4,900 in 1766, and to £8,500 in 1769.18 As indicated previously, it was in this period that the large planters became heavily indebted to English firms. Some individuals owed London houses as much as £11,000.19

Even more serious in creating debt difficulties was the depression in the tobacco trade in 1772-1773. Starting with the failure of a large London banking house, the panic resulted in the failure of several large tobacco firms. George Norton reported that the crisis in London was so serious that "not a day passes but we hear of suicides commited by those whose Cases are render'd desparate."20 In this situation, firms stopped the issuing of new credit in Virginia and 136 attempted to collect their debts. William Cuninghame & Company of Glasgow came "to a fix'd resolution to adopt a new Plan in Carrying on their Business more frugally; not only in limiting us with regard to the drafts to be made on them, butt also in the supplys of our Goods."21 John Norton instructed his son in Virginia to collect debts and remit the money as he was being pressed by his creditors in England. John Hatley Norton, failing to realize the seriousness of the crisis in Britain, continued to advance credit to Virginians. The elder Norton commented that he saw "little use of money's being collected if not remitted me towards payment of Debts here" and urged that Hatley come to London "that you may be convinc'd of our danger."22 Some British merchants even went to Virginia to collect personally their outstanding debts.23

Since Williamsburg was the clearing house for credits in the colony, it is not surprising that those who found it difficult to pay their debts simply did not attend the Meetings. "Those who could not live up to their promises just did not come to Williamsburg."24

Political controversy, as well as economic difficulty, created problems for Virginians in the 1770's. The dispute over the proper policy towards the revenue and regulatory measures of the British government brought to the surface the deep cleavage in Virginia between the merchants and the planters. As early as 1751, Charles Steuart of 137 Norfolk expressed the view held by many businessmen:

Our misfortune is that the Legislature is cheifly composed of Country Gentlemen who in their Wisdoms think fit to lay the Burthen for the support of [the provincial] Government upon Trade, not considering that they are nearly concerned in the Increase or decay of it. 25
By the same token, planters tended to regard merchants as parasites living on the fruits of the agrarian's labor. William Lee bitterly castigated the Scottish traders in this way:
A North Briton is something like the stinking and troublesome weed we call in Virginia wild onion. Whenever one is permitted to fix, the number soon increases so fast, that it is extremely difficult to eradicate them, they poison the ground so, that no wholesome plant can thrive.26

Merchants and planters, though, generally cooperated in the protest against the Stamp Act in 1765-1766, because of the strong position which London and Glasgow firms took in opposing the measure.27 But, business was slow to participate in the planter-led opposition to the Townshend Act. Following the pattern developed in the northern colonies, members of the House of Burgesses in May, 1769, formed an Association and agreed to non-importation of certain British commodities, principally luxury items as well as those upon which the Townshend duties were levied. There was also a prohibition on the importation of slaves. No enforcement machinery was provided, however, so that the plan was "honored by the public at large principally in the violation."28

A year later, the merchants were forced into line with a reorganization of the Association. James Parker of Norfolk described 138 the circumstances leading to the adoption of the agreement at the Meeting of June, 1772:

The Assembly met in Oct[obe]r. before which time Colo Arch[ibal]d Cary had waited on most of the principall Merch[an]ts. about the head of James River, told them that there would be genteel message Sent them by the Gent[leme]n. of the Assembly when the trade were Collected at Williamsburg requesting them to Join in an Association he hoped they would be all Consenting to it, if not he did hesitate to tell them that the Militia would be Raised to shut up their Stores, & if that had not the desired affect Said Some thing else would be done, that would be more Affectuall what occurred to them was that attempts would be made to prevent people from paying there debts, had this been the Case (& then no Telling what lengths people Regardless of law & authority will go) you can better figure to your self what the Situation of affairs would have been here then I can describe it, in short all the Merchants above became advocates for the Association, which Obliged us Contrary to our inclination to Comply with there Requests, & most people of Consequence who were not present have since signed it.29
By the terms of the new agreement, Associators agreed to boycott violators, and a committee of inspection was set up for each county to publish the names of offenders.30 Merchants were able, in spite of the circumstances under which they joined the Association, to secure some favorable revision in the plan originally proposed by the planters, principally to broaden the list of goods which could be imported.31 James Robinson commented, on the Association, that "as it stands at present it will not be of great prejudice to the Trading part of the Colony."32

139

James Parker regarded the Association as "a foolish affair,"33 but Robinson reported from Falmouth that "no person this way Objects to Signing this Association & I think there is the greatest probabillity of its becoming generall."34 However, Parker's opinion that "all of the associations in the Course of a few Months will fall to the Ground"35 proved to be more accurate than Robinson's prediction, Not only were many merchants out of sympathy with the movement, but the rank and file of the population apparently never extended it wholehearted support. From the point of view of the political leaders who supported the economic boycott against England, the Association was developed at a poor time. For when the planters and merchants were preparing the agreement, Virginia was on the eve of a boom in the tobacco trade. Under these circumstances, "it was difficult to convince" the people "of their grievances."36 Also, word came from other colonies that their non-importation agreements had been abandoned. The movement gradually died out, and its formal ending was declared at the Meeting of July, 1771.37

A manifesto "To the PLANTERS OF VIRGINIA" in the Virginia 140 Gazette in October, 1771, summarized in strong terms the agrarian attitude toward the Virginia business community. "In these times of liberty and patriotism," the letter from "A Planter" began, "I have expected to see the tyranny of the merchants opposed. As the crisis now draws nigh (the latter end of our General Court) when they meet to rivet the chains of the planters, I cannot avoid giving them notice of their approaching danger." The writer went on to exclaim that:

though we all know that we are slaves to the power of the merchants: For who can truly say he is free, when there is a fixed price set upon his tobacco, and the goods he purchases, at rates he does not like? Long custom makes that seem tolerable, which in reality is a great imposition; … Do they [i.e. , the merchants] not lay heavy burthens upon us that they will not touch with one of their fingers? Do they not meet twice a year in Williamsburg to consult, and plan schemes to enslave us, by setting their own price on our tobacco, and what per cent. we must give them for goods? What a blind infatuated multitude must we be, to suffer those, who ought to be dependent on us, to become our masters? Do we not support, do we not uphold them in luxury and wantonness, while we and our families want even the common necessaries of life?
38

Thus, many merchants remained away from Williamsburg because they could not pay their debts, and planters viewed the Meetings as a way in which businessmen exploited them. However, even though the impact of the business cycle and the effects of legislative and administrative actions of the British government directly affected the functioning of the Meetings of Merchants in the 1770's, more basic factors might have been in operation. If we view the periodic Williamsburg Meeting as providing the central system of exchange for the decentralized agricultural economy of Virginia, we must look to alternative methods by which the functions of a central system of 141 exchange could be performed. In other words, whether or not "wars, depression, natural calamities, and civil unrest followed one another with dismaying regularity,"39 it would be only logical to expect that fewer people might find it necessary to travel periodically to Williamsburg as Norfolk developed into a metropolitan center for the lower Chesapeake area.

THE GROWTH OF NORFOLK AS A METROPOLITAN CENTER

On the eve of the American Revolution, Norfolk was growing rapidly to a position as the center through which the economic relations of Virginia were maintained with the outside world. The Norfolk Committee of Correspondence pointed out in 1774 that "altho' we are not one of the larger commercial towns on the continent, … the trade is more collected here than in any other place of this well-watered and extensive dominion."40

Certainly, Norfolk possessed the basic location requirement for a metropolitan center in the eighteenth century — a fine harbor. Located at a strategic position near the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, the Elizabeth River provided for Norfolk a combination of natural advantages — depth of water, shelter from the sea, and nearness to the open sea — exceeded by no other port on the eastern seaboard except New York.41 142 Paradoxically, the extensive river system of the Chesapeake region, which had slowed Norfolk's growth as an entrepot, provided the major lines of communication with the port's hinterland. In addition, over-land communication was maintained with eastern North Carolina over roads improved in large part by Norfolk county authorities.42

By the 1770's, Norfolk possessed a growing merchant marine. With more of the shipping of the colony concentrated at Norfolk, shippers found it more convenient to apply there for space or to charter vessels. Sometimes, merchants in Norfolk acted as informal ship brokers for their correspondents. For example, a Blandford storekeeper wrote to Jamieson:

I want a Ship on Charter for Glasgow, of about 400 hhds burthen, to come up James river as far as City point to load, …

I understand the Diamond lys at Your port, and is much in want of a freight, and may be had Cheap — I have Spoke to James Dunlop who is it seems somehow concern'd with her and is now here, … However as you know more of these things than I do my freind, I would sooner that you should do such a thing for me than myself, provided You are in no way interested in the Matter (If You are interested, this letter is quite void to all intents, and I expect You will not take any notice of it to my prejudice or indeed in any respect) I would therefore have You to Apply to Boyd, and Screw him Down to as low terms as possible … 43

Norfolk's shipyards provided facilities necessary for repairing as well as building all kinds of water-craft. Norfolk shipbuilders contracted not only with local merchants but also with British firms, since colonial ships usually were constructed more cheaply than those built in Britain.44 However, there was some criticism of the quality of Norfolk- 143 built ships. A member of the Glassford firm of Glasgow expressed the hope that the vessel which Jamieson had ordered to be built in Norfolk would "be better work & Materials than those we had from that Country formerly."45 Refitting of ships was another major activity which provided work for ship carpenters, glaziers, iron-workers, coopers, and sail-makers in the shipyards of Norfolk.46

As Professor Gras has pointed out, "one of the pillars on which the metropolitan structure rests is the possession of a variety of wares, a full store of all commodities which are available and in demand. These may be secured in extended trade or may be produced within the metropolitan marketing area, either in the metropolis itself or in the hinterland."47 In other words, one of the main functions of a metropolitan center is to provide facilities for the collection of the area's export products and for the distribution of imported goods.

Norfolk, which in the seventeenth century was a local mart for the forest products of the adjacent counties, took advantage of the geography of North Carolina to become a major collection point for export commodities. Because of the shallow inlets from the ocean into Pamilico and Albemarle Sounds, Norfolk became a transshipment point for vessels to and from North Carolina.48 By 1733, Norfolk handled £50,000 worth of Carolina products, such as corn, meat products, naval stores, skins and furs, wax and tallow, and tobacco. Most of these commodities were exported to the West Indies, so that Norfolk became a distributing 144 center for the rum, sugar, molasses, and other products of the Islands, as well as for European merchandise.49

Since Norfolk's merchants provided market facilities for grains and meat products, it was only natural that Virginians shipped their own corn, wheat, and pork to that center. In contrast to the tobacco trade, where public warehouses were used, storage of grains and meats on the rivers constituted a problem. A central assembly point was a real convenience, if not a necessity in many cases. For the reception and storage of produce, Norfolk merchants built an extensive system of wharves and warehouses. The wharf of William Orange, for example, was said to be "one of the greatest works of the kind that ever had been erected in that Country;" it contained eleven storehouses and was valued at £5,000-6,000 in 1774.50 Furthermore, the bids and offers of merchants disclosed the supply and demand situation, so that producers could be assured of receiving the going market price for their commodities. Charles Steuart of Norfolk and Portsmouth, regularly quoted in his letters in the 1750's the "prices current" of a whole range of Virginia and Carolina products, as well as those of West Indian commodities.51

By the 1770's, Norfolk had established its predominance as the export center of most Virginia products except tobacco. Governor Fauquier maintained in 1764 that Norfolk had engrossed the grain trade of the colony.52 Neil Jamieson summarized Norfolk's position on the eve of the Revolution in this way; 145

The greatest of the wheat and Corn as well as some of the Tob[acc]o & Naval Stores are loaded at Norfolk and of late years this trade greatly Increas'd, because we found a ship Lay as safe at Norfolk than any where else in the Country, the people kept their health better and the Expence of Country freight was lower to Norfolk than from one River to another, so that by loading at Norfolk when the Cargo laid in different Rivers, was cheaper and Sooner performed than if the ship lay in any other part of the Country, had not these unfortunate troubles hapen[ne]d [i.e., 1781] the American Revolution], I should [believe] by this day [i. e., 1781] that the largest parts of the Exports for all articles (Tob[acc]o excepted) would [have] been from Norfolk.53
The significance of Jamieson's testimony is even more striking when one considers the rapidly growing importance of grains and other foodstuffs in the Virginia economy.

Even in the tobacco trade, Norfolk was assuming some significance in the 1770's. Two decades previously, Charles Steuart reported that "we deal very little in tobacco in this part of the country."54 By 1770, however, merchants were discussing the relative advantages of loading tobacco at Norfolk or on one of the major rivers. For example, Arthur Morson, manager of the Glassford store at Falmouth, wrote to Jamieson in 1770:

If you think proper to Load the Gordon [with tobacco] at Norfolk I believe you need not send any more craft to Poto[mac] … if you send her to this River w[i]t[h] a flat, I believe she might be very expeditiously loaded … but you are the best Judge whether pilotage & entry into this River would ballance it or not.55
Adam Fleming, the Glassford storekeeper at Cabin Point, regularly sent shipments of tobacco for the company's ships loading at Norfolk. Schooners and sloops, with capacities of thirty to sixty hogsheads, 146 generally were used.56 It was particularly advantageous to load at Norfolk late in the marketing season, when tobacco might have to be collected from many points to complete a cargo. For example, a London merchant proposed to Jamieson that his ship "should load at Norfolk & have Tob[acc]o sent down from James, York & Rappa[hannock] & Potomack River from any of your friends that have any left."57

Industry also was beginning to develop in Norfolk. A group of ten or twelve merchants organized a distilling company in 1769, so that Virginia traders need not have to purchase rum from New Englanders, "whom they absolutly abhor and detest."58 The company invested £5,400 of its original capital of £6,000 Virginia currency in land, buildings, equipment, and slaves, so that it was necessary to increase the capitalization to £6,000 sterling in 1772. So profitable was the distillery that the amount of capital was doubled in five years by the reinvestment of all earnings. Sixteen partners, most of whom were merchants in Norfolk or Portsmouth, held shares in the concern in 1775.59

Another important local industry was the rope walk and tan yard operated by James Campbell and Company. This too was backed by Norfolk merchants, who claimed it was the largest plant of its kind in America. The enterprise, whose net worth was valued at £16,800 147 sterling in 1774, owned fourteen buildings and fifty slaves for use in the manufacture of rope and leather.60

In spite of the expansion of commerce and industry in Norfolk, the financial business of the colony continued to be transacted at the Williamsburg Meetings. Merchants from Norfolk as well as from other parts of the colony travelled periodically to the capital to settle contracts and to buy and sell bills of exchange. Whether further centralization at Norfolk of the trade and shipping of the colony would have resulted in the development of a foreign exchange market is impossible to determine.

At any rate, the American Revolution shattered Norfolk's most promising future. Most of the members of the business community, who remained loyal to Britain, chose exile when Norfolk was captured by American forces.

CONCLUSION

To summarize briefly, the Williamsburg Meeting of Merchants performed many of the functions of a metropolitan center for the Virginia economy. The Meetings provided, most importantly, a clearing house for financial transactions, as well as something of a central market for the major export commodities of the colony. The structure of this system of exchange, though, more nearly resembled the great fairs of the Middle Ages than the modern metropolis, primarily because business was so decentralized. Businessmen conducted their day-to-day affairs, such as the purchase of tobacco and wheat and the sale of merchandise, in many small communities in all parts of the province, 148 each of which maintained separate ties with the outside world. With the centralization of trade and shipping, Norfolk was becoming the entrepot through which flowed the colony's exports and imports, particularly as the production of grain assumed growing importance. Yet, Norfolk, as the most important commercial center in Virginia, did not possess all of the facilities necessary to make it the metropolitis of the Chesapeake to the extent Philadelphia dominated the economic life of the Delaware Valley. The financial center for business remained at Williamsburg, where the periodic Meeting provided the mechanism to settle contracts and to negotiate sterling exchange.

Footnotes

^1. Carl Bridenbaugh, Seat of Empire: The Political Role of Eighteenth-Century Williamsburg (Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg, 1950, p. 78.
^2 "A French Traveller in the Colonies, 1765," American Historical Review, XXVI (1921), pp. 741-743.
^3 [St. George Tucker], "A letter to the Rev. Jerediah Morse," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st series, II (1894), p. 196.
^4 [Lyon G, Tyler], "Williamsburg — The Old Colonial Capital," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st series., XVI (1907), p. 20.
^5 Robert W. Coakley, "Virginia Commerce during the American Revolution" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1949), pp, 38, 70-72.
^6 N.S.B. Gras, An Introduction to Economic History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1922), p. 186.
^7 See Curtis P, Nettels, "The Economic Relations of Boston, Philadelphia, and New York, 1680-1715," Journal of Economic and Business History, III (1931), pp, 185-215. W. T. Baxter, The House of Hancock: Business in Boston, 1724-1775 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945); Virginia D. Harrington, The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935); Harry D. Berg, "Merchants and Mercantile Life in Colonial Philadelphia 1748-1763," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1941); Leila Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934).
^8 Arthur P. Middleton, Tobacco Coast: A Maritime of Chesapeake (Newport News: The Mariners' Museum, 1953), pp, 31-34; "Virginia Revolutionary Commerce," pp. 23-24
^9 Thomas Jefferson, "Notes on Virginia," in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, edited by A. Koch and H. Peden (New York: Modern Library, 1944), p. 191.
^10 Philip A. Bruce, Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (2 vols.; New York: Macmillan, 1895), II, pp. 522-565.
^11 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, pp. 40-41; Coakley, "Virginia Revolutionary Commerce," pp. 24-25.
^12 Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Norfolk: Historic Southern Port (Durham: Duke University Press, 1931) pp. 28-51.
^13 Tyler, "Williamsburg — The Old Colonial Capital," loc. cit, p, 11.
^14 "Journal of Alexander Macaulay," [February 25, 1783], William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XI (1903), pp. 186-187.
^15 Governor Fauquier to the Lords of Trade, November 3, 1765. C.O. /1331, p. 139, Public Record Office, (Photostat in Research Department, Colonial Williamsburg.)
^16 "A French Traveller in the Colonies, 1765," loc. cit., p. 741
^17 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), March 22, 1770. See Mary Stephenson, "Brick house Tavern," Report of Research Department, Colonial Williamsburg, March, 1956.
^18 James Robinson to William Henderson, April 17, 1770, Letterbook of William Cuninhame & Company (National Library of Scotland), I.
^19 Robert Carter to Col. Warner Lewis, July 24, 1773, Letterbook of Robert Carter (Duke University), II.
^20 Governor Fauquier to the Lords of Trade, November 3, 1765.
^21 Thomas Nelson, Jr. to Sam[ue]l Martin, December 2, 1773, Letterbook of Thomas and William Nelson (Virginia State Library Archives).
^22 "A French Traveller in the Colonies, 1765," loc. cit., pp. 742-743.
^23 Rutherfoord Goodwin, A Brief & True Report Concerning Williamsburg in Virginia (Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg, 1940), p. 36.
^24 Virginia Gazette (Rind), September 8, 1768; September 7, 1769; September 20, 1769. The first packet evidently commenced operations in 1762, the other in 1768.
^25 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), October 8, 1772. The advertisement of sale or lease of the property on Hog Island stated that "the Stable only brings, in publick Times, from three to five pounds a Day, and upwards."
^26 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), June 29, 1769.
^27 Virginia Historical Register, III (1850), pp. 79-80, from Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), June 28, 1770 (no known issue in existence.)
^28 Harrington, New York Merchant, pp. 74-75. Sellers, Charleston Business, p. 73. "The purpose of the New York Chamber of Commerce according to its own prospectus was to promote and encourage commerce, support industry, adjust disputes relative to trade and navigation, and procure such laws and regulations as might be found necessary for the benefit of trade in general."
^29 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), May 16, 1771.
^30 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon) November 26, 1772. Virginia Gazette (Rind), November 26, 1772. 0n the committee, there were four from Norfolk; three from Petersburg; two each from Yorktown, Suffolk, Hanover Town, and the Eastern Shore; and one each from Falmouth, Nansemond, Colchester, Wicomico, Hobb's Hole, Leedstown, Aylett's, Dumfries, Osborne's, Rocky Ridge, Hampton, Mattox Bridge, and Williamsburg.
^31 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), June 30, 1774.
^32 Philip Lightfoot to William Bassett, August 21, 1735, Bassett Family Papers (Library of Congress).
^33 Francis Jerdone to Neill Buchanan, April 23, 1741, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone (College of William and Mary), I.
^34 Francis Jerdone to William Montgomery, May 12, 1749, "Letterbook of Francis Jerdone," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XI (1902), p. 155.
^35 Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, 1756-1763 passim. It is possible, of course, that Jerdone attended Meetings at other times, at which he did not write letters.
^36 Baxter, The House of Hancock, pp. 295-296.
^37 Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956; first published in France, 1933), p. 98.
^38 Ibid., pp. 96-102. See also Joseph Kulischer, "Fairs," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (15 vols.; New York: Macmillan, VI, pp. 58-64.
^39 Coutts & Crosse to John Glassford, November 16, 1757, Papers of Neil Jamieson (Library of Congress), I, p. 2.
^40 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), August 5, 1773.
^41 Ibid., April 16, 1772.
^42 Robert Plessants to John Pemberton, October 8, 1773, Letterbook of Robert Plessants (College of William and Mary).
^43 Charles Steuart to Philip Livingston, February 8, 1759, Letter-book of Charles Steuart (Historical Society of Pennsylvania), II.
^44 Virginia Gazette, February 27, 1752; Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), July 30, 1773; November 4, 1773; November 11, 1773.
^45 Virginia Gazette, October 12, 1752; Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), June 11, 1767; October 22, 1767; November 5, 1767.
^46 Ibid., November 14, 1771.
^47 Joseph S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (2 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), I pp. 75-103; II, pp. 3-33. Davis found only seven private business corporations chartered in the eighteenth century: a trading company (which survived less than one year), two groups of wharf proprietors, three water companies, and a fire insurance society, all in the northern colonies. Corporations "were distinctly exceptions in the business world rather than the rule." Ibid., II, pp. 3-4.
^48 Agreement signed by Neil Jamieson, Robert Donald, John Esdale, Neill Campbell, James Lyle, and James Buchanan, May 9, 1770, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XII, p. 2551. The agreement went on to specify prices to be paid for the slaves in the West Indies, arrangements for insurance and commissions, methods of sale in Virginia, and the division of the profits. Jamieson was in charge of the venture. All of the others stores in the Richmond area. Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), November 8, 1770; January 10, 1771; June 13, 1771; Virginia Gazette (Rind), December 1, 1768.
^49 Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, p. 101. "The Champagne fairs were so widely frequented that most debts were made payable at one or other of them, no matter where contracted." See also, Abbott P. Usher, The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943), Chapter IV, "The Fairs and Inter-regional Clearance."
^50 Robert Carter to Mr. Carr, January 1, 1773, Letterbook of Robert Carter, II.
^51 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), July 9, 1772.
^52 Ibid., October 28, 1773.
^53 Ibid., July 1, 1773.
^54 Ibid., November 4, 1773.
^55 Charles Steuart to James Wellford, June 30, 1761, Letterbook of Charles Steuart (Historical Society of Pennsylvania), I.
^56 Calvin B. Coulter, "The Virginia Merchant" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1944), p. 52.
^57 Leverett S. Lyon, "Commodity Exchanges," Encylopaedia of the Social Sciences, IV, pp. 44-48
^1 Virginia and Maryland together accounted for over 98 per cent of tobacco imports. Although exact data were not available, Virginia was responsible by the 1760's for the largest share exported from the two colonies. For Scotland, "the ratio of the Virginia to the Maryland imports at this time [1773] was generally three to one or four to one." —Jacob Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707-1775," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., XI (1954), p. 195, n. 68.
^a Crop year, from October 1 of previous year to October 1 of year indicated.
^b Includes Lower James District also.
^c Includes 3 hogheads exported from Accomack District.
^d Includes 1,974 hogsheads exported in "free bottoms," or ships registered in Virginia. See Hening, Statutes, Vol. VIII, p. 252.
^e Includes 3,116 hogsheads exported in "free bottoms."
^f Includes 6,409 hogsheads exported in "free bottoms."
^g Includes 5,288 hogsheads exported in "free bottoms."
^2 G. N. Clark, Guide to English Commercial Statistics, 1696-1782 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1938), pp. 33-42.
^3 See Robert P. Thomson, "The Merchant in Virginia, 1700-1775" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1955), pp. 84-86.
^4 Lewis C. Gary, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860 (2 vols.; New York: Peter Smith, 1941), I, p. 215.
^5 Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860 (2 vols.; New York: Peter Smith, 1941), I, pp. 217-218. Middleton, Tobacco Coast, pp. 97-98.
^6 William Tatham, An Historical and Practical Essay on the Culture and Commerce of Tobacco (London: Vernor & Hood, 1800), pp. 5-6. See also Avery O. Craven, Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1606-1860 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1926), p. 61.
^7 Ibid., p. 69. Tatham, Essay on Tobacco, p. 6.
^8 John Page, Jr. to John Norton & Son, October 11, 1771, Frances N, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons: Merchants of London and Virginia (Richmond: Dietz Press, 1937), p. 199.
^9 Moses Robertson to John Norton & Son, September 21, 1772, Ibid, p. 274.
^10 Tatham, Essays on Tobacco, pp. 7--27.
^11 Ibid., p. 37.
^12 Ibid., p. 42.
^13 Robert Anderson to Messrs. Micajah Richd Perry, n.d. [March-May, 1715], Letterbook of Robert Anderson (University of Virginia).
^14 William W. Hening (ed.), The Statutes at Large: being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia (13 vols.; Richmond, IV, pp. 247-270. Although earlier attempts had been made to establish an inspection system, this was the first successful statute and remained the basic law, with minor amendments, through the rest of the colonial period. Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 95--125.
^15 David Ross to John White Holt, August 17, 1772, John Hook Papers (Duke University).
^16 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, June 15, 1772, Letterbook of Harry Piper (University of Virginia).
^17 For details of the British system of Mercantilism, see Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939). Oliver Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951, Chapters I-III, contain the most recent interpretation of the effects of the laws upon economic life and development in the colonies.
^18 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, p. 110
^19 Price, "Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade," loc. cit., pp. 180-181.
^20 Price, "Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade," loc. cit., pp. 183-191.
^21 Gray, Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, I, p. 255. Middleton, Tobacco Coast, pp. 126-127.
^22 Violet Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), pp. 63, 93-94. Vertrees J. Wyckoff, Tobacco Regulation in Colonial Maryland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 116. Gray, Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, I, pp. 245-255. Price, "Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade," loc. cit., pp. 190-191.
^23 Middleton, Tobacco Coast, pp. 129-130. "So important was the trade [with France] that during the War of the Austrian Succession and again during the Seven Years' War the belligerents agreed to issue special passes to British or neutral vessels exempting from capture ships engaged in transporting tobacco from England to France." Gray, Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, I, p. 255.
^24 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," Chapter II. See Mason (ed.) John Norton & Sons. passim, for correspondence regarding many of the details of the consignment system.
^25 John Norton to [John Hatley Norton ], April 21, 1770, Ibid., pp. 129-130.
^26 William Reynolds to George F. Norton, June 3, 1774, Letterbook of William Reynolds, I.
^27 See Letterbook of Robert Anderson, passim.
^28 See Turner to [John Hatley Norton], March 27, 1768, in Mason (ed.) John Norton & Sons, p. 40.
^29 Charles Steuart to Bowden & Farquhar, July 20, 1751, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I.
^30 R. C. Nicholas to [John Norton], November 30, 1772, Mason (ed.) John Norton & Sons, p. 283.
^31 William Nelson to John Norton, August 11, 1772, Ibid., p. 268.
^32 Robert Anderson to Gilbert Higginson, May 11, 1715, Letterbook of Robert Anderson
^33 Petr Lyons to John Norton, November 20, 1771, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, p. 207.
^34 Gray, Southern Agriculture in the United States to 1860, I, p. 275. Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 49. Primage is an allowance paid by the consignee to the mariners and master of a vessel for loading the cargo. Porterage is an allowance paid porters for carrying the goods away from the wharf, or for shipping them from the wharf. Wharfage is the fee paid for landing goods on a wharf, or for shipping them from the wharf. Lighterage is the fee paid for transporting the cargo from the ship to the wharf. Ibid., p. 38, n. 19.
^35 See, for example, Rebecca Chamberlayne to John Norton, July 13, 1771; Petr. Lyons to John Norton, July 15, 1771; Ro. C. Nicholas to [John Norton], September 7, 1771, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, pp. 165-166, 168, 184. Actually, much of the irritation conveyed in these letters was directed against the London tradesmen, but Virginians urged more careful supervision by Norton.
^36 Ro. C. Nicholas to John Norton & Son, July 30, 1773, Ibid., p. 341.
^37 Thomson, "The Virginia Merchant," pp. 51-52.
^38 John Mair, Book-keeping Methodized (Edinburgh, 1752; 4th edition), in William and Mary Quarterly, 1st. ser., XIV, (1910) pp. 87-93. See Middleton, Tobacco Coast, p. 441, regarding error in the date of the edition cited in the footnote to the excerpts printed in the Quarterly.
^39 James Parker to Charles Steuart, January 28, 1770, Charles Steuart Papers, (National Library of Scotland), Ms 5040, p. 81.
^40 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 157-168.
^41 Ibid., pp. 173-174. H. R. Fox Bourne, English Merchants: Memoirs in Illustration of the Progress of British Commerce (2 vols.; London: Richard Bentley, 1866), II, pp. 179-180.
^42 "A Factor is, a Correspondent or Agent residing beyond Seas, or in some remote Part, commissioned by Merchants (called his Employers) to buy or sell Goods for their Account, or some way to assist them in carrying on Commerce." John Mair, Book-keeping Methodiz'd: or a Methodical Treatise of Merchant-Accompts, … (Edinburgh: W. Sands, 1741; 2d ed.), p. 224.
^43 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 175-180.
^44 Letterbook of Roger Atkinson (University of Virginia), passim. Letterbook of Harry Piper, passim. Both of these letterbooks cover the period from 1768-1775.
^45 A. F. Voke, "Accounting Methods of Colonial Merchants in Virginia," Journal of Accountancy, XLII (1926), p.5. The purchase of a cargo of tobacco, which cost £8,646 earned Francis Jerdone a commission of £432 in 1759. Invoice of 310 h[ogs]h[ea]ds Tobacco, bought by Francis Jerdone, by order & for acco[un]t of Messrs Alexander Speirs & Hugh Brown Merch[an]ts in Glasgow, … June 1st, 1759. Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, II.
^46 Price, "Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade," loc. cit., pp. 191-195.
^47 [James Gourlay], A Glasgow Miscellany: The Tobacco Period in Glasgow, 1707-1775 (n.p., n.d.), pp. 28-29.
^48 James Robinson to William Cuninghame, October 8, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^49 Idem.
^50 Thomas Jett to Perkins, Buchanan & Brown, September 19, 1772, Letterbook of Thomas Jett, Jerdone Papers.
^51 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, February 26, 1773, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^52 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, September 24, 1773, Ibid., II.
^53 Alexander Blair to Neil Jamieson, August 15, 1770, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XII, p. 2707.
^54 James Robinson to Andrew Chalmer, May 31, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^55 James Robinson to Bennett Price, September 11, 1768, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^56 James Robinson to William Cuninghame, February 8, 1773, Ibid. I.
^57 James Robinson to John Turner, March 18, 1773, Ibid., I.
^58 David Ross to John Hook, May 30, 1774, John Hook Papers.
^59 James Ingram to Charles Steuart, April 25, 1771, Charles Steuart Papers, MS 5026, p. 263.
^60 James Parker to Charles Steuart, April 19, 1771, Ibid., MS 5040, p. 125.
^61 Alex. Henderson to Neil Jamieson, December 26, 1774, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XX, p, 4660.
^62 James Ingram to Charles Steuart, April 25, 1771, Charles Steuart Papers, MS. 5026, p. 263.
^63 James Robinson to Francis Hay, October 13, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^64 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, February 19, 1774, Ibid., II.
^65 Price, "Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade," loc. cit., p. 194. The Richmond store building which had belonged to the Cuninghame Company was large enough to be used in 1787 for meetings of the Senate and House of Delegates of Virginia.
^66 Arthur Morson to Glassford, Gordon, Monteath & Company, January 1, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVI, p. 3731.
^67 George Kerr to Neil Jamieson, March 2, 1774, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XIX, p. 4384.
^68 James Robinson to John Turner, April 11, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^69 Matthias Ellegood to Neil Jamieson, June 7, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVIII, p. 4025.
^70 Thomas Jett to Perkins, Buchanan and Brown, November 5, 1772, Letterbook of Thomas Jett, Jerdone Papers.
^71 Ebenezer Maehang to Neil Jamieson, June 13, 1770, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XII, p. 2621.
^72 James Robinson to John Turner, October 6, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^73 Adam Fleming to Neil Jamieson, June 18, 1770, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XII, p. 2632.
^74 Arthur Morson to Neil Jamieson, June 6, 1770, Ibid., XII, p. 2611.
^75 James Robinson to John Turner, October 6, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^76 Neil Jamieson & Company to Capt. Neil Jamieson, April 6, 1767, Papers of Neil Jamieson, VIII, p. 1709.
^77 James Robinson to William Cuninghame, October 8, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^78 James Robinson to "Dr. Sir," June 1, 1773, Ibid., I.
^79 James Robinson to William Cuninghame, October 8, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^80 James Robinson to Francis Hay, October 13, 1772, Ibid., I.
^81 Voke, "Accounting Methods of Colonial Merchants in Virginia," loc. cit., p. 2.
^82 Voke, "Accounting Methods of Colonial Merchants in Virginia," pp. 6-8. Robert A. East, "The Business Entrepreneur in a Changing Colonial Economy, 1763-1795," Tasks of Economic History (Supplemental Issue of The Journal of Economic History), VI (1946), pp. 24-25. See Baxter, The House of Hancock, pp. 35-38, for a description of the accounting system used by the Hancocks of Boston.
^83 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, October 18, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^84 Price, "Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade," loc. cit., p. 194.
^85 Ibid., p. 192
^86 W. T. Baxter, who has made a detailed study of the mercantile two generations of the Hancock family in Massachusetts, communications as the principal problem of colonial commerce. They "were bad… And the effects on business procedure were very marked." — The House of Hancock p. 294.
^87 Francis Jerdone to Flowerdewe & Norton, September 8, 1758, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, II.
^88 Robert & Robert Bogle & Scott to Neil Jamieson, August 27, 1767, Papers of Neil Jamieson, VIII, p. 1800.
^89 David Ross to John Hook, January 7, 1772, John Hook Papers.
^90 Thomas Jett to Clay & Midgley, September 2, 1769, Letterbook of Jett, Jerdone Papers.
^91 Francis Jerdone to Charles Gore, June 2, 1756, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, II.
^92 Francis Jerdone to Capt. Robert Craford, April 28, 1758, Ibid, II.
^93 Calvin B. Coulter, "The Virginia Merchant" (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Princeton University, 1944), pp. 105 ff.
^94 Robert Pleasants to Joshua Fischer & Sons, March 12, 1773, Letterbook of Robert Pleasants.
^95 James Robinson to John Turner, Fauquier, April 22, 1769, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^96 Roger Atkinson to Lyonel & Samuel Lyde, September 20, 1770, Letterbook of Roger Atkinson.
^97 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, April, 1773, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^98 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," p. 105.
^99 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, June 28, 1768, Letterbook of Harry Piper. "… as the weather is still favourable (if many Ships does not come in) Tob[acc]o. may probably rather fall than rise---"
^100 N. F. Cabell, "Some Fragments of an Intended Report on the Post Revolutionary History of Agriculture in Virginia," with Notes by E. G. Swem, William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XXVI (1918), pp. 145-168. Cabell, writing in nineteenth century, quotes "one of our elder and wiser brethren, … one well versed in our history" as maintaining that "planters would thus soon come under bonds to those who were the sole purchasers of their produce; who bought it at their own price, and charged exorbitant profits for the goods and wares given in exchange." (p. 151).
^101 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, June 1, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^102 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, April 27, 1773, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^103 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, April 1770, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^104 Edith E. B. Thomson, "A Scottish Merchant in Falmouth in the Eighteenth Century," XXXIX (1931), p. 117.
^105 James Robinson to William Henderson, October 10, 1769, Letter-book of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^106 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 260-263.
^107 Francis Jerdone to Speirs & Brown, December 15, 1757, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, II.
^108 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, November 25, 1767, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^109 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," pp. 106-108.
^110 William Johnston to Neill Buchanan, October 16, 1738, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, I.
^111 David Ross to John Hook, July 8, 1773, John Hook Papers.
^112 On the other hand, many stores charged a higher price for merchandise sold on credit, as well be explained more fully in Chapter III. The situation was similar in many ways to that in the automobile business in the 1950's, where the list price of a new automobile is "padded" to permit the dealer to give a higher price for the used car traded in. The planter received a lower price when he sold for cash, but he also purchased his goods for less when he paid cash.
^113 James Robinson to Jno Nielson, August 19, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^114 Francis Jerdone to Speirs & Hugh Brown, February, 10, 1757, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, II.
^115 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant" p. 108.
^116 James Robinson to John Turner, April 11, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^117 James Robinson to William Henderson, February 12, 1770, Ibid., I.
^118 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, January 8, 1773, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^119 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, July 1, 1773, Ibid.
^120 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, November 25, 1769, Ibid. The Scottish factors sometimes took a similar view of the buyers for English houses. James Robinson urged the Cuninghame storekeeper at Cabin Point to make a purchase before the next Meeting, "for I much draid the Operations of those English purchasers at that Court." James Robinson to William Henderson, April 9, 1770, Letterbook of William Cuninghame, I.
^121 James Robinson to John Turner, April 22, 1769, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^122 See Craven, Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1606-1860, pp. 65-68. James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, April 29, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II, in which Robinson recognizes the labor factor involved in the switch from tobacco to grains.
^123 Robert Donald to John Hyndman, November 24, 1773, Public Record Office, T. 79-19.
^124 Charles Steuart to John Mayne, February 24, 1752, Letterbook of Charles Steuart .
^125 Roger Atkinson to Lyonel & Samuel Lyde, August 25, 1772, Letter-book of Roger Atkinson.
^126 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, April 29, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^127 William Aitchison to Charles Steuart, May 15, 1774, Charles Steuart Papers, MS 5208, p. 198.
^128 Charles Steuart to Benjamin Walker, September 29, 1756, Letter-book of Charles Steuart. Gray, Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, I. pp. 292-293.
^129 Ibid., I. pp. 180-182. Arthur Morson to Neil Jamieson, December 6, 1764, Papers of Neil Jamieson, IV, p. 891.
^130 Neil Jamieson to Robert Alexander, May 11, 1781, Chalmers Collection (New York Public Library). Dunnage is material used to prevent damage to the cargo.
^131 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," pp. 55-57.
^132 E. Lipson, The Economic History of England (3 vols.; London: Adam & Charles Black, 1948), Vol. II, pp. 461-464.
^133 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 252, who cites PRO CO 16/1.
^134 Invoice of Sundries Shipped by Neil Jamieson & Compy on Board the Schooner Potby Capt Anderson by order and for Account and Risque of Messrs. Henderson & Phillips Mercht. in St Christophers, June 9, 1766, Papers of Neil Jamieson, VII, p. 1461.
^135 This description of the West Indian trade of Virginia is based upon a reading of the incoming correspondence of Neil Jamieson, particularly for the period from 1765-1770, Papers of Neil Jamieson, passim. For a general picture of trade between North America and the West Indies, see Richard Pares, Yankees and Creoles: The Trade Between North America and the West Indies before the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956)/ James B. Hedges: The Browns of Providence Plantations: Colonial Years (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), chapter 2, presents a detailed analysis of the trade of a Rhode Island merchant family to the West Indies.
^136 Charles Steuart to Andrew Armour, February 14, 1752, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I.
^137 Fergusson, Murdock & Company to Neil Jamieson, April 8, 1764, Papers of Neil Jamieson, IV, pp. 701-702/
^138 Mayne & Company to Neil Jamieson, August 19, 1769, Ibid., X, p. 2291.
^139 Robert & Robert Bogle & Scott to Neil Jamieson, October 24, 1764, Ibid., IV, pp. 861-862.
^140 Mayne & Company to Neil Jamieson, September 28, 1769, XI, pp. 2333-2336. Papers of Neil Jamieson.
^141 Edward Mayne to Neil Jamieson, October [?], 1772, XVI p. 3627; Otto Franck & Company to Neil Jamieson, October 26, 1772, Ibid., XVI, p. 3613. Baxter notes that the Hancocks of Boston dealt largely with Englishmen in foreign nations. — House of Hancock, p. 199.
^142 Robert & Robert Bogle & Scott to Neil Jamieson, October 24, 1764, Ibid., IV, p. 861-862.
^143 John Henry Noble to Neil Jamieson, September 3, 1772, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVI, p. 3560; John Henry Noble to John Glassford & Company, November 9, 1772, p. 3632-3633.
^144 Charles Steuart to [Mrs. Ninvielle and Company], January 9, 1752, and to Robert Scott, February 22, 1760, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I&II.
^145 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 252, who cites PRO CO 16/1.
^146 Mayne & Company to Neil Jamieson, July 25, 1769, Papers of Neil Jamieson, X, p. 2270.
^147 Tesson Welsh & Company to Neil Jamieson, June 26, 1770, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XII, p. 2591.
^148 March & Tilebein to Neil Jamieson, July 5, 1769, Ibid., X, p. 2261.
^149 Mayne & Company to Neil Jamieson, October 10, 1772, Ibid., XVI, p. 3595.
^150 Robert Pleasants to "Brother," December 7, 1773, Letterbook of Robert Pleasants (College of William and Mary Library).
^151 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, February 7, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^152 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), November 26, 1772.
^153 Stewart Duncan & Company to Neil Jamieson, October 3, 1765, Papers of Neil Jamieson, V, p. 1186.
^154 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, February 7, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^155 Robert Pleasants to "Brother," August 3, 1772, "Letters of Robert Pleasants," William and Mary Quarterly, 2nd ser., II, p. 268; and Robert Pleasants to James Pemberton, October 8, 1773, Letterbook of Robert Pleasants.
^156 William Holt to William Palfrey, March 2, 1765, Palfrey Papers (Harvard College Library).
^157 Virginia D. Harrington, The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), pp. 208-209.
^158 Adam Fleming to James Glassford, September 6, 1772, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVI, p. 3562.
^159 Adam Fleming to Neil Jamieson, January 15, 1771, XIII, ibid., XIII, p. 2875.
^160 James Somervell to Neil Jamieson, February 24, 1767, Papers of Neil Jamieson, VIII, p. 1890.
^161 Thomas Irving to Neil Jamieson, October 16, 1774, Ibid., XX, p. 4614.
^162 James Davidson to Neil Jamieson, February 9, 1765, Ibid.., V, p. 964.
^163 Archd. Omey to Neil Jamieson, December 12, 1767, Papers of Neil Jamieson, VIII, p. 1848.
^164 Francis Jerdone to Neil Buchanan, August 8, 1739, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, I.
^165 Adam Fleming to Neil Jamieson, January 15, 1770, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XI, p. 2429.
^166 Adam Fleming to James Glassford, March 1, 1772, Ibid., XV, p. 3311.
^167 Adam Fleming to Neil Jamieson, December 11, 1773, Ibid., XIX, p. 4306.
^163 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 126-130.
^169 Arthur Morson to Neil Jamieson, June 15, 1771, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XIV, p. 3089.
^170 Francis Jerdone to Neil Buchanan, [September] 20, 1739, Letterbook of Francis Jerdon, I.
^171 Robert Pleasants to "Brother," December 17, 1771, Letterbook of Robert Pleasants.
^172 Arthur Morson to Neil Jamieson, November 20, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XIX, p. 4277.
^173 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, February 7, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^174 Adam Fleming to James Glassford, December 4, 1772, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVI, p. 3673. Fleming stated: "I Observe what you Say [in your latest letter] with Regard to wheat Selling 4/ in Wmbg …"
^175 Robert Pleasants to "Brother," May 10, 1772, Letterbook of Robert Pleasants.
^176 Matthias Ellegood to Neil Jamieson, November 14 and November 24, 1764, Papers of Neil Jamieson, IV, pp. 881 and 886.
^177 Charles O. Hardy, "Market," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences X, pp. 131-133.
^178 See Leverett S. Lyon, "Commodity Exchanges," Ibid., IV, pp. 44-48.
^179 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 56.
^1 Lester V. Chandler, An Introduction to Monetary Theory (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940), pp. 1-20.
^2 Curtis P. Nettels, The Money Supply of the American Colonies Before 1720 (Madison: n.p., 1934), pp. 162-170. Oliver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), pp. 21-22.
^3 Nettles, Money Supply of the American Colonies, pp. 11-13, 282-283.
^4 Nettels, Money Supply of the American Colonies, pp. 44, 230-231.
^5 Ibid., pp. 232-233. A debt of 60 shillings, for example, was equivalent to 12 spanish dollars when the latter was worth 5 shillings, but to only 10 dollars when it was valued at 6 shillings.
^6 As Nettels points out, this device was used as a type of economic warfare among the commercial centers. "The first effect of an act raising the shilling value of pieces of eight was to attract them from places where lower rates were in force. Apparently, prices of local products did not rise so abruptly as the alteration of money rates was affected. Thus, for a short time, the possessor of a piece of eight could buy more American produce with it where rates were high than where rates were low." Ibid., pp. 232-233.
^7 Ibid., pp. 242-248.
^8 Nettels, Money Supply of the American Colonies, p. 242. Ray A. Foulke, The Sinews of American Commerce (New York: Dun & Bradstreet, 1941), p. 32.
^9 J. Wright, The American Negotiator, or the Various Currencies of the British Colonies in America (London: J. Smith, 1765; 3d editor), p. lxxvi.
^10 R.C. Nicholas to John Norton, November 4, 1769, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, p. 109.
^11 R.C. Nicholas to John Norton & Son, March 17, 1773, p. 307.
^* The milled dollar was rated in Sterling at 4 shillings 6 pence.
^12 William Z. Ripley, The Financial History of Virginia, 1609-1776 (New York: Columbia College, 1893), pp. 130-133. Charles J. Bullock, Essays on the Monetary History of the United States (New York: Macmillan Company, 1900), pp. 17, 20. The price of gold was fixed in Virginia in 1700 at 5 shillings per pennyweight. (Twenty penny-weight constituted one ounce.)
^13 Nettels, Money Supply of the American Colonies, p. 172.
^14 Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, pp. 111-114, 131.
^15 R.C. Nicholas to John Norton, Nov. 30, 1772, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, p. 287.
^16 Nettels, Money Supply of the American Colonies, p. 209.
^17 Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, p. 146.
^18 Nettels, Money Supply of the American Colonies, pp. 210-214.
^19 Hening, Statutes, IV, p. 252.
^20 Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, pp. 150-151.
^21 Leslie Van Horn Brock, "Currency of the American Colonies, 1700-1764: A Study in Colonial Finances and Imperial Relations" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1941), pp. 13-14.
^22 Ibid., pp. 510-512.
^23 Nettels, Money Supply of the American Colonies, pp. 250-277.
^24 Theodore Thayer, "The Land-Bank System in the American Colonies," Journal of Economic History, XIII (1953), pp. 145-159.
^25 E. James Ferguson, "Currency Finance: An Interpretation of Colonial Monetary Practices," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., X (1953), pp. 160, 171-173.
^26 Nettels, Money Supply of the American Colonies, p. 255.
^27 Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, p. 154.
^28 Ferguson, "Currency Finance," loc. cit., p. 173.
^29 Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, pp. 154-155.
^30 Charles Steuert to William Bowden, date torn [between October 15-November 20, 1755], Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I.
^31 Brock, "Currency of the American Colonies," p. 475.
^1. Bore 5% interest.
^2. Payable for public debts, but not legal tender.
^3. Payable to "such persons as may be willing to receive the same."
^32 Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, pp. 161-162. The provincial government was required to pay for tobacco stored in public warehouses and lost as a result of natural catastrophe, such as the floods which occurred in the spring of 1771.
^33 "Paper Money in Virginia," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st. ser., XX (1912), p. 228. Brock, "Currency of the American Colonies," pp. 507-508.
^34 "Paper Money in Virginia," p. 228.
^35 Land-banks, which were public institutions, faced this kind of difficulty in colonies where they were established. In one case, the director of the Pennsylvania land-bank reported that a large sum of money belonging to the loan office was stolen from his home, but it was believed that the director had invented the robbery story to hide the fact that he had used the money himself. Thayer, "The Land-Bank System," loc. cit., p. 158.
^36 David J. Mays, Edmund Pendleton, 1721-1803: A Biography (2 vols.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), I, pp. 174-223, is the most complete account available of this affair.
^37 Ibid., I, p. 175.
^38 Ibid., I, p. 184.
^39 Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, p. 161.
^40 Robert Pleasants to Joshua Fisher & Sons, March 12, 1773, Letterbook of Robert Pleasants.
^41 R. Donald to Charles Steuart, February 10, 1773, Charles Steuart Papers, MS. 5028, p. 29.
^42 James Parker to Charles Steuart, February 20, 1773, Ibid., MS. 5028, p. 32.
^43 Ibid. The "Great needy Ones" obviously referred to the same group of planters who had benefitted from Speaker Robinson's private emissions of paper money.
^44 Robert C. Nicholas to Purdie and Dixon, editors of the Virginia Gazette, September 22, 1773, "Paper Money in Virginia," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XX (1912), p. 256.
^45 Robert C. Nicholas to John Norton & Sons, March 17, 1773, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, p. 307.
^46 William Allason to Robert Allason, October 29, 1767, Letterbook of William Allason, Allason Papers (Virginia State Library).
^47 Brock, "Currency of the American Colonies," p. 557. See Ferguson, "Currency Finance," loc. cit., pp. 153-157, for a brief review of the historiography of paper money in the colonial period.
^48 See Baxter, pp. 16-34, for the similar ways in which Massachusetts merchants conducted "Trade Without Money." Some of the terms used here are those applied by Baxter to the Hancock's trade.
^49 William Holt to William Palfrey, February 26, 1768, Palfrey Papers.
^50 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," pp. 105-106. The use of English money as a measure of value was characteristic in all of the colonies during both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even where and when money was not available as a medium of exchange. For example, a set of seventeenth-century account books of a Springfield, Massachusetts, merchant, in the possession of the Connecticut Valley Historical Society, show that "each item, including labor, was assessed a monetary value." The study of these records is described in a story in the New York Times, July 1, 1956.
^51 Ledger of Francis Jerdone, 1751-1752 (Colonial Williamsburg), p. 22.
^52 H. H. Langston to Neil Jamieson, June 21, 1766, Papers of Neil Jamieson, VII , p. 1482.
^53Baxter, House of Hancock, pp. 24-26.
^54 John Smith to Neil Jamieson, April 17, 1769, Papers of Neil Jamieson, X, p. 2188.
^55 R. G. Hawtrey, "Credit," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, IV, pp. 545-550.
^56 Arthur S. Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants in the Eighteenth Century" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1927), p. 56.
^57 Foulke, Sinews of American Commerce, preface.
^58 N. S. B. Gras, Business and Capitalism: An Introduction to Business History (New York: F. S. Crofts & Company, 1939), pp. 141-151.
^59 Paul L. Ford (ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson (12 vols; New York: G. T. Putnam's Sons, 1904-1905), V, p. 28.
^60 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 285.
^61 Jerman Baker to Duncan, February 15, 1764, William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XII (1904), p. 242.
^62 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 284- 286.
^63 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," p. 73.
^64 William Reynolds to John Norton, August 10, 1772, Letterbook of William Reynolds, I.
^65 Charles Steuart to Mr. Cradock, February 1, 1755, and to Scott, Pringle, Cheap & Company, June 25, 1763, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, II.
^66 Thomas Lilly to Neil Jamieson, March 23, 1774, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XIX, p. 4423-4424.
^67 W. Russell to Neil Jamieson, January 17, 1770, Ibid., XI, p. 2433.
^68 Virginia Gazette or, Norfolk Intelligencer, June 30, 1774, carried six advertisements offering imported goods, two of which specified that sales would be made for cash.
^69 Wilbur C. Plummer, "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXVI (1942), pp. 390-391. As Plummer notes, most colonial businessmen kept records of their credit sales only. The example cited was one of the few exceptions.
^70 Catherine Rathell to John Norton, January 31, 1772, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, pp. 217-218.
^71 Prentis Papers (University of Virginia). The store, which was owned by a group of local investors, operated as William Prentis and Company until the mid-1760's and as John Prentis & Company from then to 1774, when it became Robert Prentis & Company.
^72 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," p. 73.
^73 William Reynolds to Richard Lawrence, December 23, 1773, Letter-book of William Reynolds, II.
^74 Plummer, "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia," loc. cit., p. 394.
^75 Ibid., p. 395.
^76 Joshua Johnson to Wallace & Davidson, December 2, 1771, Letter-book of Wallace, Davidson & Johnson (Maryland Hall of Records).
^77 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," pp. 76-77.
^78 Dan McCallum to Neil Jamieson, August 7, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVIII, p. 4133.
^79 Contract of Neil Jamieson and James Campbell, October 5, 1765, Ibid., V, p. 1189.
^80 Plummer, "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia," loc,cit., p. 394.
^81 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," pp. 107-108.
^82 James Robinson to William Cuninghame, October 8, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^83 Foulke, Sinews of American Commerce, p. 74.
^84 The Junto in Philadelphia, for example, provided informal facilities for the communication of credit information on local business concerns. Two of the regular subjects discussed at the meetings were: "Hath any citizen in your knowledge failed in business lately, and what have you heard of the cause?" and "Have you lately heard of any citizen's thriving well, and by what means?" Ibid., p. 66.
^85 Alexander Elmly to Neil Jamieson, March 18, 1764, Papers of Neil Jamieson, III, p. 670.
^86 Charles Steuart to Dr. Hone, August 14, 1754, Letterbook of Charles Steuart.
^87 William Reynolds to Richard Lawrence, June 8, 1774, Letterbook of William Reynolds, II.
^88 Mary Rathell to John Norton, January 31, 1772, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, pp. 217-218.
^89 Max Robinson to Neil Jamieson, July 15, 1765, Papers of Neil Jamieson, V, p. 1119.
^90 William Holt to William Palfrey, May 29, 1772, Palfrey Papers.
^91 "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," pp. 58-60.
^92 William Reynolds to Farell & Jones, July 12, 1774, Letterbook of William Reynolds, I.
^93 Harry Piper to Isaac Littledale, October 26, 1768, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^94 Robert Beverly to Samuel Athawes, February, 1773, Letterbook of Robert Beverly (Library of Congress).
^95 James Robinson to Robert Paton, February 8, 1773, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^96 Ballard & Newton to Neil Jamieson, November 19, 1766, Papers of Neil Jamieson, VII, p. 1622.
^97 Beverley Dickson to John Norton, May 10, 1773, Brock Collection (Huntington Library).
^98 Plummer points out that in Philadelphia: "The customary practice appears to have been for the debtor to pay in whole or in part as he was able if he were poor and at his convenience if he were a man of means." "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia," pp. 396-397.
^99 W. Goosley to Neil Jamieson, August 16, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVIII, p. 4143.
^100 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," p. 83.
^101 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," pp. 295-296.
^102 William Palfrey to John Cocke, March 21, 1764, Palfrey Papers. Palfrey was a Boston merchant who made regular voyages to Virginia in the 1760's.
^103 James Robinson to William Cuninghame, October 8, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^104 Carter Braxton to Neil Jamieson, September 2, 1765, Papers of Neil Jamieson, V, p. 1166.
^105 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 276-279
^106 Charles Steuart to William Bowden, June 23, 1755, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I.
^107. Hening, Statutes, IV, 542.
^108 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," pp. 237 ff. The principal exception in the county court system, as Coulter points out, was York County, whose court processed debt cases promptly and impartially, because of the influence exerted in the county by the mercantile Nelson family.
^109 R. Donald to Charles Steuart, February 10, 1773, Papers of Charles Steuart, MS 5028, p. 29.
^110 John Tazewell to John Norton, July 12, 1770, John Norton & Sons Papers (Colonial Williamsburg).
^111 Ibid.
^112 George L. Chumbley, Colonial Justice in Virginia: The Development of a Judicial System, Typical Laws and Cases of the Period (Richmond: Dietz Press, 1938), p. 97.
^113 John Snelson to Cust & Innes, September 1, 1766, Letterbook of John Snelson (Southern Historical Collection).
^114 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, July 23, 1767, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^115 Arthur Morson to Neil Jamieson, July 11, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVIII, p. 4088.
^116 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," pp. 77, 287.
^117 William Johnston to Neill Buchanan, October 4, 1739, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, I. Jerdone succeeded Johnston in the operation of this store after the latter's death in 1741.
^118 Price, "Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade," loc. cit., p.197.
^119 William Reynolds to John Norton, February 8, 1773, Letterbook of William Reynolds, I.
^120 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 282-283.
^121 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia", pp. 280-281.
^122 William Johnston to Neill Buchanan, October 4, 1739, of Francis Jerdone, I.
^123 Plummer, "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia," pp. 397-398. Three other enterprises had losses of 8.3 per cent, 10.2 per cent, and 12.5 per cent.
^124 Plummer, "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia," loc. cit., pp. 395.
^125 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, October 12, 1772, Letterbook of harry Piper.
^126 Beverly Dickson to John Norton, May 10, 1773, Brock Collection.
^127 Arthur H. Cole, "Evolution of the Foreign-Exchange Market of the United States," Journal of Economic and Business History, I (1929), pp. 386, 389, which stresses the importance of produce and money shipments, as well as bills of exchange, to settle foreign debts in the eighteenth century. This is quite different from the romantic and fanciful notion, set forth in a textbook on foreign trade in a section entitled "Foreign Trade without Foreign Exchange," that "as recently as the first part of the nineteenth century-foreign trade on a fairly large scale was carried on virtually by barter, thus circumventing the foreign exchange problem … Although each country had its own currency system the trader avoided that difficulty with the aid of universally accepted specie. Certainly foreign exchange rates were of no consequence to such a trader; his problem was strictly one of commodity prices." Frank A. Southard, Jr., Foreign Exchange, Practice and Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1940), p. 75.
^128 James W. Angell, "Foreign Exchange," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences VI, p. 358.
^129 Mair, Book-keeping Methodiz'd, p. 193.
^130 Ibid., p. 196
^131 Mair, Book-keeping Methodiz'd, p. 199. Usance on bills from London to France, for example, was thirty days; from London to Spain and Portugal, two months; and from London to Genoa and other cities in Italy, three months. There was some difference among the different colonies in regard to length of sterling bills. In Philadelphia, for example, bills on London were customarily drawn at forty days after sight. Anne Bezanson, Robert D. Gray, and Miriam Hussey, Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935), p. 320.
^132 Mair, Book-keeping Methodiz'd, p. 197.
^133 Ibid., p. 198.
^134 Ibid., pp. 201-202. Mair notes a third reason for protesting, "for better security," in cases when "there is good Reason to fear that he [the drawee] may turn insolvent before the Time of Payment."
^135 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," p. 48, n. 53.
^136 Charles Steuart to William Bowden, February 15, 1757, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, II.
^137 Ibid., pp. 29, 51.
^137 John Norton to John Hatley Norton, February 24, 1772, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, pp. 219-223.
^139 Charles Steuart to Mr. Cheslyn, June 17, 1754, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I.
^140 Charles Steuart to John Maynard, May 13, 1752, I.
^141 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchants," pp. 29-30.
^142 Charles Steuart to William Bowden, May 10, 1757, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, II.
^143 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, November 15, 1768, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^144 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, May 28, 1770, ibid ,
^145 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, August 16, 1771, ibid.
^146 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, June 15, 1772, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^147 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, October 24, 1773. Ibid.
^148 Charles Steuart to Anthony McCulloch, February 6, 1760, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, II.
^149 Charles Steuart to Anthony Bacon & Company, December 19, 1761, ibid., II.
^150 Cole, "Evolution of the Foreign-Exchange Market of the United States," loc. cit., pp. 387-389.
^151 Governor Fauquier to Lords of Trade, November 3, 1765, Public Record Office, C0/1331.
^152 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," p. 265.
^153 Mair, Book-keeping Methodiz'd, p. 188.
^154 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, June 8, 1769, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^155 John Snelson to Edward Harford, Jr., August 9, 1767, Letter book of John Snelson.
^156 Williamson, "Credit Relations Between Colonial and English Merchats", pp. 25, 48.
^157 Francis Jerdone to Speirs & Brown, December 10, 1756, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone.
^158 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 289
^159 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, January 27, 1770, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^160 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, May 28, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^161 Francis Jerdone to Speirs & Brown, April 28, 1759, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, II.
^162 Capel & Osgood Hanbury in Acc[oun]t. Current with Richard Corbin as Receiver [General], Corbin Papers (Colonial Williamsburg). Corbin remitted £5,708 in 1762 (all of which was in bills of exchange except £331), £6,582 in 1763 (including £200 in English and Spanish money), £7,707 in 1764 (including £91 in English money), £8,368 in 1765 (including £65 in English currency), and £4,725 in 1766.
^163 Richard Corbin to John Roberts, February 8, 1766, Letterbook of Richard Corbin.
^164 Robert C. Nicholas to John Norton, January 13, 1769, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, p. 83.
^165 Ibid.
^166 Robert C. Nicholas to John Norton, November 4, 1769, ibid., p. 109.
^167 Robert C. Nicholas to John Norton & Son, May 16, 1771, ibid., 157.
^168 Robert C. Nicholas to John Norton, January 13, 1769, ibid., p. 83.
^169 Robert C. Nicholas to John Norton & Sons, September 10, 1773, John Norton & Sons. p. 349
^170 Robert C. Nicholas to John Norton & Son, March 17, 1773, ibid., p. 305.
^171 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), June 29, 1769.
^172 Roger Atkinson to "Brother," May 16, 1772, Letter book of Roger Atkinson.
^173 James Robinson to David Walker, July, 1770, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^174 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, June 1, 1772, William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^175 Thomson, "Scottish Merchant in Falmouth," loc. cit., p. 230.
^176 Roger Atkinson to Lyonel & Samuel Lyde, April 28, 1770, Letter-book of Roger Atkinson.
^177 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, April 12, 1773, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^178 William Reynolds to John Norton, August 10, 1772, Letterbook of William Reynolds, I.
^179 Francis Jerdone to Capt. Archibald Crawford, October 14, 1762, Letterbook of Francis Jerdone, II.
^180 Francis Jerdone to Speirs & Brown, April 28, 1759, Letter book of Francis Jerdone, II.
^181 Francis Jerdone to Speirs & Brown, April 22, 1759, II.
^182 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," p. 268.
^183 William Aitchison to Charles Steuart, March 15, 1770, Charles Steuart Papers, MS 5040, p. 91.
^184 James Robinson to Andrew Chalmer, September 28, 1771, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^185 James Robinson to William Henderson, October 8, 1771, I.
^186 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, January 7, 1769, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^187 William Allason to Robert Allason & John Gray, May 2, 1769, Letterbook of William Allason.
^188 William Aitchison to Charles Steuart, January 2, 1770, Charles Steuart Papers, MS 5026, p. 1.
^189 John Snelson to Edward Harford, December 10, 1770, Letterbook of John Snelson.
^190 Ripley, Financial History of Virginia, pp. 139-140.
^191 James Robinson to William Cuninghaime & Company, August 5, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^192 Ibid.
^193 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, October 24, 1773, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^194 Charles Steuart to George Keith, September 16, 1751, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I.
^195 James Balfour to John Norton, November 5, 1769, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, p. 110.
^196 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, November 29, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^197 R. C. Nicholas to Virginia Gazette, July 16, 1773, "Paper Money in Virginia," loc. cit., p. 235.
^198 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, May 28, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^199 Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, November 25, 1768, Letter-book of Harry Piper.
^200 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, June 25, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^201 Brock, "Currency of the American Colonies," pp. 477-479.
^202 Charles Steuart to Scott, Pringle, Cheap & Company, July 13, 1762, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, II.
^203 Brock, "Currency of the American Colonies," p. 476 and Figure XVI, "Virginia Bills of Credit (War Issues) and Exchange Rates, 1755-1773" following p. 475. Ferguson, "Currency Finance," loc. cit., pp. 160-161. Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," pp. 264-269.
^204 R. C. Nicholas to John Norton, November 12, 1771, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, p. 204.
^205 James Parker to Charles Steuart, December 31, 1771, Charles Steuart Papers, MS 5027, p. 82.
^206 Bezanson and others, Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania, p. 317.
^207 T. S. Ashton, An Economic History of England: The 18th Century (London: Nethuen & Company, 1955), pp. 167-200.
^208 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, May 28, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^209 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," pp. 52-54.
^210 Francis Jerdone to Speirs & Brown, February 10, 1757, Letter-book of Francis Jerdone, II.
^211 Adam Fleming to Neil Jamieson, April 15, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVII, pp. 3946-3947.
^212 Charles Steuart to Anthony McCulloch, February 6, 1760, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, II.
^1 William Carr of Dumfries generally sold bills of exchange for Harry Piper of Alexandria at the Meetings. See, e. g., Harry Piper to Dixon & Littledale, May 12, 1770, Letterbook of Harry Piper.
^2 Roger Atkinson to John Ponsonby, November 5, 1770, Letterbook of Roger Atkinson.
^3 Neil Jamieson to James Glassford, April 26, 1771, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XIII, p. 2968.
^4 Roger Atkinson to Lyonel & Samuel Lyde, May 6, 1771, Letterbook of Roger Atkinson.
^5 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, May 7, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^6 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), May 21, 1772.
^7 Roger Atkinson to "Brother," July 21, 1772, Letterbook of Roger Atkinson.
^8 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, August 5, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^9 Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), November 26, 1772. As indicated previously, this agreement provided that those engaged in business in the colony "give their Attendance … in Person, or by their Representatives, on the twenty fifth Days of January, April, July, and October."
^10 Neil Jamieson to James Glassford, February 1, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVII, p. 3802.
^11 James Glassford to Neil Jamieson, August 3, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVIII, 4130-4131.
^12 Thomas Nelson, Jr., to John Norton & Son, August 7, 1773, Letterbook of William and Thomas Nelson.
^13 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 297.
^14 Neil Jamieson to James Glassford, October 27, 1773, Papers of Neil Jamieson, XVIII, p. 4247.
^15 Neil Jamieson to Neil Jamieson & Company, November 28, 1773, XIX, pp. 4290-4291.
^16 James Robinson to William Cuninghame & Company, May 28, 1774, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^17 Robert Pleasants to "Dear Friend," February 19, 1774, Letterbook of Robert Pleasants.
^18 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 312.
^19 Isaac S. Harrell, Loyalism in Virginia (Philadelphia: n.p., 1926), pp. 26-28.
^20 George F. Norton to John Hatley Norton, July 8, 1772, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, p. 254. "Mr. Bogle Junr. [of one of the firms which failed] not being able to struggle with the Fire of adversity threw himself out of a window on the second Story (in a phrenzy) he happily fell in such an attitude as only to bruise his latter end."
^21 James Robinson to John Nielson, August 19, 1772, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, I.
^22 John Norton to John Hatley Norton, March 20, 1773, Mason (ed.), John Norton & Sons, pp. 308-314.
^23 John Norton to John Hatley Norton, August 6, 1772, p. 266.
^24 Coulter, "Virginia Merchant," p. 52.
^25 Charles Steuart to Walter Tullidesti, September 23, 1751, Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I.
^26 Coakley, "Virginia Revolutionary Commerce," p. 52.
^27 Thomson, "A Scottish Merchant in Falmouth," loc. cit., p. 233.
^28 Coakley, "Virginia Revolutionary Commerce," pp. 77-78.
^29 James Parker to Charles Steuart, August 2, 1770, Charles Steuart Papers, MS 5040, p. 101.
^30 Virginia Gazette, June 28, 1770, in Virginia Historical Register, III (1850), pp. 17-24.
^31 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 328.
^32 James Robinson to "Dear Sir," July 11, 1770, Letterbook of William Cuninghame & Company, II.
^33 James Parker to Charles Steuart, August 2, 1770, Charles Steuart Papers, HS 5040, p. 101.
^34 James Robinson to William Henderson, July 10, 1770, Letterbook of William Cuninghame, I.
^35 James Parker to Charles Steuart, August 5, 1770, Charles Steuart Papers, MS 5040, pp. 103-107.
^36 Coakley, "Virginia Revolutionary Commerce," pp. 81-82.
^37 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1918), p. 236. Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," pp. 333-334.
^38 Virginia Gazette (Rind), October 31, 1771.
^39 Thomson, "Merchant in Virginia," p. 301. To complicate problems, disastrous floods struck Virginia in the spring of 1771, causing many thousands of pounds worth of damage.
^40 Norfolk Committee of Correspondence to Baltimore Committee of Correspondence, June 3, 1774, Virginia Boxes, Miscellaneous (New York Public Library).
^41 Robert G. Albion, The Rise of New York Port [1815-1860] (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939, pp. 23-37. Nearness to the open sea was a most important advantage in the day of sailing ships, because of the difficulty of maneuvering on rivers. Norfolk lay thirty miles from the ocean, while New York, Boston, and Charleston were seventeen miles, and Philadelphia 100 miles from open sea.
^42 Wertenbaker, Norfolk, pp. 34-36.
^43 Alexander Cuningham to Neil Jamieson, November 27, 1765, Papers of Neil Jamieson, VI, p. 1260.
^44 Robert G. Albion, "Colonial Commerce," in Harold F. Williamson (ed.), Growth of the American Economy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1947), pp. 78-79.
^45 Mr. Muro to Neil Jamieson, May 13, 1761, Papers of Neil Jamieson, I, p. 43.
^46 Wertenbaker, Norfolk, p. 45.
^47 Gras, Introduction to Economic History, p. 209.
^48 Wertenbaker, Norfolk, p. 31.
^49 Wertenbaker, Norfolk, pp. 37-38.
^50 Memorial of William Orange, American Loyalist Transcripts (New York Public Library), LVIII, pp. 270-295.
^51 Letterbook of Charles Steuart, I and II, passim.
^52 Governor Fauquier to Board of Trade, January 30, 1764, quoted in Wertenbaker, Norfolk, p. 38 n.
^53 Neil Jamieson to Robert Alexander, May 11, 1781, Chalmers Collection (New York Public Library).
^54 Quoted from Charles Steuart Letterbook 1751-1763.
^55 Arthur Morson to Neil Jamieson, June 1, 1770, Papers of Neil Jamieson XII, p. 2592.
^56 E.g., Adam Fleming to Neil Jamieson, January 6, 1772, ibid., XIV, p. 3236; April 15, 1773, ibid., XVII, pp. 3946-3947; July 16, 1774, ibid., XX, p. 4553.
^57 Robert & Robert Bogle & Scott to Neil Jamieson, June 3, 1764, Papers of Neil Jamieson, IV, p. 752.
^58 James Parker to Charles Steuart, July 5, 1769, Charles Steuart Papers, MS 5025, p. 140.
^59 Memorial of William Calderhead, American Loyalist Transcripts, LVIII, pp. 238-257. Calderhead, who was manager of the distillery, and Neil Jamieson each held three shares in the firm: the rest had one share each.
^60 Papers relating to business affairs and losses of James Parker, Parker Family Papers (Liverpool Record Office), bundle 16.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

* Indicates that microfilm copy of manuscripts is located in Research Department, Colonial Williamsburg, Inc.

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  • *Jamieson, Neil. Papers, 1757-1789 (23 vols.) [Library of Congress]
  • *Jerdone, Francis. Ledger, 1751-1752 [Colonial Williamsburg]
  • Jerdone, Francis Letterbooks, 1738-1744, 1756-1763, 1769-1776 (3 vols.) (Volume III is the Letterbook of Thomas Jett.) [College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia] 150
  • Miscellaneous letters and documents [Public Record Office, London]
  • *Nelson, Thomas and William letterbook, 1766-1775 [Virginia State Library]
  • North Papers Exports and imports from and to the ports of North America, January 5, 1772-January 5, 1773. [Bod1eian Library, Oxford, England]
  • *Norton, John, & Sons Papers, 1752 (1768-1800) 1827 [Colonial Williamsburg]
  • *Norton-Savage-Dickson Papers in Brock Collection [Huntington Library, San Marino, California]
  • *Palfrey, William Papers, 1763-1774 [Harvard College Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts]
  • *Parker Family Papers, 1759-1835 [Liverpool Record Office, Liverpool England]
  • *Piper, Harry Letterbook, 1767-1775 [University of Virginia]
  • Pleasants, Robert Letter-book, 1771-1778 [College of William and Mary]
  • *Prentis, William Papers, 1733-1780 [University of Virginia]
  • *Reynolds, William Letterbooks, 1771-1785 (2 vols.) [Library of Congress]
  • *Snelson, John Letterbook, 1757-1775 [Southern Historical Collection, Chapel Hill, North Carolina]
  • *Steuart, Charles Letterbooks, 1751-1763 (2 vols.) [Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania]
  • *Steuart Charles Papers , 17 58-1798 (21 vols.) [Rational Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, Scotland} 151
  • *Virginia Boxes, Miscellaneous Norfolk Committee of Correspondence to Baltimore Committee of Correspondence [New York Public Library]
  • *Wallace, Davidson, & Johnson letterbooks, 1771-1777 (2 vols.) [Maryland Hall of Records, Annapolis, Maryland ]

PRINTED SOURCE MATERIALS

  • Anderson's Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce … Revised by Mr. Coombe. 6 vols, Dublin: P. Byrne, 1790.
  • "The Association in Williamsburg, in 1770," Virginia Historical Register, III (1850), pp. 17-24.
  • Carman, Harry J. (ed.) American Husbandry. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
  • "A French Traveller in the Colonies, 1765." American Historical Review, XXVI (1921), pp. 726-747; XXVII (1922), pp. 70-89.
  • Hening, William H. (ed.) The Statutes at Large: being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia. 13 vols. Richmond, 1810-1823.
  • "Jerman Baker to Duncan Rose." William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XII (1904), pp. 237-242.
  • "Journal of Alexander Macaulay." William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XI (1902), pp. 180-191.
  • Koch, A. & Peden, W., (eds.) The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson. New York: Modern Library, 1944.
  • "Letter Book of Francis Jerdone." Wil1iam and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XI (1902), pp. 153-160, 236-242.
  • "Letters of Robert Pleasants, of Curles," William and Mary Quarterly, 2d ser., I (1921), pp. 107-113; II (1922), pp. 257-275.
  • Mair, John, Book-keeping Methodiz'd: or a Methodical Treatise of Merchant-Accompts…, Edinburgh: W. Sands, 1741.
  • Mason, Frances N. (ed.) John Norton & Sons: Merchants of London and Virginia Richmond: Dietz Press, 1937.
  • "The Meeting of the Merchants, Held in Williamsburg, in 1770." Virginia Historical Register, III (1850), pp. 79-83.
  • "Paper Money in Virginia," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XX (1912), pp. 237-262. 152
  • [Tucker, St. George.] "A Letter to the Rev. Jerediah Morse." William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., II (1894), pp. 181--203.
  • Virginia Gazette (Parks), 1736-1750.
  • Virginia Gazette (Hunter), 1751-1761.
  • Virginia Gazette (Royle), 1761-1765.
  • Virginia Gazette (Purdie & Dixon), 1766-1775.
  • Virginia Gazette (Rind), 1766-1774.
  • Virginia Gazette or, Norfolk Intelligencer, 1774-1775.
  • Wright, J. The American Negotiator, or the Various Currencies of the British Colonies in America. London: J. Smith, 1765. 3d ed.
153

SECONDARY WORKS

  • Albion, Robert G. The Rise of New York Port (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939.
  • Angell, James W. "Foreign Exchange." Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 15 vols. New York: Macmillan Company, 1930-1935. VI.
  • Ashton, T. S. An Economic History of England: The 18th Century. London: Methuen & Company, 1955.
  • Barbour, Violet. Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950.
  • Baxter, W. T. The House of Hancock: Business in Boston, 1724-1775. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.
  • Bert, Harry D. "Merchants and Mercantile Life in Colonial Philadelphia, 1748-1763." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1941.
  • Bezanson, Anne; Gray, Robert D.; and Hussey, Miriam. Prices in Colonial Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1935.
  • Bridenbaugh, Carl. Seat of Empire: The Political Role of Eighteenth-Century Williamsburg. Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg, 1950.
  • Brock, Leslie Van Horn. "Currency of the American Colonies, 1700-1764: A Study in Colonial Finances and Imperial Relations." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1941.
  • Bruce, Philip A. Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan Company, 1895.
  • Bullock, Charles J. Essays on the Monetary History of the United States. New York: Macmillan Company, 1900.
  • Cabell, N. F. "Some Fragments cf an Intended Report on the Post Revolutionary History of Agriculture in Virginia," with Notes by E. G. Swem. William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XXVI (1918), pp. 145-168.
  • Chandler, Lester V. Introduction to Monetary Theory. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940.
  • Channing, Edward, A History of the United States. 6 vols. New York: Macmillan Company, 1930-1938.
  • Chumbley, George L. Colonial Justice in Virginia: The Development of a Judicial System, Typical Laws and Cases of the Period, Richmond: Dietz Press, 1938.
  • Clark, G. N. Guide to English Commercial Statistics, 1696-1782. London: Royal Historical Society, 1938.
  • Coakley, Robert W. "Virginia Commerce during the American Revolution." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1949. 154
  • Cole, Arthur H. "Evolution of the Foreign-Exchange Market of the United States." Journal of Economic and Business History, I (1929), pp. 386-421.
  • Coulter, Calvin B. "The Virginia Merchant." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1944.
  • Craven, Avery O. Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1606-1860. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1926.
  • Davis, Joseph S. Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917.
  • Dickerson, Oliver M. The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951.
  • East, Robert A. "The Business Entrepreneur in a Changing Colonial Economy, 1763-1795." Tasks of Economic History (Supplemental Issue of The Journal of Economic History), VI (1946), pp. 16-27.
  • Ferguson, E. James. "Currency Finance: An Interpretation of Colonial Monetary Practices." William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., X (1953), pp. 153-180.
  • Ford, Paul L. The Works of Thomas Jefferson 12 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904-1905.
  • Foulke, Ray A. The Sinews of American Commerce. New York: Dun & Bradstreet, 1941.
  • Fox Bourne, H. R. English Merchants: Memoirs in Illustration of the Progress of British Commerce. 2 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1866.
  • Goodwin, Rutherfoord. A Brief & True Report Concerning Williamsburg in Virginia. Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg, 1940.
  • [Gourlay, James]. A Glasgow Miscellany: The Tobacco Period in Glasgow, 1707-1775. N.P.: N.P., N. D.
  • Gras, N. S. B. Business and Capitalism: An Introduction to Business History. New York: F. S. Crofts & Company, 1939.
  • Gray, Lewis C. History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860. 2 vols. New York: Peter Smith, 1941.
  • Harper, Lawrence A. The English Navigation Laws. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.
  • Harrell, Isaac F. Loyalism in Virginia. Philadelphia: N.P., 1926. 155
  • Harrington, Virginia B. The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935.
  • Hawtrey, R. G. "Credit". Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, IV.
  • Hedges, James B. The Browns of Providence Plantations: Colonial Years. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
  • Kulischer, Joseph. "Fairs," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, VI.
  • Lipson, E. The Economic History of England. 3 vols. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1948.
  • Lyon, Leverett S. "Commodity Exchanges." Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, IV.
  • Mays, David J. Edmund Pendelton 1721-1803: A Biography. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
  • Middleton, Arthur P. Tobacco Coast: A Maritime History of Chesapeake Bay. Newport News: The Mariners Museum, 1953.
  • Nettels, Curtis P. "The Economic Relations of Boston, Philadelphia, and New York, 1680-1715." Journal of Economic and Business History, III (1931), pp. 185-215.
  • Nettels, Curtis P. The Money Supply of the American Colonies Before 1720. Madison: N .P., 1934.
  • Pares, Richard. Yankees and Creoles: The Trade Between North America and the West Indies before the American Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.
  • Pirenne, Henri. Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956.
  • Plummer, Wilbur C. "Consumer Credit in Colonial Philadelphia." Magazine of History and Biography, LXVI (1942), pp. 385-409.
  • Price, Jacob. "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707-1775." William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., XI (1954), pp. 179-199.
  • Ripley, William Z. The Financial History of Virginia, 1608-1776. New York: Columbia College, 1893.
  • Schlesinger, Arthur H. The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution. New York: Columbia Press, 1918.
  • Sellers, Leila. Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934.
  • Stigler, George J. The Theory of Price, New York: Macmillan Company, 1952.
  • Tatham, William. An Historical and Practical Essay on the Culture and Commerce of Tobacco. London: Vernor & Hood, 1800. 156
  • Thayer, Theodore. "The Land-Bank System in the American Colonies." Journal of Economic History, XIII (1953), pp. 145-159.
  • Thomson, Edith E. B. "A Scottish Merchant in Falmouth in the Eighteenth Century." Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XXXIX (1931), pp. 108-117, 230-238.
  • Thomson, Robert P. "The Merchant in Virginia, 1700-1775". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1955.
  • Tyler, Lyon G. "Williamsburg — The Old Colonial Capital." William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XVI (1907), pp. 1-65.
  • Usher, Abbott P. The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943.
  • Voke, A. F. "Accounting Methods of Colonial Merchants in Virginia." Journal of Accountancy, XLII (1926), pp. 1-11.
  • Wertenbaker, Thomas J. Norfolk: Historic Southern Port. Durham: Duke University Press, 1931.
  • Williamson, Harold F. (ed.) Growth of the American Economy. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1947.
  • Wyckoff, Vertrees J. Tobacco Regulation in Colonial Maryland. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936.

Note: This part of the bibliography is not intended to be exhaustive of all of the books, articles, and dissertations about economic life in eighteenth-century Virginia. Rather, it merely lists the secondary works cited in the body of the report.